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ABSTRACT
The diffuse runoff of agricultural nutrients, also called agricultural nonpoint
source pollution (NPS), is a widespread threat to freshwater resources. Despite decades of
research into the processes of eutrophication and agricultural nutrient management,
social, economic, and political barriers have slowed progress towards improving water
quality. A critical challenge to managing agricultural NPS pollution is motivating
landowners to act against their individual farm production incentives in response to
distant ecological impacts. The complexity of governing the social-ecological system
requires improved understanding of how policy shapes farmer behavior to improve the
state of water quality. This dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to
NPS pollution governance by examining the impacts of water quality policy design on
farmer nutrient management decision making and behavior.
In the first study, I theoretically contextualize the issue of agricultural NPS
pollution in the broader discussion of environmental public goods dilemmas to suggest
that an increased focus on the link between policy and behavior can improve sustainable
resource management. I propose two empirical approaches to study the policy-behavior
link in environmental public goods dilemmas: 1) explicit incorporation of social
psychological and behavioral variables and 2) utilization of actor mental models, or
perceptions of the world that guide decision making, to identify behavioral drivers and
outcomes. In the second and third studies, I then use these approaches to examine how
water quality policies for agricultural NPS collectively change farmer behavior to reduce
nutrient emissions. The second chapter uses a quantitative, survey-based approach to
examine the relationship between mandatory policy design and behavior change in New
Zealand. I find that a shift to mandatory policy is not immediately associated with
increased adoption of nutrient management practices, but the mandatory policy design is
important for potential future behavior change and long-term policy support. In the third
study, I combine qualitative methodology with network analysis of qualitative data to
examine a spectrum of agricultural NPS pollution policies in Vermont, USA and Taupo
and Rotorua, New Zealand. I use farmer mental models to examine behavior change
within each of the regions, the perceived drivers of behavior change and perceived
outcomes of the policy. In this study, farmers across all three regions cite mandatory
water policy as a key behavioral driver, but in each region, policy design interacts with
the social-ecological context to produce distinct patterns of behaviors and perceived
outcomes. Taken together, this dissertation demonstrates that agricultural NPS pollution
policy design must consider the interactions between policy and other social-ecological
behavioral drivers in order to achieve long term water quality improvements.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem Description
Diffuse runoff of the nutrients nitrogen and phosphorus in agricultural lands,
also known as nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, is a widespread and persistent challenge
to water quality across the globe. Agriculture is the largest source of nitrogen and
phosphorus to freshwater systems and nutrient enrichment of rivers and lakes is one of
the most common impairments of surface waters (Foley et al., 2005; V. H. Smith &
Schindler, 2009). The excessive nutrient loading of surface waters has broad ranging
social and ecological impacts. These impacts include damage to fish populations,
decreases in biodiversity, economic hardships for businesses and threats to drinking water
supplies (Bennett, Carpenter, & Caraco, 2001; Carpenter et al., 1998). Many of these
impacts are expected to increase with accelerating global climate change
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015; Zia, 2013), setting up an urgent
societal and environmental need to find workable solutions for NPS pollution.
While much is known about the biogeochemistry of NPS pollution, less is
known about the social, economic, and political dynamics that contribute to the
persistence and expansion of the problem (Carpenter et al., 1998; McDowell et al., 2015;
Rissman & Carpenter, 2015). As with many environmental public goods, there are
competing individual and community level incentives for the provisioning of water
quality (Ostrom, 2005). Farmers across a watershed are incentivized to maximize
production and nutrient emissions through many small (or not so small) emissions, over
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time and across a large geographical area. Any one individual emission may be
imperceptible, but scaled up the impacts can be dramatic (L. E. D. Smith & Porter, 2010).
Since Hardin’s (1968) classic “Tragedy of the Commons,” researchers and
practitioners have theorized and debated institutional designs to avoid this social dilemma
of collective degradation of a resource (Agrawal, 2003; Baland & Platteau, 1996;
Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Institutions, as used here, refer to the formal or informal rules,
strategies or norms that constrain human interaction and behavior (North, 1990; Ostrom,
2005). This body of literature highlights the potential for institutional design, whether
political, market-based, or normative in nature, to align competing individual and group
incentives to create sustainable management regimes (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom,
2004; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Ostrom, 2005).
Drawing from the perspective of institutional design, a breadth of potential
options exist to align individual and community incentives for mitigating agricultural
NPS pollution. These range from education and capacity building interventions to
incentive payments, to market-based trading instruments, to traditional command-andcontrol rule-based mechanisms (Drevno, 2016). Institutional design for managing
agricultural NPS must also consider the complexity and uncertainty of the spatial and
temporal dynamics of a watershed. The transport of land applied nutrients to receiving
waters is characterized by stochastic climate events, heterogeneous land and soil
characteristics, legacy nutrients within receiving water bodies and time lags in the system
(Moss, 2008; Withers, Neal, Jarvie, & Doody, 2014). In addition to this biophysical
complexity, agricultural landowners’ farm business decisions are governed by broader
2

market trends for agricultural products and individual social and cultural priorities (L. E.
D. Smith & Porter, 2010).
Despite the broad range of available tools to address the problem, little progress
has been made in improving nutrient impaired waterbodies across the globe (Dowd,
Press, & Los Huertos, 2008; Rissman & Carpenter, 2015), suggesting that we lack an
understanding of which institutional designs will work in a given watershed context.
Specifically, we lack an understanding of two critical institutional interactions for NPS
pollution governance: 1) the fit of a policy intervention within its social, economic and
environmental context, and 2) the connection between policy design and farmer decision
making. In this dissertation I seek to examine these two institutional interactions to
advance understanding of governing agricultural NPS pollution through combining
theories of institutional design and analysis with social psychological theories of decision
making. I will ground the study in watersheds in New Zealand and Vermont, USA. These
two regions both feature high levels of farming and are facing similar environmental
challenges, but that have distinct and different governance approaches to agricultural
NPS pollution. In order to collectively govern individual farm nutrient emissions across a
watershed, it is important to gain a better understanding of how institutional designs
shape farm management behavior.

1.2. Theoretical Background
Numerous studies have examined governance approaches for agricultural NPS
pollution. These approaches have mostly aligned with two theoretical angles: farmer
decision making (Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, & Floress, 2012; Conner, Miller, Zia, Wang,
3

& Darby, 2016; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007; Prokopy, Floress, Klotthor-Weinkauf, &
Baumgart-Getz, 2008a) and environmental policy (Drevno, 2016; Horan & Ribaudo,
1999; Shortle & Horan, 2013). The first angle seeks to understand motivating factors for
individual decision making. This research has relied upon behavioral theories, such as the
diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 1962) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)
(Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011), or econometric studies to identify and define
predictive factors for the adoption of water quality practices (Blackstock, Ingram, Burton,
Brown, & Slee, 2010; Burton, 2004; Conner et al., 2016; Edwards-Jones, 2006). From
this research we know that a wide variety of social, economic and farm system variables
are important factors in whether or not a farmer will adopt management strategies that
reduce negative environmental impacts, including the degradation of water quality. In a
meta-analysis of studies examining farmers adoption of Best Management Practices,
Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) found “access to and quality of information, financial
capacity and being connected to an agency or local networks of farmers or watershed
groups” to be the strongest determinants of adoption.
The environmental policy approach to examining governance of agricultural
NPS pollution focuses on the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of policy interventions in
internalizing water quality deterioration negative externalities within agricultural
production (Drevno, 2016; Pretty et al., 2001; Shortle, Abler, & Horan, 1998; Shortle &
Horan, 2013). This microeconomic perspective models the trade-offs between different
institutional designs based on the assumption that farmers are utility-maximizing agents
that will change behavior given the appropriate mix of costs and benefits. In this line of
4

research, Shortle and Horan (2013) examine the current state of water quality policy
instruments and conclude that, due to the complexity of NPS pollution, second-best
institutional designs are required. These second-best designs feature trade-offs in
efficiency and equity as compared to theoretically optimally-efficient policies. They do
suggest that water quality trading and cap-and-tax institutions show promise for resolving
some of the information and transaction cost challenges associated with NPS pollution
(Shortle & Horan, 2013). Drevno (2016) also examines the potential for policy tools to
address agricultural NPS pollution and concludes that effective water quality institutional
design will require a mix of policy instruments, local participation and political will.
While literature examining both farmer behavior and environmental policy have
greatly expanded the water quality policy instrument tool kit and our knowledge of the
factors farmers balance in their management decisions, there are large gaps in
understanding how individuals respond to institutional designs in a given watershed
context. From the behavioral and econometric approach, studies have failed to identify a
consistent list of predictor variables for pro-environmental farm management (BaumgartGetz et al., 2012; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007; Prokopy et al., 2008a). The policy
approach appears to offer a similar lack of consensus in the best approach to designing an
institutional intervention. Neither perspective takes into account that “farmers’
conservation behaviors are more than individual decisions about isolated practices; they
are scale dependent and influenced by issues of space, institutions and time” (Reimer et
al., 2014, p. 57A).

5

There are limited number of studies that have examined the interaction of
environmental policy institutional design and farmer decision making. A few studies have
focused on the differential response of individuals to voluntary and mandatory water
quality regimes (Barnes, Toma, Willock, & Hall, 2013; Barry, King, Larson, Lennox, &
others, 2010; Kara, Ribaudo, & Johansson, 2008). The results of these studies show no
clear trend and there is a lack of acknowledgement for market-based alternatives. For
policy makers to design and implement effective policy solutions, a clear understanding
of the interaction between institutional design and behavior is critical.
Institutional analysis provides a vehicle to examine the formal institutional rules
of a water quality policy intervention in conjunction with the other formal and informal
institutions that govern individual behavior within a watershed. As mentioned above, the
nature of agricultural NPS pollution as a social dilemma sets up a scenario in which it is
to society’s benefit to collectively shift behavior in a way that may not be beneficial at
the individual level (Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010). The challenge in designing an
intentional institutional intervention for this purpose is that for the intervention to achieve
the desired outcome (e.g. farm management change to improve water quality), it must fit
well with the pre-existing institutions that exist to structure social interaction and
behavior in a given setting (Goodin, 1998). As Young highlights, “institutions play a role
in both causing and addressing problems that arise from human-environment
interactions,” hence the fit of the institution to the biophysical context, the interplay of
the institution with other existing institutional arrangements, and the scale at which the
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institution is implemented for the given problem are all important elements in the success
of the institutional intervention (Young, King, Schroeder, Galaz, & Hahn, 2008, p. xiiv).
Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, and its
expansion and evolution into the social-ecological systems (SES) framework provide a
theoretical basis from which to examine the institutional governance of interactions
between actors (Ostrom, 2009, 2011). Typically, in the application of Ostrom’s
frameworks to understand collective action in natural resource regimes, individual
behavior is assumed to be boundedly rational, in that individuals intend to behave
rationally but have limited information, cognition and attention processing abilities
(Ostrom, 2011; Poteete et al., 2010; Simon, 1972). In cases like agricultural NPS
pollution where there are high degrees of uncertainty in resource dynamics, which makes
measurement, monitoring and enforcement of policy institutional interventions difficult,
there is an increased need to understand individuals’ internal decision-making processes.

1.3. Dissertation Overview
In this dissertation, I further the understanding of SES governance through
examining the role and impact of institutional design on farmer nutrient management
decision making and behavior through an integrated institutional analysis and social
psychological approach. First, I do this theoretically in the second chapter through
building the case for an expansion of Ostrom’s (2007, 2009) SES Framework to facilitate
the study of environmental public goods dilemmas, like declining water quality from
agricultural NPS pollution. Then in the third and fourth chapters I build on the theoretical
approaches laid out in the second chapter to empirically examine farmer decision making
7

and behavior across a number of agricultural NPS pollution policy regimes. In this
section I highlight the key topics, questions and approaches used in each chapter of the
dissertation.
In the second chapter I contextualize the issue of agricultural NPS pollution in the
broader discussion of environmental public goods dilemmas and the need for greater
analysis of these dilemmas to lead to their sustainable management. Water quality decline
from agricultural NPS pollution is used as an example case throughout the first chapter to
define the challenges to analyzing these types of regimes, as well as potential paths
forward. I suggest that Ostrom’s (2007, 2009) SES framework provides a foundational
structure for this type of analysis. However, the SES framework has yet to fill this
analytical need for environmental public goods dilemmas. I propose that a critical gap in
applications of the framework lies in the treatment of actor decision making, and in
particular the lack of attention paid to how institutions shape behavior. I conclude by
proposing two potential pathways for increasing attention paid to the institution-behavior
link in applications of the SES framework. These analytical pathways are: 1) through
explicitly incorporating social psychological and behavioral variables into the analysis of
environmental public goods dilemmas and 2) by studying actor mental models to identify
the most salient components to actor behavior and perceived outcomes.
In my third and fourth chapters, I then pursue these two analytical pathways to
examine how water quality policy institutions for agricultural NPS collectively change
farmer behavior and reduce nutrient emissions in a given watershed context. The third
chapter takes a quantitative, survey-based approach to compare farmer decision making
8

and behavior across agricultural NPS pollution policy regimes in New Zealand. This
study examines the relationship between policy design and behavior change to evaluate
potential for water quality improvement in the future. Further, this study incorporates the
social psychological Theory of Planned Behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011) to examine
alignment between farmer decision making and their values and beliefs as a basis for
evaluating potential for long term policy support.
In the fourth chapter I use the SES framework as the basis to examine farmer
mental models within a spectrum of agricultural NPS pollution regimes in Vermont, USA
and Taupo and Rotorua, New Zealand. Here, I use farmer mental models to examine
behavior change within each of the regions, perceived drivers of behavior change and
perceived outcomes of the policy. The qualitative, interview-based study allows for an
in-depth examination of the fit of each policy within the biophysical context in terms of
behavior change and the interplay of the policy with existing social and ecological
dynamics in the watershed. I examine the distinct pattern of behaviors and outcomes that
emerge in each policy context to draw conclusions for agricultural NPS pollution policy
design.
Finally, in the fifth chapter, I offer concluding thoughts on the results of the
dissertation as a whole and insights to pursue for future research. Ultimately, through
increasing our knowledge on the contextual and psychological drivers of farmer response
to water quality policies, this dissertation seeks to reduce barriers to the management of
agricultural NPS pollution and inform effective policy design. Furthermore, this
dissertation aims to inspire other researchers to do likewise in the study of environmental
9

public goods dilemmas more broadly guided by an expanded SES Framework that
incorporates a greater focus on actor decision making and behavior.
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CHAPTER 2: STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTION-BEHAVIOR LINK IN
THE SES FRAMEWORK TO FACILITATE ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PUBLIC GOODS DILEMMAS
Author: Courtney Hammond Wagner

2.1. Abstract
Many environmental challenges take the form of environmental public goods
dilemmas, including climate change, water quality deterioration and biodiversity loss.
There is a great need for analysis of these challenges to better inform the design of
governance institutions for sustainable resource management. The social-ecological
systems (SES) framework provides a foundational structure for analyzing the
sustainability of complex, multi-scale environmental challenges. However, in application,
the SES framework has struggled to facilitate analysis of environmental challenges
beyond common-pool resource (CPR) regimes and the emergence of community-based
governance institutions. In this paper, I propose that one way to facilitate the application
of the SES framework to environmental public goods dilemmas is to incorporate a greater
focus on the link between institutions and behavior.
After introducing the SES Framework, I examine attributes of environmental
public goods dilemmas that differentiate them from CPR regimes. These include the lack
of a behavior-reinforcing link, multi-actor and multi-resource system dynamics, higher
levels of uncertainty and complexity, and lack of built-in social capital. Then I suggest
that these attributes also increase the need to study a broader suite of potential
governance institutions. I propose that one way to address both of these challenges is to
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incorporate the study of the psychological drivers of individual behavior and decisionmaking into the SES Framework. I link the attributes of environmental public goods with
the need for an increased focus on actor decision making and behavior. Then I explore a
sampling of psychological and behavioral concepts to show their potential to improve our
understanding of system dynamics within environmental public goods dilemmas. Finally,
I propose revisions to the SES Framework to facilitate this increased focus on the
institution-behavior link. Incorporating psychological and behavioral theory into the SES
framework to strengthen the institution-behavior link is a promising approach to allow for
the study of institutional interventions for environmental public goods. Ultimately, a
better understanding of which institutions promote behavior change within and across
environmental public goods regimes can improve the sustainability of these systems.

2.2 Introduction
Many of the regional and global environmental challenges we face are
environmental public goods dilemmas, including climate change, ocean acidification,
declining water quality, and biodiversity loss (Rockström et al., 2009; Shortle &
Uetake, 2015). Because of the scale and persistence of many environmental public
good dilemmas, there is a critical need to improve our understanding of how
institutions can support sustainable resource regimes in environmental public goods
dilemmas. To improve our understanding of these systems we need analysis of
environmental public good dilemmas to identify generalizable trends or design
principles for robust management regimes (Ostrom, 2005). The social-ecological
systems (SES) framework provides a foundational structure for this type of analysis,
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specifically for analyzing and improving the sustainability of complex environmental
dilemmas (Ostrom, 2007, 2009). The framework acknowledges the context-specific
nature of human decisions and behavior within environmental dilemmas, and the
existence of influences and feedbacks between the ecological and the social (Ostrom,
2011). However, the SES framework has yet to fill this analytical need for
environmental public goods dilemmas. I propose that a critical gap in applications of
the framework lies in relying on behavioral assumptions about actor decision making,
in particular the lack of attention paid to how institutions shape decision making and
behavior.
In an effort to inspire transdisciplinary analysis of environmental public goods
dilemmas using the SES framework, I propose to improve the link between governance
institutions and actor behavior within the framework. Thus far, applications of the SES
framework have been limited to the study of common pool resource (CPR) regimes and
the conditions that lead to the emergence of community-based natural resource
management (Thiel, Adamseged, & Baake, 2015). In this paper, I will suggest that the
attributes of environmental public goods dilemmas, in particular those that differentiate
them from CPR dilemmas, increase the relevance of actor behavior and decision
making for social-ecological outcomes compared to the role of actor behavior in CPR
regimes. I identify these attributes as the lack of a behavior-reinforcing link, multi-actor
and multi-resource system dynamics, higher levels of uncertainty and complexity, and
lack of built-in social capital.
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An expanded focus on the link between governance institutions and behavior
within the SES framework will allow analysts to examine how institutions shape socialecological outcomes in environmental public goods dilemmas, in light of their unique
attributes. Methodologically, the expanded SES framework that I am proposing for
environmental public goods dilemmas includes 1) designing research questions around
the institution-behavior link, 2) incorporating new variables into the SES framework on
drivers, influences and psychological components of actor decision-making, and 3)
utilizing actor mental models to identify the salient components of the social-ecological
dilemma. The expanded SES framework allows the analyst to draw from the literature
of social psychology, cognitive psychology and behavioral economics to investigate
behavior under different institutions rather than rely on strong behavioral assumptions.
This approach allows for the examination of diverse types of institutional arrangements
in a broader range of environmental resource dilemmas, including environmental public
goods.
In section one, I begin by reviewing the vision behind the SES framework and
outline its current constraints. Then, in the second section, I explore the specific
challenges in the management of environmental public goods for implementation of the
SES framework. In section three I build on the exploration of environmental public
goods to suggest the need for examining diverse institutional arrangements with the
SES framework to motivate collective action. In section four I establish the importance
of the institutional-behavioral link to address these challenges. Finally, in section five, I
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propose revisions to the SES framework to strengthen researchers’ ability to examine
the institutional-behavioral link in public goods dilemmas using the framework.

2.3. SES Framework Vision & Constraints
The seemingly simple question of which institutions promote sustainability under
which social-ecological contexts is hugely complex. Variation in scale, scope, resource
attributes, community attributes, market forces, and governance regimes, among other
factors, makes drawing concrete conclusions and proposing solutions challenging.
Furthermore, researchers analyzing these systems from different disciplinary perspectives
use different terminology, use different scales of analysis and focus on different
variables, which makes drawing system-wide transdisciplinary conclusions difficult
(Agrawal, 2003). The SES framework was proposed as a solution to this problem,
following the success of a research program on CPR regimes (Poteete et al., 2010). The
framework provides a theoretical basis from which to examine interactions between
ecological resource dynamics, underlying biophysical systems, governance regimes and
human behavior (see Figure 2-1 below) (Ostrom, 2009, 2011). These first-order
variables, and the second- and third- order variables nested below them, are organized to
guide research design and data collection so that analysts can communicate across cases
and begin to form theories about how SES work (for more detailed introduction to the
SES framework see Ostrom (2007, 2009)). The long-term goal of the SES Framework is
to enable research that can recognize “which combination of variables tends to lead to
relatively sustainable and productive use of particular resources systems operating at

19

specific spatial and temporal scales and which combination tends to lead to resource
collapses and high costs for humanity” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 15183).

Figure 2-1. The SES framework with example elements of watershed agricultural nonpoint source
pollution dilemma adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom (2014)

Thus far, the SES framework has struggled to live up to this initial vision.
Applications of the SES framework still lie mostly within the realm of CPR regimes
(Thiel et al., 2015), despite the intention for the framework to branch out to different
types of resource regimes (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). Additionally, the framework has
been applied primarily in community-based natural resource management contexts, such
as when and under what conditions will resource users self-organize to address resource
degradation or overharvesting (Thiel et al., 2015). Yet, the framework has the potential to
examine a much wider breadth of governance questions.
Theoretically the SES Framework centers around individual behavior and the
“conscious choices” made by individuals or collaborative groups (McGinnis & Ostrom,
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2014, para. 5). The SES framework “does not dictate a particular model of decisionmaking; instead it prompts the analyst to explicitly identify what participants value; what
resources, information, and beliefs they have; what their information-processing
capabilities are; and what internal mechanisms they use to decide on strategies” (Ostrom,
Cox, & Schlager, 2014, p. 274). However, in application, very few studies explicitly
identify actor perceptions that drive behavior and how actors perceive costs and benefits
(Thiel et al., 2015). This may be in part because, as Ostrom identifies, “accurate and
reliable measures of users’ perceived benefits and costs are difficult and costly to obtain,
making it hard to test theories based on users’ expected net benefits” (Ostrom, 2009, p.
420). Therefore, in applications of the SES Framework, analysts tend to overlook
individual perceptions and values that drive decision-making, despite the fact that these
lie theoretically at the core of the framework. This relates to a broader challenge for the
SES Framework, which lies in the lack of a common understanding in what it means to
apply the SES Framework (Ban & Cox, 2017).
In the following section, drawing from the vision and constraints laid out here, I
explore the attributes of environmental public goods dilemmas that present challenges for
applications of the SES framework.

2.4. Environmental Public Goods Dilemmas
In the disciplines of economics and political science, public goods are often defined
as non-subtractable (e.g. one person’s use of the good does not subtract from another
person’s) and non-excludable (e.g. it is difficult or impossible to exclude others from
accessing the resource) (Ostrom, 2005). Another related way to consider environmental
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public goods dilemmas is that they are, at their core, environmental externalities.
Environmental externalities occur when a behavior in a specific domain results in an
output outside or external to the domain in question. This external output results in the
deterioration or degradation of an environmental good shared by all. One example of an
environmental public good dilemma, which I will draw on for illustrative purposes
throughout this paper, is water quality deterioration from agricultural nonpoint source
(NPS) pollution. In this dilemma, farmers spread nutrient fertilizers on their fields to
increase agricultural yield, but as a result, these added nutrients may runoff into nearby
waterbodies and decrease water quality of rivers and lakes. Environmental public goods,
such as water quality, differ from the traditionally studied common-pool resource
regimes, such as irrigation networks, fisheries and forests, on a few important
characteristics. These are: 1) a lack of a clear resource-behavior reinforcing link and 2)
they typically feature larger geographic scales, greater complexity and more uncertainty.
2.4.1. Public Goods Dilemmas Lack of Behavior-Reinforcing Link
CPR dilemmas also feature externalities at their core, but with an important
distinction. Within CPR dilemmas, overuse of resource results in degradation of that
same resource for all. Therefore, an individual who overharvests, say overfishes in a
vulnerable fishery, will ultimately see reductions in their own ability to fish because of
aggregate overfishing. As shown in Figure 2-2 below, this can be conceptualized as a
negative reinforcement mechanism. Hardin described this situation in his classic Tragedy
of the Commons paper: “each pursuing his own best interest” will bring “ruin to all”
(Hardin, 1968, p. 1244).
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Figure 2-2. Resource system and resource use relationships in common-pool resource and
environmental public good. Note the lack of feedback between undesirable outcomes in public good
example.

This feedback link, in which the behavior in question ultimately affects the ability
to engage in that same behavior in the future, is not present with environmental public
goods, as show in Figure 2-2. Rather, environmental public goods dilemmas often feature
many different types of actors using or exploiting the same resources for different
purposes (Young, 2002). In the water quality example, farmers use nutrients to produce
agricultural products, and citizens more broadly enjoy water quality for recreation,
aesthetics or drinking water, as shown in Table 2-1. Importantly, the decline in water
quality, in and of itself, will not limit a farmer’s ability to apply fertilizer on the farm.
This is true even if a farmer is a part of the population that also enjoys water quality.
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This lack of a behavior-reinforcement link creates challenges for characterizing
the resource system within the SES Framework because it is unclear which resource
system dynamics drive behavior and at which scales. Environmental public goods
dilemmas generally do not feature the one-to-one resource system-resource unit link that
is characteristic of most CPR regimes (e.g., Resource unit: Fish; Resource system:
Fishery). Hinkel et al.’s (2015) diagnostic approach for identifying the resource units,
resource system, and provisioning and/or appropriation problem using the SES
Framework is not as clear cut for a public goods dilemma without this one-to-one link.
Environmental public goods dilemmas typically feature at least two nested resource
systems, and often many more.
Table 2-1 shows the relevant action situation for the example case of declining
water quality in agricultural watersheds. Connected to this action situation are two
distinct levels of resource system, resource units, activities, benefits and actors. The first
resource system is that of the focal behavior: the farm in which a farmer is applying
fertilizer to produce agricultural products. The second resource system is the higher-level
system that absorbs the negative externality of the behavior in the first system: the
watershed, which receives nutrients from the land into local waterbodies. Similarly, the
resource units are related, but distinct. One is units of nitrogen and phosphorus, and the
other is the nutrient capacity of the waterbody in the watershed. Additional units of
nitrogen and phosphorus added to farms will overwhelm the nutrient capacity of the
waterbody but will not prevent farmers from adding additional nutrients to their farms in
the future.
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Table 2-1. Characterization of appropriation and provisioning action situations for agricultural
watersheds. Structure adapted from Hinkel et al. (2015).
Actors

Farmers

Rural
and
Urban
Citizens

Benefits

Activity

Stock of
Resource
Units (RU)

Subtractability

Resource System
(RS)

Sale of
crops/
products

Extracting
nutrients from
soil and
adding
nutrients
through
fertilizer/feed

Nitrogen and
Phosphorus

No

Farm system

Water
quality

Aesthetics,
Recreation,
drinking
water, local
economic

Nutrient
assimilative
capacity of
the
waterbody

Yes

Watershed
(biogeochemical
processes)

Action
situation (s)

Addition of
nutrients at the
farm scale
creates a water
quality
provisioning
problem at the
watershed
scale

Importantly, what I am characterizing here as an environmental public goods
dilemma could also be described as a number of other types of environmental dilemmas
depending on perspective and context. As Young (2002, p. 142) suggests, “environmental
problems are socially constructed in the sense that there are almost always a number of
plausible ways to think about them, and the choice of conceptualizations is likely to have
significant consequences for the interests of one or more members of the relevant group.”
For example, the issue of declining water quality in agricultural watersheds also bears
elements of a CPR regime: the nutrient capacity of the waterbody can be viewed as a
CPR that farmers and other landowners use (and overuse) for disposing of wastes (e.g.,
excess nutrients applied to fields or sewage). Here again, Young (2002, p. 142) suggests
that “the extent to which any given environmental concern is properly construed as a
CPR problem is likely to be more a matter of how we look at it than a fact of life.”
2.4.2. Complexity and Uncertainty in Public Goods Dilemmas
Environmental public goods dilemmas tend to be larger scale, featuring greater
levels of complexity and uncertainty than small-scale CPR regimes. All SES share
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elements of complex systems, including feedbacks, nonlinear dynamics and emergent
system properties (Meadows & Wright, 2008). Yet, in larger scale systems, with multiple
interacting resource systems and multiple user groups, greater levels of complexity can
further complicate the search for sustainable resource management regimes, by
complicating our ability to understand system dynamics and measure system outcomes.
To illustrate the complexity and uncertainty typical of public goods dilemmas, I
return to the example case of water quality deterioration in agricultural watersheds. The
biogeophysical movement of NPS nutrient pollution throughout a watershed is dependent
on both deterministic factors, such as land use and soil composition, and random,
weather-related processes. Phosphorus and nitrogen molecules, whether originating from
agricultural, urban storm water, or streambank erosion, are extremely difficult to
differentiate at the watershed scale (Moss, 2008). Because of this, it is very difficult and
costly to attribute nutrient pollution to a source (Horan & Ribaudo, 1999). The
measurement of pollution is generally done at the watershed scale as farm scale models
and measurements have high degrees of uncertainty (Moss, 2008). Yet, even at the
watershed scale, modeling of diffuse nutrient pollution involves combining hydrological,
geological, meteorological, land cover classification and other data sources across a
complex, heterogeneous landscape, with trade-offs in specificity and uncertainty.
Typically, at the watershed scale, government agencies and researchers use a variety
of modeling techniques to estimate and attribute NPS pollution contributions to
individual sectors, such as agriculture. Management strategies within or across polluting
sectors then rely on proxy measurements such as ambient water quality, or production26

related measures, such as input-use or practice implementation (Horan & Ribaudo, 1999).
Furthermore, at the watershed scale, the transport of nutrients from farms to waterbodies
may face significant time lags in the system, again resulting in a high degree of
uncertainty and unpredictability (Meals, Dressing, & Davenport, 2010). These attributes
of the agricultural NPS pollution, while unique to this specific problem, are
representative of the broader challenges of uncertainty and complexity that make many
environmental public good dilemmas more difficult to address than small-scale CPR
regimes.
The challenges outlined here, namely the multi-resource, multi-actor, highly
complex and uncertain nature of public good dilemmas, make them difficult to
characterize within the SES Framework. In particular, it is difficult to identify which
elements of the system are important to examine for motivating collective action, and
how to portray these systems given multiple potential ways to conceive of them. Here I
suggest, and will further describe in the fourth section below, the importance of focusing
on the actors within the system, drawing on their perceptions of the system to define the
relevant elements driving behavior and collective action. Before describing this proposal,
I first need to consider another important and related gap within the applications of the
SES Framework: the need to apply the SES Framework to examine a broader range of
institutional interventions for SES.

2.5. Examining Diverse Institutions to Motivate Collective Action
Many, if not most, SES issues are collective action problems. In collective action
problems individuals’ pursuit of their own self-interested welfare leads to collective
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suffering. In other words, all individuals would be better off if they worked together. The
collective action problem in agricultural nonpoint source pollution can be defined as:
each farmer’s individual pursuit of a maximum yield, realized through excessive nutrient
inputs, results in poor water quality that is shared by all farmers (and other residents of
the watershed). Overcoming collective action problems requires motivating individuals to
pursue the collective welfare (Olson, 1971; Ostrom, 1990). In the literature on
community-based natural resource management, collective action is often linked with
self-organized community management. This body of work, led by Ostrom and others,
aimed to suggest that community-based, self-organized governance systems are a viable,
potentially sustainable form of natural resource management. More broadly, communitybased natural resource management, or self-organized management of resource systems,
is just one type of institutional arrangement that can motivate collective action. Other
institutional arrangements for addressing collective action problems in SES include
market-based strategies, state-based strategies, or any combination of these options with
community-based strategies. According to Ostrom, institutional arrangements should be
context specific, hence the formation of the SES framework to guide analysis of which
institutions promote sustainable system outcomes under specific conditions (Ostrom,
Janssen, & Anderies, 2007).
The focus thus far on the emergence of community-based management using the
SES framework is just a narrow slice of the potential institutional arrangements that
could effectively manage resource systems. More broadly, there is a need to examine a
diversity of potential institutional arrangements in environmental dilemmas. This is
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especially the case within the study of environmental public goods dilemmas, where
community-based management strategies may not be the most effective or the most
efficient means to address the issue. Indeed, the traditional economics perspective
dictates that the state should intervene in the provision public goods because individuals
face incentives to freeride off the contributions of others (Singh et al., 2013).
Characterizing environmental public goods as dual- or multi-resource system dilemmas,
as I do above, illustrates an additional reason for this need: when compared to small-scale
CPR regimes, the structure of environmental public good dilemmas does not lend itself to
the emergence of social capital.
Small-scale CPR regimes typically consist of “individuals who observe on a daily
basis each other’s behavior and the impact of their actions on the resource” and,
furthermore, “the resource users and the public infrastructure providers are the same
individuals” (Anderies et al., 2004, para. 43). In environmental public goods dilemmas,
by contrast, these conditions that lead naturally to the building of social capital, such as
norms and trust, are not necessarily present. Social capital refers to the “idea that social
bonds and norms are important for people and communities” (Pretty, 2003, p. 1913). In
public goods dilemmas, resource users are not often the same as the public infrastructure
providers. Resource users may not be observing each other’s behavior on a daily basis.
Finally, it may be impossible to see the impact of each other’s behavior on the broader
resource system. Therefore, reciprocity, trust, norm creation, and repeated interactions
may not be feasible mechanisms to create sustainable resource management regimes.
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Take, again, the example of water quality declines in agricultural watersheds: a
farmer’s fertilizer use and nutrient management behavior takes place on her farm in
isolation. It is difficult for other farmers to observe her nutrient management actions.
Additionally, public infrastructure providers, such as employees of government water
resources agencies, are typically not farmers and do not interact with farmers on a regular
basis. It may be difficult for farmers to make the connection between regular nutrient
applications on their farm and broader water quality issues at the watershed-scale because
of the complexity challenges outlined in the previous section. Furthermore, water quality
issues may be less salient to those farmers who farm higher up in a watershed when they
don’t experience or witness water quality issues firsthand. Therefore, the rule and norm
creation, trust, reciprocity, and shared understanding may not exist amongst the farming
community, making self-organized collective action on water quality very difficult. This
suggests that there may be a place for other types of institutional interventions, such as
regulatory or market-based policies, to encourage or require collective farmer behavior
change to improve water quality. I propose that to investigate diverse institutional
arrangements using the SES framework, it is important to more closely examine this
institution-behavior link. This focus on how and why institutions shape behavior and
decision-making is what is needed to improve our understanding and management of
environmental public goods.

2.6. Expanding the Institutional-Behavior Link
An increased focus on actor decision making within the SES Framework, and in
particular, on the link between institutions and behavior, can facilitate its application to
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both environmental public good dilemmas and a broader diversity of institutional
arrangements. As described in the previous two sections, environmental public goods
dilemmas differ from CPR regimes, the archetypal application of the SES Framework, by
a number of factors, including the lack of a behavior-reinforcing feedback, multiple
resource systems and actor groups, complex and uncertain biophysical dynamics, and a
lack of key interactions that build social capital. These elements of environmental public
goods dilemmas increase the importance of understanding actor decision making and
behavior. In this section, I will first describe how an increased focus on decision-making
can improve the applicability of the SES Framework to environmental public goods
dilemmas and diverse institutional arrangements. Then I will describe a sampling of
social-psychological and behavioral theories of decision-making to demonstrate how
pulling from theory and models in these fields can improve our understanding of SES
system outcomes through incorporation into the SES Framework. In the last section of
this paper, I outline how to incorporate these theories and models into the SES
Framework.
2.6.1. The Critical Role of Actor Decision Making in SES
The SES Framework is designed around actor decision-making, but the decisionmaking processes, or at least actors perceptions of costs and benefits, themselves are
typically not empirically analyzed (Thiel et al., 2015). Actor decision-making and
behavior are important components of any SES because ultimately, actor behavior is a
key driver of both social and ecological outcomes, and moreover, one of the major
leverage points that humans have to intervene in SES. However, I propose that the
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attributes of environmental public goods dilemmas, as compared to CPR dilemmas, make
actor decision-making and behavior even more relevant for SES system outcomes.
As described above, public goods dilemmas lack the behavior-reinforcing link
present in CPR dilemmas as illustrated in Figure 2-2. This link in CPR dilemmas serves
as leverage to change self-interested actors’ behaviors. It is possible to design incentives
around this self-interest to motivate a behavior shift towards long-term individual (and
social) payoffs. This is, of course, not a simple shift, and much research has been
dedicated to designing incentives to solve this difficult problem (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom
et al., 2002; Poteete et al., 2010). However, the shift to sustainable resource management
for public goods dilemmas, which lack this behavior-reinforcing link, can be even more
difficult. Without this self-interested mechanism to motivate behavior change, there must
be another value-based motivator. A few possibilities include altruism, stewardship, and
deterrence from fees or penalties. Drawing again from the example of water quality and
agriculture, when water quality declines, there is nothing physically preventing farmers
from applying nutrients to their farms. It is possible that informing a farmer of the impact
of nutrient applications on the lake could inspire behavior change due to a farmer
identifying with stewardship values. Whether or not this is the case would have
implications for designing effective policy. Identifying and understanding what motivates
collective behavior in context-specific environmental public goods dilemmas is important
for the design of institutional interventions to change behavior.
The difficulty in defining behavioral motivation and incentives is further
exacerbated by the multi-resource, multi-actor nature of many environmental public
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goods dilemmas. With different actors, using a resource, or multiple-related resources
systems for different purposes, it is hard to decipher what the breadth of motivators are
for distinct actor groups/resource uses. Moreover, individual actors understanding of the
SES is likely to vary actor to actor. The way in which an actor perceives the SES and
their role in it is likely to influence their decision-making process and behavior. Ostrom
highlighted the importance of actors’ mental models and knowledge of the SES on
system outcomes by designating these as variables in the framework (McGinnis &
Ostrom, 2014). These variables are likely to be of increased importance in environmental
public goods dilemmas. Here again, understanding the drivers, perspectives and values
that comprise actors’ mental models and knowledge of the SES that underlie the
decision-making process can help with identifying behavioral interventions.
In environmental public goods dilemmas, SES are often larger scale, more
complex, and more uncertain. This poses a challenge for designing sustainable
governance solutions because often it is impossible to accurately measure ecological
system outcomes. With water quality decline in agricultural watersheds, due to time lags
in the movement of nutrients from farms to waterbodies, it may take decades for
collective behavior change to result in water quality improvement (Meals et al., 2010). In
these cases, we often use models to project future ecological outcomes based on land use
behavior. Therefore, behavior change itself becomes the proxy for ecological outcomes.
The central focus on behavior change in these systems suggests that understanding the
drivers of behavior to then change behavior is the most direct pathway to improve
ecological outcomes.
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Finally, in environmental public goods dilemmas the lack of built-in processes for
building social capital amongst actors calls for greater attention to how specific
institutional interventions influence decision-making. The lack of built-in processes for
building social capital suggest that there is less likelihood for the emergence of
community-based collective action (Pretty, 2003). This is not to say that trust, reciprocity,
norms, and shared rules do not play a role in shaping behavior, but it does suggest that
greater emphasis is required to understand where and how they play a role.
In making the case for the relevance of decision-making and behavior in the
analysis of environmental public goods dilemmas, it is important to note that the SES
framework is compatible with a wide range of decision-making and behavioral theories.
Within the SES framework, McGinnis and Ostrom (2014, para. 5) suggest that “choice
processes are not required to comport to any specific model of decision-making or
policymaking, nor are all outcomes observed required to have been intended by
participants in the process.” This flexibility means that we can use a variety of decisionmaking and behavioral theories to better understand SES actor behavior and outcomes.
However, so far, this flexibility has been underutilized.
Ostrom and her colleagues were aware of the importance of incorporating a
broader understanding of human behavior into the study of SES. Poteete et al. (2010), in
their book on methods for studying collective action, identify this as one of the key next
steps for the field. Rather than using a single model to describe behavior, such as
bounded rationality, Poteete et al. (2010, p. 222) suggest that it “is more productive to
posit broad theoretical attributes of human behavior that can help explain why individuals
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act in particular ways in one situation versus another.” To do this, I suggest, requires
drawing on a broad range of psychological and behavioral theories to empirically
examine the conditions and contexts that drive decision making and behavior with SES.
Next, I will highlight a few psychological and behavioral concepts that may be
particularly relevant for the study of environmental public goods dilemmas. This is not
meant to be an exhaustive list, but rather a sampling to suggest the utility of this approach
(see Singh et al. (2013) and Schlüter et al. (2017) for additional reviews of decisionmaking theories of relevance to understanding environmental dilemmas).
2.6.2. Promising Decision-making Concepts and Theories for Environmental Public
Goods Dilemmas
A number of decision-making and behavioral models exist that could prove useful
for incorporation within the SES framework for the study of environmental public goods
and beyond. The body of research on collective action and common pool resource
dilemmas, including SES Framework applications, has typically relied upon the
behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality to explain individual behavior, as
suggested in Section 2 above (Ostrom, 2005). This approach models decision-making as
dependent upon limited information, cognitive processing, and attention in shifting
individual cost-benefit analysis of potential actions (Poteete et al., 2010). Bounded
rationality offers insight into the heuristics and biases that shape individual behavior,
such as a greater aversion to losses than gains, anchoring on a given value rather than
intrinsic values, or habit-formation (Gsottbauer & van den Bergh, 2011). Within the SES
Framework, these aspects of decision-making may have important implication for
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institutional design, such as whether to design incentives to motivate behavior or
sanctions, or what level to set a baseline incentive offer.
Social psychology also offers a number of decision-making models and theories,
which are not mutually exclusive with bounded rationality. Theories such as the Theory
of Planned Behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011), the Value-belief-norm theory (Stern,
Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999), and the Norm-Activation theory (Schwartz,
1977) model individual behavior as embedded in individual’s beliefs and perceptions of
the world. As a complement to bounded rationality, individuals’ beliefs and perceptions
are grounded in an individual’s worldview and experience, as opposed to full information
about any given decision-making situation. These social psychological theories suggest
that constructs such as an individual’s attitudes toward a behavior, subjective and
personal norms surrounding the behavior, and perceived behavioral control, or selfefficacy in engaging in a behavior are important predictors of how an individual will
behave (Bandura, 2000; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011; Stern et al., 1999). Klöckner’s (2013)
comprehensive action determination model combines elements of the theory of planned
behavior, norm-activation theory and bounded rationality in an integrated decisionmaking model and has shown strong predictive power across a number of domains of
environmental behavior.
In environmental public goods dilemmas, where individuals are faced with high
levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, social psychological decision-making theories can
help identify the way in which individuals are making decisions in these highly variable
conditions (e.g. based on other’s actions, their own level of understanding, what they
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think is right, etc.). Furthermore, these theories can help to identify types or typologies of
actors that value different types of information and assistance. This stands in stark
contrast to an institutional rational choice model which assumes individuals to be selfinterested and motivated by utility maximization (in practice mainly profit
maximization).
As a proof of concept, I will suggest a few psychological and decision-making
concepts that may be particularly helpful in examining actor behavior in environmental
public goods dilemmas and describe their potential contribution. These are: self-efficacy
and perceived behavioral control, experience and personal norms, and attitudes.

2.6.3 Self-Efficacy and Perceived Behavioral Control
When considering actor behavior in collective action dilemmas, autonomy, or an
individual’s capacity to make their own decisions, is an important concept. Autonomy is
closely aligned with the concept of self-efficacy, for motivating behavior change.
According to Bandura, “unless people believe that they can produce desired effects and
forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act” (Bandura, 1986,
2000, p. 75). Another closely related psychological concept is perceived behavioral
control, which is an element of the psychological Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen,
1985). Perceived behavioral control refers to “a general sense of personal competence or
perceived ability to influence events” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011, p. 153). Beliefs of selfefficacy strongly inform an individual’s confidence in their ability to perform a behavior
and it is predicted that those with higher levels of perceived behavioral control with
respect to a specific behavior or action would be more likely to adopt the behavior
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(Ajzen, 1991). There is a strong link between individual self-efficacy, individual action
and collective action. Individual’s hold beliefs about collective efficacy within
themselves, as opposed to some external representative. Therefore examining
individual’s beliefs about perceived behavioral control may be an important component
of actor decision making and behavior in SES (Bandura, 2000). Furthermore, different
institutional arrangements intended to motivate collective behavior change in SES may
impact actor self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control in different ways. This could
have important consequences for overall SES system outcomes.
2.6.4. Experience and Personal Norms
Exposure or experience with a policy can be through participation in town hall
meetings, planning committees, or public hearings, as well as measurement, monitoring
or enforcement exercises can shape individual decision-making. Edward-Jones (2006, p.
788) highlighted this as an important area for future research, in the light that engaging in
a behavior due to policy requirements could “have a positive feedback on behavior such
that the policy aims would continue to be met after the formal end of the policy”. This is
further in line with Krosnick et al.’s (2006) Attitude, Certainty and Existence (ACE)
model which includes personal experience and informant’s messages as predictors of
general public support for a policy agenda. Throughout a policy process and through
engaging in target behaviors, individuals may be exposed to information that updates
belief sets and norms to reinforce the target behavior. It is possible that exposure to a
policy process activates personal pro-environmental norms. Personal norms are a
component of the Norm-Activation theory (Schwartz, 1977) and Value-Belief-Norm
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theory (Stern, 2000) which suggest that given awareness of a behaviors consequences and
personal ascription of responsibility for a given outcome, personal norms for a behavior
will be activated and increase the likelihood that an individual will engage in the
behavior.
2.6.5. Attitudes
Attitudes are a central concept to many psychological models of decision-making,
including the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991). According to Fishbein and
Ajzen, attitudes are the “latent disposition or tendency to respond with some degree of
favorableness or unfavorableness to a psychological object” (2011, p. 76). Attitudes can
be seen as an evaluation, on a scale from negative to positive, of a given action or
behavior. In the context of actor behavior in environmental public goods dilemmas,
actors may hold attitudes toward specific behaviors of interest that may influence whether
or not they engage in the behavior. According to the Theory of Planned Behavior, one
would expect an individual with positive attitudes towards an action to be more likely to
engage in that action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011).
I propose that incorporating the study of actors’ attitudes, experience and personal
norms, and self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control, along with other psychological
theories, into the study of environmental public goods dilemmas using the SES can
improve our ability to design institutions to promote sustainability in these systems.

2.7. Incorporating the Institutional-Behavior Link into the SES
What would it look like to expand the institutional-behavior link in the SES
Framework to apply it to environmental public goods dilemmas and to examine diverse
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institutional arrangements? Given the flexibility of the SES framework towards decisionmaking and behavioral theories, the incorporation can take many different forms. Here I
recommend two potential approaches to strengthen the institution-behavior link in the
SES framework. The first approach is to add social-psychological variables to the suite of
actor attribute variables to test and explore the role of relevant psychological and
behavioral theories in driving outcomes in SES. The second is to examine actor mental
models within environmental public goods dilemmas to redefine SES framework
categories to capture the relevant actor motivations and drivers of behavior. These
recommendations complement each other and ultimately, a mixed methods approach
combining both recommendations would be the most beneficial to improving our ability
to identify elements of institutional design that lead to robust environmental public good
regimes.
The first recommendation, to add social-psychological variables to the SES
Framework, methodologically begins with framing research questions around the
connection between institutions and actor behavior. For example, in the context of
declining water quality due to agricultural activities, a potential set of institution-behavior
questions could be: Are farmers more likely to adopt water quality best management
practices in mandatory or voluntary policy regimes? Do farmer feelings of self-efficacy
explain the difference in behavioral response to these policies? These questions would
then drive the application of the SES Framework to a series of cases to be compared. In
Table 2-2, I demonstrate the application of the SES Framework to these example
questions by listing the variables that could be used in defining and testing the
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relationship of interest. First, one would define the independent variables of interest,
shown as red variables in Table 2-2. The first independent variable is the institutional
variable: GS6 Rules-in-use, which is defined in this example as being either mandatory or
voluntary. Then the second independent variable, “A10 Actor(s) values and
motivations,” is a new second tier variable that I am proposing to add to the framework
under the first tier Actor category. This new variable is where theories from psychology
and behavioral economics, such as those reviewed above, can be incorporated into the
framework as shown in Table 2-2 below. Drawing from the sampling of theories
reviewed in the previous section, some potential third tier variables under “A10 Actor(s)
values and motivations” are personal norms, attitudes and self-efficacy. In the example
case, self-efficacy can be included as an actor attribute, falling on a spectrum from high
to low.
The relationship of interest is the interaction of these two variables, and their effect
on the dependent variable “I1* Resource use levels of diverse users,” defined here as
adoption of water quality best management practices. In order to better accommodate
environmental public goods dilemmas, I also propose including this revised label
category for I1 (“Resource use”) as opposed to the previous label for the category
“Harvesting levels of diverse users”, since not all resource use behavior within an SES is
harvesting behavior. Furthermore, I suggest explicitly adding a variable to examine
public good provisioning behavior: “I9* Public good provisioning levels.” This variable
could be another dependent variable of interest in the example case, defined as ambient
water quality levels.
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Table 2-2. Example application of a revised SES framework to the case of declining water quality due
to agriculture. Additions or revised categories are marked with an asterisk (*). Highlighted
variables: red are the example independent variables, gold are example dependent variables, blue are
covariates and bold black are held constant. Adapted from McGinnis & Ostrom (2014)
Social, economic and political settings (S): S1 Economic development, S2 Demographic trends, S3 Political
stability, S4 Government resource policies, S5 Market incentives, S6 Media organization
Resource systems (RS)

Governance systems(GS)

RS2 Clarity of system boundaries

GS1 Policy area
GS2 Geographic scale of governance system:
state/region

RS3 Size of resource system: large

GS3 Population

RS4 Human-constructed facilities

GS4 Regime type

RS5 Productivity of system
RS6 Equilibrium properties: declining water
quality

GS5 Rule-making organizations: state/regional

RS7 Predictability of system dynamics

GS7 Property-rights systems: private

RS8 Storage characteristics

GS8 Repertoire of norms and strategies

RS9 Location

GS9 Network structure

RS1 Sector: watershed

GS6 Rules-in-use: voluntary or mandatory

GS10 Historical continuity
Resource units (RU)

Actors (A)

RU1 Resource unit mobility
RU2 Growth or replacement rate: continued
nutrient applications

A1 Number of relevant actors: few to many farmers

RU3 Interaction among resource units

A3 History or past experiences

RU4 Economic value

A4 Location

RU5 Number of units

A5 Leadership/entrepreneurship
A6 Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social capital: existence of
farmer group

RU6 Distinctive markings
RU7 Spatial and temporal distribution: history of
nutrient enrichment

A2 Socioeconomic attributes: small to large farms

A7 Knowledge of SES/mental models
A8 Importance of resource (dependence)
A9 Technologies available
A10* Actor(s) values and motivations: high or low selfefficacy

Interactions (I) -> Outcomes (O)
I1* Resource use levels of diverse users: adoption of
practices
O1 Social performance measures
I2 Information sharing among users

O2 Ecological performance measures

I3 Deliberation processes

O3 Externalities to other SESs

I4 Conflicts among users
I5 Investment activities
I6 Lobbying activities
I7 Self-organizing activities
I8 Networking activities
I9* Public good provisioning levels: ambient water
quality
Related ecosystems (ECO): ECO1 Climate patterns; ECO3 Flows into and out of focal SES; ECO2 Pollution
patterns
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With the independent and dependent variables of interest defined, the framework can
then be used to guide case selection, by selecting cases that have similar resource
systems, resource units, governance systems and actors. This is demonstrated by the
resource system, resource unit and governance system variables in bold black text in
Table 2-2. These variables would define the criteria that all cases must meet to be
included in the analysis. Alternatively, or within the same analysis, some variables could
be allowed to vary to examine covariates of the institution-behavior link of interest. An
example for these is given by the variables in blue text, including farm size for
socioeconomic attributes (A2) and existence of a farmer group for social capital (A6).
This approach, as defined here, lends itself to a quantitative analysis in which the
relationship between the dependent variable (e.g. behavior or system outcomes) and the
independent variables (e.g. policy type and covariates) is measured using a regression
model. Agent-based modeling also offers an promising complementary approach for
exploring the institution-behavior link in environmental dilemmas, as described in
Schlüter et al.(2017).
The key element to incorporating this new social-psychological second tier variable
(A10) is data collection, as well as agreement on standardized constructs and validated
questions. Data will need to be collected from actors within the system of interest, either
from surveys, interviews, experimental games or any other number of methods (see
Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom (2010) for a review of methods for studying collective
action problems). In doing so, it is important that a core set of psychological constructs
are include and questions are asked in the same way to provide internally valid
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comparisons. One potential example that can be informative for this is the New
Ecological Paradigm, a standardized, broadly used, internally valid questionnaire to
measure environmental concern (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig,
& Jones, 2000; Stern, Dietz, & Guagnano, 1995). This quantitative approach is one way
that we can begin to better understand trends in how institutional design shapes decision
making, behavior and ecological outcomes in environmental public goods dilemmas.
The second recommendation for strengthening the institution-behavior link within
the SES Framework is to draw upon actor mental models to define the relevant system
attributes in environmental public goods dilemmas. Mental models of actors are
acknowledged to play an important role in SES outcomes and are included in the
framework (see variable A7 in Table 2-2) and in many applications of the framework
(Thiel et al., 2015). Mental models are individuals’ “internal representations” of the
world and are made up of concepts linked together, and it is these relationships between
concepts that are used to make meaning of the world (Carley & Palmquist, 1992, p. 602).
In environmental public goods dilemmas it is important to look to actors to define the
concepts/variables that they perceive to be important influences on their behavior. Again,
actor behavior is important because ultimately it is actor behavior that policy-makers and
society in general are looking to change to improve social-ecological outcomes.
Examining actor mental models lends itself to a qualitative methodologies, much like
the in-depth case studies Ostrom and others pursued in the early work on CPR regimes
(Ostrom, 1990). Interviews, focus group, and other ethnographic approaches can be used
to elicit actors’ perceived motivations, interactions and system outcomes within an
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environmental public good dilemma. The analyst can then using qualitative coding
techniques such as grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994) or other forms of content
analysis (Saldaña, 2015) to identify the salient or relevant aspects of the system according
to actors. These elements can then be merged with the SES framework, either falling
under existing second tier variables, or adding new ones as needed to better define the
environmental public goods dilemma context. Working up from actor perceptions of their
own behavior and experience to the system level will allow analysts to identify
institutions and contextual variables shaping system outcomes in environmental public
goods dilemmas.
Ultimately these two recommended approaches to strengthening the institutionbehavior link can be used in conjunction, or iteratively to improve our understanding of
institutional design in environmental public goods dilemmas.

2.8. Conclusion
The study of environmental public goods dilemmas and of diverse institutional
arrangements can help us to identify design principles to improve the sustainability of
these regimes. The SES framework was designed with the ambition to fill this need and
facilitate the study of all types of SES. However, in application, the SES Framework has
struggled to facilitate the study of SES beyond CPR regimes and community-based
natural resource management institutions. The same attributes of environmental public
goods dilemmas that differentiate them from CPR regimes, namely the lack of a
behavior-reinforcing link, the multi-actor and multi-resource system dynamics, higher
levels of uncertainty and complexity, and lack of built-in social capital, also increase the
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need to understand how a broader suite of institutions govern these systems. I have
proposed that one way to address these linked challenges within the SES Framework and
facilitate the application of the SES to these types of systems is to expand the
framework’s focus on the institution-behavior link. I suggest that this can be done
through incorporating decision-making and behavioral models from psychology and
behavioral economics into the SES framework and through examining actor mental
models to define relevant system attributes. Both of these recommendations will improve
the ability of the SES framework to accommodate the analysis of more diverse resource
regimes and facilitate the design of context-specific institutional interventions to support
sustainable resource management.
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CHAPTER 3: FROM WATERSHED LIMITS TO FARM-SCALE DECISIONS:
THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY WATER QUALITY POLICY ON FARM
MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING
Authors: Courtney Hammond Wagner, Asim Zia, Suzie Greenhalgh, Pike Brown,
Meredith T. Niles

3.1. Abstract
Nutrient runoff from agricultural lands is a challenge for agricultural watersheds
across the globe. As decades of voluntary programs to address nonpoint source (NPS)
pollution have failed to improve water quality, regional governments are turning to
mandatory policies in an effort to achieve water quality goals. This recent policy shift
highlights a need for insight on the effectiveness of mandatory water quality policy
design to limit agricultural NPS pollution. We analyze a national survey of 1,917 New
Zealand farmers to compare farmer nutrient management behavior and decision making
under three different policy types: mandatory practice-based policy, which requires
farmers to adopt specific practices; mandatory performance-based policy, which requires
farmers meet a modeled farm nutrient limit; and no current mandatory policy. To
compare the success of policy types, we examine behavior change as a proxy for future
water quality improvements, and we use the social psychological Theory of Planned
Behavior to evaluate potential for farmers’ long-term policy support. We run logistic and
Poisson mixed effects models to examine differences in the presence and extent (e.g.
number of related practices or strategies) of nutrient management plan (NMP) adoption,
and for non-adopters, intention to adopt an NMP between policy groups. In our series of
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models, farmers in performance-based policies are almost four times more likely to
intend to adopt an NMP than the no policy group, which is not the case for farmers in the
practice-based group. However, we find that policy type is not predictive of actual NMP
adoption or extent of adoption, suggesting that neither type of mandatory policy is
associated with increased nutrient management behavior when compared to the no policy
group. On the policy support side when we compare predictors of extent of adoption and
intention to adopt NMPs, we see perceived behavior control and attitudes are significant
predictors of nutrient management behavior in the performance-based policy group and
the no policy group, but not the practice-based policy group. Combined, these results
suggest that performance-based mandatory policies send a stronger policy signal to
farmers in that they are associated with greater intended adoption of NMPs, as well as
increased potential long-term policy support.

3.2. Introduction
Globally, declining water quality from the agricultural runoff of nitrogen and
phosphorus is an increasing challenge for local, regional and national governments. This
diffuse form of pollution, also known as agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution,
has broad ranging social, ecological and economic impacts (Bennett et al., 2001;
Carpenter et al., 1998). Managing agricultural NPS pollution is challenging due to the
difficulty of attributing the diffuse pollution to a source. Management is further
confounded by variation in nutrient loss rates due to ecological and climatological
characteristics (Carpenter et al., 1998; Ghebremichael, Veith, & Watzin, 2010), the
contribution of legacy nutrient loads in the watershed (Sharpley, 2016; Wironen, Bennett,
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& Erickson, 2018) and potential decades-long time lags between agricultural
management changes and resulting water quality improvements (Meals, 1996; Meals et
al., 2010). Agricultural NPS pollution has traditionally been approached through
voluntary programs and policies, such as funding for conservation practice adoption
through the United States Department of Agriculture and New Zealand’s former
emphasis on non-regulatory approaches such as education, advice and incentives (Quinn,
Wilcock, Monaghan, McDowell, & Journeaux, 2009; Shortle, Ribaudo, Horan, &
Blandford, 2012). To date, voluntary programs have made little progress in improving
nutrient impaired waterbodies across the globe (Dowd et al., 2008; Rissman & Carpenter,
2015). Governments are beginning to implement mandatory, rules-based approaches to
achieve water quality improvements (McDowell et al., 2015). This recent policy shift
highlights a need for insight on the effectiveness of mandatory water quality policy
design in addressing agricultural NPS pollution.
With mandatory approaches to agricultural NPS pollution, policy makers must
make difficult decisions about who bears the burden of paying for water quality
improvements, and how to measure and monitor rule compliance (Drevno, 2016). These
policy decisions can be controversial, which may impact the ability of the policy to
achieve its overall goal of water quality improvement by instigating resistance, noncompliance or policy rejection. Two major rules-based approaches have emerged for
regulating nutrient exports from farms that are the focus of this study: practice-based and
performance-based policies. Both mandatory practice-based and performance-based
policies regulate nutrients flowing off the farm, as opposed to more upstream policies that
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regulate farm inputs through quotas or taxes (Drevno, 2016). The two approaches,
practice and performance, differ in terms of what farmer behavior is allowed or required
under the policy, and therefore the farmer experience and behavior under each policy
may vary significantly.
Practice-based rules require farmers to adopt a specific practice or set of
practices to reduce nutrient exports from the farm. This approach is based on the
assumption that various practices are “proven” to reduce nutrient emissions from the
farm, although in reality there is wide variety of practice effectiveness (e.g. Zhang et al.
(2010) and Dodd and Sharpley (2016)). In a mandatory practice-based policy regime a
farm is in compliance if the practices are in place. Conversely, in a mandatory
performance-based policy, rules specify a numeric limit for units of nitrogen or
phosphorus that leave the farm system. The numeric limit for the farm system can be set
through a number of different allocation strategies, including allocation based on
historical levels of nutrient use, farm type, physical quality of the land or nutrient
vulnerability (Daigneault, Greenhalgh, & Samarasinghe, 2017). Then, performance-based
policies typically use a farm system model to calculate whole farm nutrient balances and
compare these to the numeric limit to demonstrate compliance. A popular farm system
model used in performance-based policies in New Zealand is Overseer®, which
calculates nitrogen and phosphorus exports from a farm based on the geographical and
ecological characteristics of the farm as well as the farm system type, including the
management practices and infrastructure on the farm (Wheeler et al., 2003). To comply
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with the mandatory performance-based policy, farmers can employ any practice or
strategy they choose to achieve their numeric limit and be in compliance.
To improve water quality in an impaired watershed, both practice- and
performance-based mandatory NPS pollution policies require patience and prolonged
policy support. First patience is required to see results: due to time lags in the movements
of nutrients from land to water, the results of management changes on the land today will
most likely not be seen for decades (Meals et al., 2010; Morgenstern et al., 2015), though
this varies by soil type and landscape. Additionally, internal nutrient cycling in lakes can
impede the alleviation of eutrophication symptoms once external nutrient loads are
reduced (Carpenter et al., 1998; Roy, Martin, Irwin, Conroy, & Culver, 2010). Second,
prolonged support is required to ensure that behavior changes endure to provide sustained
improvements in water quality in the future. This suggests that two different elements of
policy success are particularly important for the long-term success of agricultural NPS
pollution policy: achievement and maintenance of the desired outcome and attracting
support for the goals of the policy and means of achieving them to ensure long-term
viability (McConnell, 2010).
Given the difficulty in measuring NPS pollution, the best proxy for measuring
whether policy is achieving the desired goal (i.e. improvements in water quality in the
long term) is changes in farmer behavior. However, if changes in behavior are achieved
at the expense of support for the policy and means of achieving them, it is possible that
long term water quality improvements will not materialize if adoption is short-term or
sporadic. This second aspect of policy success calls for examination of the social
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psychological impacts of policy on land management decision making. Research has
shown that past policy experiences can have lingering negative impacts on farmers’
environmental beliefs (Niles, Lubell, & Haden, 2013) and theories of the policy process
and social movements suggest that value alignment is a key component of policy support
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014; Stern et al., 1999). Therefore, it is
probable that a policy that allows for decision making that aligns with farmer values and
beliefs, is more likely to be associated with sustained policy support from farmers.
While much social science research has attempted to understand farmer’s
voluntary adoption of conservation behaviors, including nutrient management behavior
related to water quality (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Conner et al., 2016; Knowler &
Bradshaw, 2007; Pannell et al., 2006; Prokopy et al., 2008a; Ranjan et al., 2019), much
less work has examined farmer behavior within mandatory policy setting regimes. A few
studies have focused on the differential response of individuals to voluntary and
mandatory water quality regimes, but the results of these studies show no clear trends.
There is evidence for higher levels of adoption of nitrogen testing within mandatory
regimes (Bosch, Cook, & Fuglie, 1995), evidence for higher levels of adoption of water
quality management techniques in voluntary regimes (Barnes et al., 2013), and evidence
for mixed effects of regulation on adoption of different conservation practices (Kara et
al., 2008). One relevant case study-based paper examined two types of water quality
regulation in Tomales Bay, California and Lake Taupo, New Zealand (Barry et al. 2010).
The authors found that farmers in Lake Taupo’s performance-based cap-and-trade policy
faced more negative economic and social impacts to farm sustainability than Tomales
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Bay’s practice-based policy, in large part due to the availability of financial assistance in
Tomales Bay for on farm practice changes (Barry et al., 2010). For policy makers to
design and implement effective policy solutions, a clear understanding of the interaction
between policy design and behavior is critical.
In this study, we draw on a natural water quality policy experiment across New
Zealand to examine the success of mandatory practice- and performance-based
agricultural NPS pollution policy in comparison to regions without mandatory water
quality policies. Our focal behavior is adoption of nutrient management plans (NMP),
which entails creating and following a plan to manage and control nutrient dynamics on
the farm. In practice this means adopting strategies or building farm structures to control
nutrient runoff and nutrient applications beyond land and crop requirements. In New
Zealand some of these strategies and structures include applying fertilizer at agronomic
rates, precision irrigation, fencing permanent waterways, and adjusting the number of
livestock units on the farm to match nutrient capacity. Theoretically, engaging in nutrient
management planning and adopting an NMP allows a farm to maximize economic
benefits (if cost savings are possible through reduced input use) and minimize
environmental harm (Beegle, Carton, & Bailey, 2000). Regardless of type of policy,
nutrient management planning serves as an important gateway to improving nutrient
dynamics on the farm.
We address the following three core research questions to examine the role and
impact of mandatory NPS pollution policies:
1. Are mandatory policies associated with higher levels of adoption of NMPs?
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2. For those that have adopted NMPs, is policy type related to the extent of adoption
of nutrient management practices?
3. For those that have not adopted NMPs, is policy type related to intention to adopt
NMPs?

3.3. Material and Methods
3.3.1 Study location
To address our three research questions, we utilize a cross-sectional sample of
farmers in a diversity of water quality policy regimes across New Zealand. New Zealand
is an ideal study location because there is a high level of variation in regional policy
approaches for agricultural NPS pollution, including practice-based, performance-based
and no policy regions. The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management of
2011 & 2014 requires all regional governments to put in place water quality limits for all
watersheds across the country by 2025 (NPSFM, 2014). Moreover the National Policy
Statement requires regions to create policy to achieve reductions to meet water quality
limits where they are unmet, and importantly, these limits can be met through any policy
approach. As a result, there is great variation in water quality policies across the country,
including a number of regions without policy yet in place (see Appendix 1 Table 5-1 for
policy descriptions by region). In essence, the National Policy Statement, prior to 2025,
has enabled a natural experiment to examine the impact of water quality policy on farmer
behaviors related to NMPs and nutrient management practices.
3.3.2 Policy support and the Theory of Planned Behavior
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To evaluate the potential for prolonged policy support, we employ the Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011) to examine the predictors of nutrient
management behavior amongst farmers both within and outside of mandatory practiceand performance-based water quality policy regimes in New Zealand, as shown in Figure
3-1. We use the TPB to examine evidence for value alignment between theorized social
psychological predictors of behavior change and drivers of reported behavior change
within a policy context. Existence of value alignment suggests greater potential for
prolonged policy support (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Stern et al., 1999).
The TPB predicts that intention to engage in a behavior is explained by an
individual’s attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control beliefs
regarding the behavior in question (Ajzen, 1985). In the TPB, attitudes are defined as the
tendency for an individual to respond with a degree of favorableness towards a behavior
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). Subjective norms are the degree to which an individual
perceives social pressure to behave in a certain way regarding the behavior of interest.
Finally, perceived behavioral control is a “general sense of personal competence or
perceived ability to influence events” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011, p. 153). It has also been
suggested that a fourth component, a moral norm, can improve the predictive validity
associated with the TPB for certain behaviors that have a moral dimension (Beck &
Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). Since nutrient management behavior may have an
environmental moral component, we include a variable for environmental stewardship in
our application of the TPB. The TPB is one of the most widely researched psychological
theories of behavior and has been shown to have consistent predictive power of
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individual behavior across behavioral domains, including health, political and
environmental behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011).

Figure 3-1. Adaptation of Ajzen’s (1985) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to test the influence of
variation in institutional choice rules on intention and actual adoption of nutrient management
strategies by farmers. The dashed arrows represent the hypothesized existence of a relationship
between policy choice rules and components of the TPB in a farmer’s decision making process on
nutrient management planning adoption.

As described above, farmers under practice- and performance-based regulations
may have different experiences under each policy type due to differences in rule
structure. It is possible that policy design could interact with all four of the TPB
psychological pathways for nutrient management plan adoption decisions. For practicebased policies, the clear designation of nutrient management practices that need to be in
place may shape social norms within the farming community, attitudes towards practices,
control beliefs regarding the practices or moral norms to adopt nutrient management
planning. Likewise, in performance-based policies, the requirement to measure and
monitor nutrient export from the farm may shape norms, attitudes and perceived
behavioral control. However, without the clear regulatory signal for specific practices,
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performance-based policies may shape norms, attitudes and control beliefs through a
farmers’ learning, exposure and experience of meeting a nutrient limit for their particular
farm system. In the case that any of the TPB predictors are found to be positive and
significant predictors of NMP adoption, extent of NMP adoption or intention to adopt
NMP, we take this as evidence for value alignment between decision making and a
policy. This value alignment suggests that farmers are making decisions about NMPs
within a policy context that align with their internal values and beliefs.
3.3.3 Survey and sample description
The data for this study are drawn from a national survey of New Zealand
farmers, the Survey of Rural Decision Makers (SRDM) undertaken by Maanaki Whenua
– Landcare Research. The SRDM was fielded between July and December 2015 (Brown,
2015). The SRDM is a national, internet-based survey of commercial farm owners and
managers. The SRDM sampling strategy consisted of contacting farmers via email
through farmer industry lists and databases, circulating invitations to participate through
industry and sector groups, and sending mail invitations to farmers in the Statistics New
Zealand business frame (for a full description of the sampling strategy, see Brown
(2015)).
The SRDM featured 288 questions covering ownership, farm structure, land use,
livestock, land management, technology adoption, values, norms, preferences, farming
objectives, profitability, demographics, and education (Brown, 2015). Also included in
the survey are questions reflecting the TPB that address farmers’ attitudes, subjective
norms, perceived behavioral control and environmental stewardship related to NMP (see
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Appendix 1 Table 5-2 for description of TPB related questions). The focus of the present
work is farmers’ behavior toward managing nutrients, which is addressed through three
questions: 1) has the farmer adopted a nutrient management plan (NMP), 2) if yes, what
nutrient management practices has the farmer adopted (e.g. extent of adoption) and 3) if
no, does the farmer intend to adopt an NMP in the next 2 years? Extent of NMP adoption
is a count of seven NMP-related practices that a farmer has adopted, including reduced
stocking rates, changed cropping patterns, changed timing of fertilizer applications,
constructed/maintained wetlands, reduced fertilizer applications, fenced waterways and
an optional “other” category defined by the respondent. It is important to note that there
was a skip pattern built into the survey such that farmers who answered yes to question 1
(i.e. have adopted an NMP), only received question 2 and not question 3. The opposite
was also true, such that farmers who answered no to question 1 (i.e. have not adopted an
NMP), only received question 3 and not question 2 (See Appendix 1 Figure 5-1 for
survey skip pattern structure). Our analytical approach to these questions, as discussed
below, reflects the structure of the survey.
The 2015 survey featured a sample of 2,342 commercial farmers which
represents 3.90% of the farming population (according to the NZ Ag Census 2012 farm
totals). Survey representation varies across territorial authorities in New Zealand (New
Zealand’s sub-regional geographic unit), from representing 0.60% of the farming
population in Tauranga to 16.67% of the Kawerau district farming population (for survey
sample by territorial authority see Appendix 1 Table 5-1). Due to missing data, we
dropped 425 commercial farmers from the sample, leaving us with a subset of 1,917
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farmers to use in analyses. The descriptive statistics of participants are shown in Table
3-1 and represent the subset of 1,917 farmers used in the analyses (for descriptive
statistics broken down by policy group, see Appendix 1 Table 5-3). With regard to the
key behavioral and decision making variables of interest in our study, adoption of
nutrient management planning, we see that 40.53% of the full sample of farmers has
adopted an NMP (NMP adoption). Of those 777 farmers that have adopted an NMP, they
have adopted on average 2.64 nutrient management strategies (NMP extent adoption).
Alternatively, of those 1,139 farmers who have not adopted an NMP, we see that 21.51%
state that they intend to adopt an NMP in the next two years.
Table 3-1 also lists mean response and percentages for the TPB variables
included in the study. Two of the TPB constructs, subjective norms and attitudes, are
index variables built from aggregating multiple survey questions relating to the construct,
as shown in Appendix 1 Table 5-2. Subjective norms questions asked farmers about the
expectations from family, the farming community and the New Zealand public for
running the farm in an environmentally friendly way. Similarly, attitudes questions asked
farmers about how they perceive adopting an NMP has or would impact financial,
environmental and farming lifestyle performance of the farm. Cronbach’s alpha were
used to assess the internal reliability of the attitude and subjective norm latent constructs
amongst the measured variables. Both measures were found to have high internal
reliability with an alpha of 0.74 for both attitude and subjective norms, which is above
the generally accepted 0.70 cutoff for internal reliability (Nunnally, 1978).
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The third TPB construct, perceived behavioral control is a count variable of the
number of perceived behavioral control-related constructs selected as factors that led to,
or kept a farmer from, implementing an NMP. The perceived behavioral control related
constructs include successful demonstration, trialing, reversible in nature, having the
necessary skills, receiving advice, and availability of financial resources. Respondents
could tick up to three of factors. We examine perceived behavioral control as four distinct
levels from 0 to 3, reflecting increased perceived behavioral control as more items were
selected. We include perceived behavioral control as a categorical variable in our
analysis, comparing each level to the base level of “0” or no reported perceived
behavioral control. To capture an environmental moral norm, we separated out one of the
potential factors included with the perceived behavioral control constructs,
“environmental stewardship,” to include separately as a binary variable. It is also
important to note that some of the TPB questions, specifically the perceived behavioral
control and stewardship, were framed differently for NMP adopters and non-adopters.
Therefore, we keep these separate and designate the difference using a “_no” for those
variables that were asked of non-adopters.
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Table 3-1. Farmer sample descriptive statistics

Continuous variables
farm size (thousand hectares)
age
attitude (n = 1018)
norms (n = 1830)
nmp_adopt_extent (n = 773)

All
(n = 1917)
mean
sd
0.37
1.24
56.47
11.60
6.41
1.31
21.32
4.79
2.64
1.34

Categorical variables
NMP (yes)
NMP intention to adopt (yes, n =
1139)
profitable (yes)
farm type
farm type: other
farm type: dairy
farm type: sheep & beef
farm type: grazing support
education
education: secondary school or less
education: certificate/diploma
education: bachelor's degree
education: advanced degree
education: other

count
777

%
40.53

245
935

21.51
48.77

457
425
920
115

23.84
22.17
47.99
6.00

700
544
367
287
19

36.52
28.38
19.14
14.97
0.99

N (nmp extent adoption model only)
0. perceived behavioral control
1. perceived behavioral control
2. perceived behavioral control
3. perceived behavioral control
stewardship (yes)

423
128
163
106
26
220

100
30.26
38.53
25.06
6.15
52.01

N (nmp intention model only)
0. perceived behavioral control_no
1. perceived behavioral control_no
2. perceived behavioral control_no
3. perceived behavioral control_no
stewardship_no (yes)

596
239
207
108
42
94

100
40.10
34.73
18.12
7.05
16.93

3.4 Policy coding
The regional policy context of farmer survey respondents was used to explore
farmer behavior across different policy contexts, including mandatory practice-based (n =
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268), mandatory performance-based (n = 583), or no current mandatory policy (n =
1048). We utilized farmers’ reported territorial authority to match farmers to water
management zones and identify the existing water quality rules for each territorial
authority (NPSFM, 2014). In most cases territorial authority and water management
zones overlap significantly or are the same. To categorize territorial authorities as
mandatory performance-based policy, mandatory practice-based policy, or no current
mandatory policy, we referenced regional environmental policy documents and policy
reviews (Greenhalgh & Murphy, 2017), consulted with officials in regional policy
offices, and relied on the expertise of co-author S. Greenhalgh in water quality processes
throughout New Zealand. The map in Figure 3-2 shows the application of the policy
codes by territorial authority across New Zealand.
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Figure 3-2. Water quality policy types as of 2015 by territorial authority across New Zealand
(Statistics New Zealand, 2015).

3.3.5 Data Analysis
We use three mixed effects regression models to investigate the relationship between
mandatory water quality policy and farmer behavior for each of the three behavioral
outcomes (i.e. adoption, extent of adoption, and intention to adopt). We run logistic
mixed effects regression models for NMP adoption and intention to adopt NMPs and a
Poisson mixed effects regression model for the extent of NMP adoption. In each of the
models we include a random effect at the level of territorial authority to control for
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unobserved heterogeneity at the district level (Albright & Marinova, 2015). We would
expect farms within a region to experience similar trends, both social, market and
ecological, and we use the random effect term to control for this in our comparison of
behavioral predictors.
Additionally, for each of the three models, we run one full sample and then three
group-wise runs by policy type, breaking the sample into no policy, mandatory practicebased policy and mandatory performance-based policy groups to examine intergroup
differences in predictors of nutrient management plan behavior. We would like to note a
limitation of these policy group sub-models in that they vary in terms of sample size. The
practice-based sub-model in particular has relatively low sample sizes for extent of
adoption (n=52) and intention to adopt (n=76). In each of the mixed effects models we
include farm size, farm type, farmer age, farmer educational attainment and farm
profitability as controls. These variables have been found to be important in farmer
decision making and conservation behavior (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Conner et al.,
2016; Prokopy et al., 2008a). To determine model structure we compared the results of
many different model types, including simple single level regressions, single level
regression with clustered errors, and mixed effects with and without survey weights. We
decided upon the mixed effects models without survey weights as they were the most
conservative, although the variation between models did not result in major changes.
Statistical analysis was performed in Stata 15 (StataCorp, 2017).

3.4. Results
3.4.1. NMP adoption
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The results of the mixed effects logistic regression model examining the
predictors of NMP adoption are shown in Figure 3-3 below with the model coefficients
represented with odds ratios (for table of odds ratios and standard errors see Appendix 1
Table 5-4). There is no statistically significant effect of policy type (either practice or
performance) on rate of NMP adoption. Dairy farms were nine times more likely to have
adopted an NMP compared to the other farm type category, which includes deer, pig,
poultry, vegetable and horticultural farms. Sheep and beef farms and grazing support
were each about half as likely as the other farm type category to have adopted an NMP. A
shift from not profitable or breakeven to profitable farms was associated with a 1.35
times increased likelihood of adopting an NMP. Farm size, education and age were not
significant predictors of NMP adoption. The Likelihood Ratio Test (LR) for the
significance of the random effect of territorial authority on NMP adoption was nonsignificant (χ2 (1) = 0.72, p = 0.20).
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Figure 3-3. Coefficient plot of NMP Adoption mixed effects logit model (n=1917). Coefficients are
presented as odds ratios. For table of odds ratios and standard errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-4.

3.4.2 Extent of NMP adoption
Figure 3-4 shows the results of the Poisson model predicting farmer extent of
NMP adoption. The betas associated with significant predictors can be interpreted as the
number of nutrient management practices associated with a one unit increase in the
predictor variable. For extent of NMP adoption we again see no effect of policy type on
rate of adoption. With regard to the TPB variables, perceived behavioral control does
significantly, and positively, predict adoption at two levels: the second level of perceived
behavioral control (β= 0.21, p < 0.05) and the third level of perceived behavioral control
(β= 0.31, p < 0.05), as compared to the lowest (base) level of perceived behavioral
control, but attitudes and norms do not. The second and third levels of perceived
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behavioral control represent the second highest and highest belief strength, respectively,
of perceived ability to engage in nutrient management planning. Of the TPB constructs,
environmental stewardship (β= 0.21, p < 0.01) does significantly predict extent of NMP
adoption. In addition, farm size (β= 0.06, p < 0.05) and operating a dairy farm (β= 0.48, p
< 0.000) compared to other farm types both significantly and positively predict extent of
NMP adoption. The random effect for territorial authority on extent of NMP adoption for
the model was estimated to have a coefficient of zero.

Figure 3-4. Coefficient plot of NMP Extent of Adoption mixed effects Poisson model (n=401).
Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. For table of coefficients and standard errors see
Appendix 1 Table 5-5.

Broken down by policy type we see that the three policy types are associated
with different factors related to extent of NMP adoption. The no policy group, shown in
Figure 3-5, results align closely with the full model: perceived behavioral control of 3 (β=
72

0.44, p < 0.05), environmental stewardship (β= 0.22, p < 0.05), farm size (β= 0.17, p <
0.05) and operating a dairy farm (β= 0.47, p < 0.000) all significantly and positively
predict NMP extent adoption. In the practice-based model, shown in Figure 3-6, only
operating a dairy farm (β= 0.68, p < 0.05) is a significant predictor of extent of NMP
adoption. Although, we would like to reiterate here the low sample size (n=52) for the
practice-based model, which may limit the ability to interpret these results. In the
performance group, shown in Figure 3-7, only the second level of perceived behavioral
control (β= 0.33, p < 0.05) is a significant predictor of NMP extent adoption. The random
effects for territorial authority on extent of NMP adoption in all three policy sub-group
models were estimated to have a coefficient of zero
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Figure 3-5. Coefficient plot for no policy group (n = 230) NMP Extent of Adoption mixed effects
Poisson model. Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. For table of coefficients and standard
errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-5.
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Figure 3-6. Coefficient plot for practice-based group (n = 52) NMP Extent of Adoption mixed effects
Poisson model. Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. For table of coefficients and standard
errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-5.
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Figure 3-7. Coefficient plot for performance-based group (n = 119) NMP Extent of Adoption mixed
effects Poisson model. Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. Note that we present a
truncated left hand confidence interval for other education in this plot. For table of coefficients and
standard errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-5.

3.4.3 Intention to adopt nutrient management plan
The results of the logistic mixed effects model examining predictors of the
intention of non-adopters to adopt an NMP, with coefficients presented as odds ratios, are
shown in Figure 3-8. In the full model, farmers in a performance-based policy are almost
four times more likely to intend to adopt an NMP than farmers in the no policy group
(OR = 3.96, p < 0.001). Amongst the TPB variables, attitudes (OR = 1.56, p < 0.000) and
norms (OR = 1.08, p < 0.01) both significantly and positively predict intention to adopt
an NMP, but perceived behavioral control is not statistically distinguishable from zero. In
addition, operating a sheep and beef farm (OR = 2.212, p < 0.01), operating a grazing
support farm (OR = 3.042, p < 0.05) and having a bachelor’s degree (OR = 2.19, p <
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0.05) are all positive and significant predictors of intention to adopt an NMP. Age (OR =
0.97 p < 0.01) is a significant negative predictor of intention to adopt an NMP, meaning
older farmers are less likely to adopt a NMP. The LR test for the significance of the
random effect of territorial authority on intention to adopt NMP was non-significant (χ2
(1) = 0.05, p = 0.41).

Figure 3-8. Coefficient plot of Intention to Adopt NMP mixed effects logit model (n=536).
Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Note that we present a truncated right hand confidence
interval for other education in this plot. For table of odds ratios and standard errors see Appendix 1

Table 5-6.

Comparing policy group models, again we see the policy types are associated
with different factors related to intention to adopt NMP. In the no policy group model,
shown in Figure 3-9, attitudes (OR = 1.98, p < 0.01), norms (OR = 1.14, p < 0.05) and
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operating a sheep and beef (OR = 5.23, p < 0.05) significantly and positively predict
intention to adopt. For the practice-based group model, shown in Figure 3-10, farm size
(OR = 114.5, p < 0.01) is associated with a very large increased likelihood of NMP
intention to adopt, whereas sheep and beef farms (OR = 0.0134, p < 0.05) and age (OR =
0.899, p < 0.05) are associated with a very low likelihood of NMP intention to adopt.
Amongst the performance group, shown in Figure 3-11, attitudes (OR = 1.35, p < 0.05) is
a positive and significant predictor of NMP intention to adopt and so is operating a
grazing support farm type (OR = 4.40, p < 0.05). The LR test for the significance of the
random effect of territorial authority on intention to adopt NMP was non-significant for
the no policy group (χ2 (1) = 0.40, p = 0.26) and the coefficient was estimated as zero for
the practice-based and performance-based groups.
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Figure 3-9. Coefficient plot for no policy group (n=271) Intention to Adopt NMP mixed effects logit
model. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. For table of odds ratios and standard errors see
Appendix 1

Table 5-6.
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Figure 3-10. Coefficient plot for practice-based group (n=76) Intention to Adopt NMP mixed effects
logit model. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Note that we present a truncated right hand
confidence interval for farm size and model constant in this plot. For table of odds ratios and
standard errors see Appendix 1

Table 5-6.
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Figure 3-11. Coefficient plot for performance-based group (n=186) Intention to Adopt NMP mixed
effects logit model. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Note that we present a truncated right
hand confidence interval for dairy and other education in this plot. For table of odds ratios and
standard errors see Appendix 1

Table 5-6.

3.5. Discussion
3.5.1. Do mandatory policy choice rules matter for behavior change?
According to our first two models in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4, mandatory water
quality policy is not associated with an increase in NMP adoption or extent of adoption.
This suggests that, at least in the time period captured by the SRDM survey, mandatory
policy is not (yet) changing behavior. There are a couple potential reasons for this no
effect. The first is that in 2015, of the 29 territorial authorities with mandatory policies,
12 territorial authorities had policies that were not yet operational. This means that rules
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had been defined, but in 2015 farmers were not yet required to meet practice or
performance standards. For those policies that were not yet operation, the policy process
provided a policy signal that alerted farmers to near future rules, which would require
forward planning and action. Importantly, this differs from the “no policy” regions where
no rule-making was occurring or if it had begun, no decisions had been made towards the
structure of future water quality rules (i.e. practice-based or performance-based).
However, despite these distinctions, it may be too early in the policy process to detect
differential levels of adoption. It is possible that in five years we may see a difference in
nutrient management behavior between policy groups.
Another potential explanation for the lack of higher NMP adoption rates under
mandatory policy is that overall adoption of NMP is high across the country (e.g. in
mandatory policy and no policy groups) possibly due to a combination of public pressure
and regulatory pressure. Public pressure on farmers to clean up their impact on New
Zealand’s waters may be driving adoption of NMP across all policy types in the country.
For example a 2015 newspaper article in the New Zealand newspaper Scoop written by
dairy industry group DairyNZ said that New Zealand farms “need to evolve new farming
systems” in response to the challenge of nutrient limits (DairyNZ, 2015). In addition,
national level policy signal from the National Policy Statement for Freshwater
Management that requires that, eventually, all regions must implement water quality
limits and rules (NPSFM, 2014). Therefore, even farmers in the no policy regions may
see adoption of NMP as an inevitable regulatory requirement. The final potential rational
for the lack of nutrient management behavior differences between policy groups is that
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mandatory policy does not change farmer NMP behavior. If this is the case, water quality
improvements will likely not be realized in the future. Given the potential implications of
a lack of behavior change, future research should continue to monitor farmer nutrient
management behavior across policy regimes.
Turning to other predictors of NMP adoption, the positive relationship between
farm profitability and adoption of NMPs suggests that profitability can drive
environmental stewardship. NMPs are often framed as a win-win for farming in that they
can save farmers money by allowing them to maximize the economic benefits from
nutrient inputs and reduce environmental impacts (Beegle et al., 2000). This result could
suggest two things: profitable farms could be drawn to NMPs as a strategy to increase
farm economic efficiency or farms that have adopted NMPs are able to maximize their
economic returns and are therefore more profitable. Given the correlational nature of our
study, we are unable to discern whether one or both of these are occurring. However, the
positive relationship between profitability and NMP adoption does suggest that framing
NMP benefits in economic terms is a good strategy to promote adoption, even within
regulatory contexts. This result aligns with much of the literature on voluntary farm
conservation practice adoption (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Conner et al., 2016;
Prokopy, Floress, Klotthor-Weinkauf, & Baumgart-Getz, 2008b). In their meta-analysis
on farmer adoption of conservation practices, including nutrient management practices,
Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) found a farm’s financial capital, or investment into the farm,
as having one of the largest impacts on adoption. This suggests that with regard to the
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practice of nutrient management planning, regardless of differing regulatory
environments, farm financials relate to behavior change.
The role of farm type in driving NMP adoption may have more to do with
increased industry support and initiatives in New Zealand for dairy farms versus other
farm systems (grazing support, sheep and beef and other categories) than the particulars
of the farm system, as we see dairy farms show a strong likelihood to adopt NMP,
whereas other farm types show a decreased likelihood. However, in the intention to adopt
models, sheep and beef farms and grazing support farms are more likely to intend to
adopt than dairy. This is likely due to the fact that most dairy farms have already adopted
NMPs, over 80% in the sample, compared to much fewer sheep and beef farms and
grazing support farms, 23% and 24% respectively. It is likely that industry pressure and
support for dairy has led to dairy NMP adoption, whereas the relatively lower pressure on
sheep and beef and grazing support farms has resulted in less motivation for sheep and
beef and grazing support farms actually adopt NMP.
The dairy industry in New Zealand had been under heightened public pressure to
clean up its impact on water quality following the “Dirty Dairying Campaign” led by an
environmental NGO in the early 2000s (Edgar, 2008; Holland, 2015). Dairy farming has
a greater nutrient impact per unit of production on the land compared to other pasturebased farm types (Monaghan, Hedley, et al., 2007; Monaghan, Wilcock, et al., 2007), and
so it has been targeted the New Zealand public as a polluter of the country’s waterways
(Holland, 2015). As a result, Fonterra, the dominant dairy cooperative in New Zealand
and DairyNZ, the dairy industry research and support group, have promoted the adoption
84

of NMPs as a way to budget farm nutrients to reduce water quality impacts (Quinn et al.,
2009). Thus far there has not been the same public pressure on other farm types
throughout the country, which suggests that industry and public pressure play an
important role in motivating behavior change.
While our results show no evidence of differences in reported levels of nutrient
management behavior between groups, we do see that performance-based policy is
associated with an increased intention to adopt NMP. If indeed the lack of behavior
change is due to policy phase-in periods as suggested above, the increased intention to
adopt NMP in performance-based policies suggests promise for future behavior change in
performance-based policies. However, we know that intention to change can be quite
distinct from actual behavior change. For example, Niles et al. study of New Zealand
farmers intended versus actual adoption of climate change mitigation and adaptation
strategies showed that intended adoption did not correlate well with actual behavior
change (2016). In order to encourage this shift from intention to actual behavior change
we can look to the results of our first model again to suggest that profitability, public
pressure and industry support may help motivate farmers who intend to adopt an NMP to
follow through with actual adoption. Additionally, in mandatory policies, enforcement of
the policies may also help shift intention to actual adoption. Regardless, the increased
intention to adopt NMP in performance-based policies suggest that they are more likely
to be associated increased levels of behavior change in the future, relative to mandatory
practice-based policies and no policy regions.
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3.5.2 Do policy choice rules impact decision making and does this have implications for
policy support?
Across the full sample, in the extent of adoption model (Figure 3-4) and the
intention to adopt model (Figure 3-8), we see evidence that all four TPB variables,
attitudes, subjective norms, moral norms (i.e. environmental stewardship) and perceived
behavioral control are significant, positive predictors of NMP behavior. This suggests, as
would be expected by the literature, that values and beliefs are an important component
of NMP behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011; Stern et al., 1999). When the sample is
broken down into policy sub-groups, for both extent of adoption and intention to adopt,
there is greater evidence for value alignment in the no policy group than both of the
mandatory groups, suggesting that values and beliefs may play lesser roles in adoption of
NMP in regulatory contexts than in non-regulatory contexts. Environmental stewardship
and subjective norms are only significant predictors of extent of adoption and intention to
adopt, respectively, in the no policy sub-group model. This suggests that, subjective
norms and stewardship moral norms may only be relevant to behavior outside of
regulatory environments.
However, perceived behavior control and attitudes are both positive and
significant predictors of adoption behavior in both the no policy group and performancebased group’s extent of NMP adoption and intention to adopt NMP models respectively.
According to Fishbein & Ajzen, the role of perceived behavioral control is expected to
both moderate the impact of social norms and attitude on intention and the impact of
intention on actual behavior (2011, p. 181). Logically, one would assume that once a
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farmer has already adopted NMPs as a practice then attitudes and norms would play less
of a role in determining which nutrient management strategies or structures are
implemented. Instead, as we see here, we would expect the farmers’ capabilities and their
farm system dynamics to drive adoption. However, this result is not observed amongst
farmers in the practice-based policy group. In the practice-based group, operating a dairy
farm was the only significant predictor of extent of nutrient management plan adoption.
The significance of attitudes and norms in the full sample intention to adopt
NMP model is also in line with what one would expect from the TPB, as Fishbein and
Ajzen suggest, it is not anticipated that one would see a strong relationship between
perceived behavioral control and intention because “the fact that I am capable of
performing a behavior does not necessarily imply that I will intend to do so” (2011, p.
181).
For both extent of NMP adoption and intention to adopt an NMP, when broken
down by policy group, we see that no TPB variables are correlated with farmers’
adoption or intention decisions in a practice-based policy. Instead, in practice-based
policies, farm and farmer characteristics appear to drive adoption and intention. However,
for farmers in performance-based policies, we see perceived behavioral control and
attitudes play a role in adoption extent and intention to adopt (respectively). In practicebased policies, were farmers are required to adopt specific practices, it appears that an
individual farmer’s level of perceived behavioral control doesn’t matter. However, in
performance-based policies, where farmers’ have the autonomy to determine how to
achieve a benchmark, perceived behavioral control is important. This indicates that
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fostering perceived behavioral control amongst farmers in performance-based policies
can help to capitalize on their increased likelihood to intend to adopt NMP and motivate
actual NMP adoption.
Furthermore, this seems to imply that there is more room in performance-based
policies for farmers to make adoption decisions that align with their internal values and
beliefs. Additional evidence for this lies in the fact that farmers in performance-based
policies TPB drivers align with the TPB drivers for farmers in the no policy group. We
interpret this in terms of policy success to say that farmers in performance-based regimes
show greater potential for prolonged policy support. According to social movement and
public policy theory, value alignment between a policy and on farm management is more
likely to result in policy support than value misalignment (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014;
Stern et al., 1999).

3.6. Limitations
Before concluding, we would like to acknowledge a few limitations of the study.
First, the practice-based versus performance-based categorization system for water
quality policies employed in the policy coding for this paper is a simplification of the
nuances of each unique policy. For example, not all farms under a policy may be subject
to the practice or performance standards of the policy and there are often farms that
because of size (e.g. small commercial farms) or type (e.g. forms of low input agriculture
such as some varieties of horticulture and vegetable farms). However, this is likely to be
a small number of our commercial farm sample and these farms would have most likely
been exposed to the policy discussion and policy signal.
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We would also like to acknowledge some limitations in the application of the
TPB in the study. Other implementations of the TPB often use sets of paired questions to
compute the attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control components
which includes both the participant’s evaluation of the impact of the element on the
behavior and the participant’s assessment of the importance of the element to themselves
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011; Willcox, Giuliano, & Monroe, 2012). Due to question
restrictions, we were unable to ask participants to evaluate the strength of importance of
the TPB elements and therefore our measures may be seen as partial representations of
the constructs. Additionally, we use a proxy behavior for nutrient management planning
for the subjective norms question in this study (i.e. environmentally friendly farming), on
the survey to represent subjective norms towards NMP. As NMPs are a tool to farm at
agronomic rates and described by both industry and regulations to reduce the
environmental impact of a farm system, we see this as an appropriate proxy. However, it
would be preferable for this question to have been asked explicitly about NMP (Fishbein
& Ajzen, 2011). Finally, it is likely that the stringency (e.g. amount of reduction required
and/or precision of monitoring and compliance) of each of the water quality policies
plays a role in driving behavior change. Analyzing the stringency of each policies was
out of the scope of this study, but future research should investigate how stringency
interacts with values and beliefs and behavior change.

3.7. Conclusion
Agricultural NPS pollution is a challenging environmental issue to manage and
a growing concern for watersheds across the globe. As regions seek certainty in attaining
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long term water quality improvements, it is likely that more will turn to mandatory, rulesbased policies. The results of this study suggest that a switch to mandatory policies is not
assured to increase nutrient management behavior change. However, our results do
suggest that mandatory performance-based policies are associated with an increased
likelihood of future behavior change compared to mandatory practice-based policies and
no mandatory policy. Furthermore, performance-based policies show greater potential for
prolonged policy support from farmers due to better alignment with farmer decision
making values and norms compared to practice-based policies. Given the complexity of
agricultural NPS, achieving water quality goals requires both behavior change on the
landscape and sustained policy support to maintain behavior change over a long period of
time. It is likely that any form of mandatory policy will incur a degree of cost and
resistance amongst the farming community as compared to a voluntary policy. However,
if mandatory policy is necessary to achieve water quality results, our results suggest that
performance-based policy increases the likelihood of attaining water quality goals and
may be more palatable to farmers in that it allows them autonomy and flexibility in
running their farm system. Long term monitoring of farmer nutrient management
behavior is needed to better understand whether mandatory policies will result in
increased nutrient management behavior and therefore increased water quality
improvements.
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Authors: Courtney Hammond Wagner, Suzie Greenhalgh, Meredith T. Niles, Asim Zia,
William Bowden

4.1. Abstract
Water quality policy for agricultural lands strives to improve water quality
through changing farmer behavior across the landscape. Understanding what farmers are
doing on their land and the drivers that influence these behaviors are signals of whether
water quality will improve and if behavior is changing in the intended direction. This
study utilizes farmer behavior and mental models to qualitatively examine the fit of water
policy within its social-ecological context and the interplay of the water quality policy
within existing institutional dynamics, each of which contribute to the ability of the
policy to achieve the overall goal of increased water quality. We investigate farmer
behavior in three mandatory agricultural NPS pollution regimes in similar contexts in
Vermont, USA and Taupo and Rotorua, New Zealand that vary by policy design and
degrees of implementation. Vermont, USA has implemented mandatory practice-based
rules that require farmers to enact a specific set of practices to improve water quality.
Whereas Taupo and Rotorua both have mandatory-performance based policies that
require farms to stay below a nutrient leaching limit, but give farms the flexibility to
achieve the limit how they see fit. Vermont and Taupo’s policies are operational and
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Rotorua’s policy had been formalized by the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (i.e. the
formal rules had been written and released to the public) but not yet operational.
We interviewed 38 farmers across the three regions to examine farmers reported
behavior change, perceptions of the drivers causing those behaviors and perceived
individual and watershed outcomes. We then used the social-ecological systems (SES)
framework to inform content analysis of each interview. Coding was aggregated by
region to produce group mental model networks, consisting of farmers reported links
between drivers, behaviors and outcomes. Each region’s mental model network was
analyzed using simple network analysis techniques to identify influential elements in
each network. Our results show that farmers report behavior change across the three
regions, with Vermont farmers reporting the highest number of changes per farmer,
followed by Taupo and then Rotorua. We also see different patterns in types of behavior
changes with dominance of structural changes in Vermont (e.g. fencing or buffers) and
system changes in Taupo (e.g. switch from dairy to cattle farm system), and no
dominance in Rotorua. Farmers report that the water quality policy is a key driver of
behavior change across all three regions, but we see the interplay between the water
quality policy and existing institutional dynamics contributes to the different behavioral
patterns, as well as perceived outcomes. Farmers in Vermont’s practice-based policy
reported greater behavior change and practice adoption, but farmers in Taupo’s
performance-based policy reported greater levels of system change which ultimately may
be associated with higher nutrient reductions. We conclude by suggesting that driver-
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behavior-outcome dynamics should be considered carefully in future policy design to
achieve the desired water quality outcomes.

4.2. Introduction
Water quality policy targeting agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution
strives to improve water quality through changing farmer behavior across the landscape.
Despite the pervasive impact of agricultural NPS pollution to freshwater systems around
the globe, little is known about the social, economic, and political dynamics that
contribute to the persistence of the problem, including the role of mandatory NPS
pollution policy in changing farmer behavior (Carpenter et al., 1998; McDowell et al.,
2015; Rissman & Carpenter, 2015). What farmers are doing on their land and the drivers
that influence these behaviors are signals of whether water quality will improve and if
behavior is changing as intended. The mental models farmers hold with respect to the
motives for their nutrient management behavior can help identify underlying mechanisms
driving behavior (Saldaña, 2015). Mental models are “internal representation of external
reality that people use to interact with the world around them”(Jones, Ross, Lynam,
Perez, & Leitch, 2011, para. 1). Understanding farmers’ mental models can in turn shed
light on the interplay between a water quality policy, the broader watershed context, and
social, economic and ecological outcomes.
History is littered with examples of policy interventions gone wrong, in which
the intended behavior is not achieved, or worse yet, the opposite of the social objective of
the policy is realized (Goodin, 1998). For water quality policy to achieve the desired
outcome (e.g. farm management change to improve water quality), it must fit well with
95

the pre-existing institutions that structure social interaction and behavior in a given
setting (Goodin, 1998). As Young highlights, “institutions play a role in both causing and
addressing problems that arise from human-environment interactions,” hence the fit of
the institution to the biophysical context and the interplay of the institution with other
existing institutional arrangements are important elements in the success of the
institutional intervention (Young et al., 2008, p. xiiv). Institutions, as used here, refer to
the formal or informal rules, strategies or norms that constrain human interaction and
behavior (North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005). Due to challenges in measuring and monitoring
agricultural NPS pollution (Meals et al., 2010), it is important to look for other avenues to
understand what is driving NPS pollution trends. Farmer behavior and mental models are
a promising alternative that can be used to qualitatively assess the fit and functioning of
an agricultural NPS policy regime.
This study utilizes interviews and network analysis to examine farmer nutrient
management behavior in a water quality policy context, thereby integrating farmers’
individual decision-making processes and the influence of the broader watershed social,
economic, political and ecological context. We investigate farmer behavior in three
agricultural NPS pollution policies in similar contexts in Vermont, USA and New
Zealand that vary by policy choice rules and degrees of implementation.
Within these policy frameworks, farmers have a set of “choice rules”, which
specify what a farmer “must, must not, or may do” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 200). The
mandatory policy regimes under consideration represent two different types of choice
rules: practice-based and performance-based. Under a practice-based policy, as is the
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case in Vermont, farmers must implement a series of practices or structures to be in
compliance. In a performance-based regime, as is the case in both New Zealand regions,
farms are required to stay under a performance limit for modeled nutrient leaching from
the farm, but they can choose any suite of strategies to achieve the standard. The Lake
Taupo policy has been operation since 2011, Vermont since 2016 and the Rotorua
process is yet to be implemented and therefore represents a policy signal, i.e.
requirements for policy known but no enforcement.
Through examining farmer perceptions and behavior in a spectrum of
agricultural NPS pollution policy regimes, this study will contribute to an understanding
of how policy influences and interacts with nutrient management behavior. We address
three key research questions to explore policy performance, policy fit and policy
interplay across the three policy contexts: 1) what types of nutrient management behavior
changes do farmers report making, if any? 2) What do farmers perceive as the drivers of
their nutrient management changes? And 3) what are the perceived individual and
watershed outcomes of behavior changes and the NPS pollution policy?

4.3. Theoretical Framework
Elinor Ostrom’s social-ecological systems (SES) framework provides a
theoretical basis from which to examine the institutional governance of interactions
between actors within natural resource regimes (Ostrom, 2009, 2011). Typically, in the
application of Ostrom’s framework to understand collective action, individual behavior is
assumed to be boundedly rational, in that individuals intend to behave rationally but have
limited information, cognition and attention processing abilities (Ostrom, 2011; Poteete et
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al., 2010; Simon, 1972). In cases like agricultural NPS pollution where there are high
degrees of uncertainty in resource dynamics which makes measurement, monitoring and
enforcement of policy institutional interventions difficult, there is an increased need to
understand individuals’ mental models and internal decision making processes (see
chapter 2).
This study seeks to build on the literature in applying the SES framework to
explore the institutional drivers of nutrient management behavior within a policy context
through farmers’ mental models. Ostrom’s SES framework (2009) considers the
interactions between governance systems (e.g. water quality policy), users (e.g.
individual farmer decision making processes), resource systems (e.g. farm systems),
resource units (e.g. nutrient dynamics) and system outcomes (e.g. water quality) as shown
in Figure 4-1. The SES framework focuses on the way in which these interactions exist
within broader social, economic, political and ecological dynamics. The framework in
particular, building on Ostrom’s work with the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework, seeks to understand the workings of “action arenas,” in which actors interact
in the context of the broader system to produce outcomes, e.g. improved water quality
(Ostrom, 2005). The focus of this study is on nutrient management decision making and
behavior, in which the agricultural NPS pollution water quality policy rules interacts with
individual behavior, the community and the biophysical world (Ostrom, 2005).
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Figure 4-1. Adaptation of the SES Framework to Agricultural NPS pollution, adapted from Ostrom
(2009) and revised from Hammond Wagner et al. (forthcoming) (chapter 2 of this dissertation).

Typically in applications of the SES framework researchers use a diversity of
metrics and indices (Cox, 2014; Leslie et al., 2015; McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014), but
rarely include perspectives of individuals within the system. Here we present a novel
application of the framework, drawing on farmers’ internal perceptions of dynamics in
the SES (i.e. mental models) to identify the most salient aspects of the system to
individual farmers’ behavior and decision making. Each farmer in the watershed is
operating based on their own understanding of their situation and the broader context.
Farmers, like all people, filter and store information through their mental models and, as
Jones et al. (2011, para. 4) suggest, mental models are “limited and unique to each
individual…context-dependent and may change according to the situation in which they
are used.” Therefore, exploring farmer mental models within the context of a water
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quality policy can provide important insight into how farmers are evaluating alternatives,
framing discussions and making decisions that ultimately impact water quality (Carley &
Palmquist, 1992).
A mental modeling approach, i.e. eliciting actor mental models, has been
employed to understand a broad range of environmental behavior and decision making,
including irrigator water-use decisions in a water stressed basin (Douglas et al., 2016),
farmer definitions of sustainable agriculture (Hoffman, Lubell, & Hillis, 2014), organic
farmers’ weed management decisions (Jabbour et al., 2014), and the public’s climate
change beliefs (Zia & Todd, 2010). Furthermore, mental models can be aggregated or
grouped to examine “collective knowledge and understanding of a particular domain held
by a specific population of individuals” (Hoffman et al., 2014, p. 36). These group mental
models are the focus of this study, in that we group individual farmer mental models
within each of the three water quality policy regions to examine and compare collective
understanding of nutrient management in each social-ecological context.

4.4. Methods
We employ qualitative interviews and network analysis to examine farmer
mental models in three water quality SES’s that have mandatory policy to curtail
agricultural NPS pollution.
4.4.1 Study Site Descriptions
The three focal agricultural NPS pollution policy contexts of this study are:
Rotorua, Bay of Plenty region and Taupo, Waikato region, both in New Zealand, and
Vermont, USA. As noted above, these regions differ in terms of policy choice rules, i.e.
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practice-based versus performance-based, and degree of implementation. These regions
have each implemented agricultural NPS pollution policy that regulates nutrients coming
off of farms, as opposed to more upstream regulation that targets nutrient import to the
farm. The three regions are all agriculturally dominated landscapes that have seen
agricultural intensification in the last few decades which has been associated with
decreases in water quality (Mcdowell, Larned, & Houlbrooke, 2009; Quinn et al., 2009;
Rutherford, Pridmore, & White, 1989; Smeltzer, 2015; Smeltzer, Shambaugh, & Stangel,
2012). Table 4-1 gives a description of each of the three case study regions using the high
level SES categories shown in Figure 4-1.
Before describing the specifics of each region, it is important to note some
general differences between the New Zealand and Vermont social, economic and political
settings. Agriculture in the United States is highly subsidized (Kirwan, 2009), which
includes millions of dollars in cost-share for farmers to adopt conservation agricultural
practices (Baylis, Peplow, Rausser, & Simon, 2008). In sharp contrast, New Zealand
abolished all agricultural subsidies in 1984 and is export-based, meaning that farmers are
exposed to international market dynamics (Quinn et al., 2009). While Vermont exports
most of its agricultural products outside of the state (Wironen et al., 2018), it is partially
protected from market exposure due to national subsidies. Another important difference
is the dominance of pastoral agriculture across New Zealand, compared to the semi- and
full-confinement systems for animal agriculture in Vermont.
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Table 4-1. SES description of the three case study regions
Case study
policy regions
Resource units

Taupo, Waikato Region,
New Zealand
Nitrogen

Rotorua, Bay of Plenty
Region, New Zealand
Nitrogen

Vermont, United States

Resource system

Mostly extensive pasturebased beef and sheep farms
with some dairy operations

Mixture of pasture-based
dairy operations and sheep
and beef operations

Mixture of full and semiconfinement dairy, semiconfinement cattle,
vegetable and other
diversified farm systems

Governance
System

Variation 5: performancebased cap-and-trade

Rule 11 and Proposed Plan
Change 10: performancebased cap-and-trade

Act 64 and the Required
Agricultural Practices:
practice-based regulation

Users

Farmers

Farmers

Farmers

Social,
economic,
political setting

*No subsidies for
agriculture (Quinn et al.,
2009)
*International export-based
market (Quinn et al., 2009)
*Public pressure on
agriculture, and dairy in
particular, to reduce water
quality impacts (Holland,
2015)
*National policy focus on
improving water quality
across New Zealand
(NPSFM, 2014)
*Taupo first in country to
take a stringent regulatory
approach (Yerex, 2009)

*No subsidies for agriculture
(Quinn et al., 2009)
*International export-based
market (Quinn et al., 2009)
* Public pressure on
agriculture, and dairy in
particular, to reduce water
quality impacts (Holland,
2015)
*National policy statement
for freshwater in 2011/2014
mandates water quality
limits across country by
2025 (NPSFM, 2014)
*Rotorua early adopter of
water quality regulation
(behind Taupo and some
other regions)

*Lots of subsidies for
agriculture, including
incentives and programs
to adopt conservation
practices (McDowell et
al., 2015)
*Most agricultural
products are sold out of
state, but less exposure to
international markets
than NZ farmers
(Wironen et al., 2018)
*Public finger pointing at
dairy as the problem for
water quality in Lake
Champlain and other
waterbodies throughout
the state (Flagg, 2015; J.
M. Smith, Parsons, Van
Dis, & Matiru, 2008)

Phosphorus

Taupo, New Zealand
The Lake Taupo watershed is located in the center of the North Island of New
Zealand and is the country’s largest lake. The watershed is dominated by pastoral
agriculture consisting of approximately 120 farms, mainly extensive sheep and cattle
farms, with a few dairies. With evidence for declining water quality and algal blooms in
the early 2000s, the Waikato Regional Council proposed “Variation No. 5 – Lake Taupo
Catchment” in 2005 to clean up Lake Taupo (Waikato Regional Council, 2011), which
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became operational in 2011. The policy is a performance-based cap-and-trade for
nitrogen, the main nutrient of concern in the lake, and features three core aspects. First,
farm nitrogen leaching was capped at current levels (i.e. prior to the proposed policy) and
each farm was given a “nitrogen discharge allowance” based on historical levels of
nitrogen use (Waikato Regional Council, 2011). Second, a trust was endowed with 80
million New Zealand dollars of government funds to reduce 20% of the nitrogen in the
catchment to align the nitrogen load with estimates of the catchment’s sustainable
nitrogen load. Third, the policy set up a nitrogen market to allow farmers to trade
nitrogen discharge allowances between each other to allow for increases or decreases in
individual farms’ nitrogen leaching, while maintaining the overall basin level. Farms are
monitored through annual modeling of the farm system to ensure compliance with their
nitrogen discharge allowance and are required to pay an annual fee (Waikato Regional
Council, 2011).
Rotorua, New Zealand
Lake Rotorua watershed is also located in central North Island, New Zealand
and is about 80 km northeast of Lake Taupo. Similar to the Lake Taupo, the Lake
Rotorua watershed is dominated by pastoral agriculture, with a similar number of farms
to Taupo, but including a stronger presence of dairy farms. As a result of declining water
quality in the Rotorua Lakes region, the Bay of Plenty regional council passed Rule 11 in
2005 which, similar to Taupo’s Variation 5, capped farm nitrogen emissions at their
current levels. This policy was meant to stop agricultural intensification in the region.
Further rules, Proposed Plan Change 10, were proposed to reduce the overall amount of
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nitrogen leaching in the watershed. Proposed Plan Change 10 was notified in February,
2016 (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2016). Proposed Plan Change 10 is also a
performance-based cap-and-trade for nitrogen, including a nitrogen discharge allowance
for each farm. Similar to Taupo, the policy features an incentives board with 40 million
New Zealand dollars of government funding to remove nitrogen from the catchment and
the potential for farm-to-farm trading of nitrogen. Unlike Taupo, Rotorua farmers must
make mandatory reductions in their nitrogen leaching rates to achieve the required 42%
reduction in the watershed’s nitrogen load. Farms must reach their required load
reductions before they can trade nitrogen. Once operational, farmers will need to pay an
annual fee and be monitored annually for compliance with their nitrogen discharge
allowance (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2016).
Vermont, United States
The state of Vermont is located in the northeastern United States on the border
with Canada. While Vermont’s policy is state-wide, it was motivated by the need to
address the phosphorus-driven eutrophication of Lake Champlain, a watershed shared by
Vermont, New York State, and the province of Quebec, Canada. Similar to the New
Zealand watersheds, the Lake Champlain Basin has seen declining water quality for
decades due primarily to agricultural intensification and urban development (USEPA,
2016). Vermont’s agricultural industry includes dairy, cattle, and vegetable farms, with
dairy dominating agricultural land use and economic output (Vermont Dairy Promotion
Council, 2015). In 2015, the Vermont legislature passed Act 64 to enact new regulations
for managing phosphorus on farms, as well as rules for other sources of phosphorus (Act
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64: An Act Relating to Improving the Quality of State Waters, 2015). Under Act 64,
farms are required to comply with the Required Agricultural Practices (RAPs) which
include mandatory practices, such as writing nutrient management plans, requirements
for cover cropping on highly erodible soils, winter manure and flood plain spreading
bans, and 25 foot (7.5 meter) buffers between farm fields and surface waters (Vermont
Agency of Agriculture, Food & Markets, 2018). It should be noted that some of these
practices were already required for medium and large farms before Act 64. Under the
new rules, farms must register with the state, pay an annual fee and are monitored for
compliance with the RAPs at a rate dependent on farm size: every year for large farms (>
700 dairy cows or equivalent, e.g. 1000 beef cattle), every three years for medium size
farms (<700 and >200 dairy cows or equivalent) and every seven years for small farms
(<200 dairy cows or equivalent).
Phosphorus and Nitrogen Dynamics
As shown in Table 4-1, the case study sites differ in their focal nutrient of
concern: Vermont’s rules are written to reduce phosphorus runoff from farms and
Taupo’s and Rotorua’s rules target reductions in nitrogen leaching from farms.
In freshwater systems phosphorus tends to be the limiting nutrient for cyanobacteria or
algal blooms because the phosphorus cycle lacks external atmospheric inputs, unlike
nitrogen (Schindler, 1977). However, in the Lake Taupo and Lake Rotorua watersheds
there are naturally high occurring levels of phosphorus, so the limiting nutrient for
cyanobacteria in these lakes is considered to be nitrogen (Edgar, 1999; Rutherford et al.,
1989). There is debate as to whether a nitrogen-only management strategy is appropriate
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(see Morgenstern et al. (2015), Abell et al. (2016) and Smith et al. (2015) for
commentary on this debate), but the current policies are written only to address nitrogen
leaching from farms. It should be noted, however, that Rotorua’s Proposed Plan Change
10 does address phosphorus mitigation in the watershed, but not as a part of the rules for
farmers (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2016, p. 10).
The differences in the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles do have implications for
nutrient management behavior on farms that should be taken into account when
comparing the impact of policy on behavior between these three regions. The primary
difference, from a management perspective, is that phosphorus’ main transport pathway
off the farm is through soil erosion and overland water flow, whereas nitrogen’s primary
transport pathway off the farm is through sub-surface flow, such as leaching into
groundwater (Carpenter et al., 1998; Mcdowell et al., 2009). In both cases, managing
fertilizer inputs and timing is an important mechanism for managing nutrient loses form
the farm system. However, nutrient management behaviors that target transport factors
from farm systems will have differential impacts on nitrogen leaching and phosphorus
runoff.
4.4.2 Data Collection
We completed a total of 38 semi-structured interviews with farmers as shown in Table
4-2. New Zealand interviews were completed between June and August, 2016 and
Vermont, USA interviews were completed between February, 2017 and September, 2018.
It is important to note that while the number of interviews between each region is fairly
balanced, the number of farmers interviewed in Vermont represents a much smaller
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proportion of the farming population in Vermont compared to the proportion represented
by our sample in Taupo and Rotorua. An interview protocol was used as a basis for the
semi-structured interviews. Farmers were asked about their farm system, any changes
they have made to managing nutrients on their farm in the last 5-10 years, the drivers of
those changes, and their perceptions of the broader water quality and policy context in the
watershed (see Appendix 2 Table 5-7 for interview protocol). Interview duration ranged
between 30 minutes and 3 hours and were conducted by the lead author. Each transcript
was recorded and transcribed. Prior to conducting interviews, we received an exempt
certification for the research from the University of Vermont’s Institutional Review
Board.
Table 4-2. Interview sample across regional policy contexts
Region
Farmers interviewed

All

Vermont

Taupo

Rotorua

Total

38

16

11

11

By farm type
Dairy

23

11

3

9

Beef, cattle or deer

15

5

8

2

1

1

0

0

11
12
15

11
4
1

0
4
7

0
4
7

Vegetable
By farm size
Small
Medium
Large

Farmer participants were selected using maximum variation sampling to
purposely interview participants that represented a diversity of farm systems types (e.g.
dairy, beef cattle, sheep, vegetable) and farm sizes (e.g. small, medium, large following
Vermont’s farm size categories referenced above) in an effort to capture the breadth of
experiences (Morse, 2010). To recruit participants, we worked with key individuals in
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each region, including agricultural extension agents and regional government employees
to identify an initial list of potential participants. Following this initial contact list, we
used snowball sampling to recruit additional participants and, in Vermont only, reached
out to the agricultural community to recruit participants through the Vermont Agency of
Agriculture, Food and Market’s monthly newsletter and the Vermont Farm Bureau.
4.4.3 Data Analysis
Interview Coding
Interview transcripts were analyzed using directed (i.e. theory-driven)
qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) in NVivo 12 (QSR International
Pty Ltd, 2018), followed by network analysis of codes and their relationships to identify
themes (Pokorny et al., 2018). We use the SES Framework (Ostrom, 2009) to examine
the interactions between nutrient management drivers, including governance dynamics,
farmer attributes, farm system dynamics and nutrient dynamics, as shown above in Figure
4-1. The interaction of interest for this study is the farmers’ nutrient management
behavior. We also examined how drivers and behaviors relate to farmers’ perception of
individual and watershed level outcomes.
We used del Mar Delgado-Serrano and Ramos’ (2015) definition of variables in
the SES Framework as a starting point for the content analysis. From there the content
analysis proceeded as an inductive and deductive process, identifying behaviors, drivers
and outcomes and the relationships between them for each interview. We also allowed for
sub-categories to emerge in the coding process that were not present in del Mar DelgadoSerrano and Ramos’ (2015) articulation of the SES framework to capture the full range of
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relevant drivers, behaviors and outcomes. For example, we differentiated between
individual-level and watershed-level outcomes, a distinction not made in Ostrom (2009)
or del Mar Delgado-Serrano and Ramos’ (2015) use of the SES framework.
Differentiating between levels of outcomes allowed us to capture variation in individual’s
own personal experience of the policy and their perception of community outcomes.
Following the SES Framework, we differentiate between social, economic and ecological
outcomes. We also coded outcomes according to the farmer’s stated or implied valence of
the outcome. See Appendix 2 Table 5-8 for the full codebook used in the analysis,
description of codes, and representative quotes.
To capture farmers’ nutrient management behavior we coded any self-reported
change in nutrient management behavior in the last 5-10 years or concrete, planned
changes to occur in the next two years. We categorized nutrient management behavior
change into one of three categories: management changes, structural changes, or system
changes, as defined in Table 4-3. Our constructed categories reflect a spectrum in capital
expense and time commitment required to make the changes, as well as the reversibility
of the changes (e.g. management changes are generally less capital/time intensive and
more reversible compared to structural, and structural are generally less so than system).
The spectrum also captures variation in the potential change in nutrient loss that one
would expect to see from a nutrient management change.
Management changes can be very impactful in achieving nutrient reductions as
they can represent a direct reduction in the amount of nutrients mobilized in a watershed,
for example through reducing nutrient inputs in fertilizer amounts. However,
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management changes are likely to hit a limit in potential nutrient reductions without
changing other farm dynamics due to farm production needs. Structural changes, such as
riparian buffers, water detainment berms, or new manure pits reduce nutrient inputs
mainly through mitigating nutrient runoff or leaching. For example, riparian bank buffers
work by capturing phosphorus before it enters the stream ecosystem. However, research
has shown that it is possible for buffers over time to become saturated with phosphorus
and actually transition to a source of phosphorus entering streams (Dodd & Sharpley,
2016). In most cases, structural changes adjust nutrient pathways on the farm and not the
overall amount of nutrients used. System changes, conversely, usually impact the overall
quantity of nutrients used on the farm through changing the amount required for farm
production needs and therefore represent the highest potential for nutrient reduction.
Table 4-3. Categories of nutrient management behavior changes on farms
Category
Management

Definition
Changes that effect crop or animal
types, plus anything else related to
soil and animal management

Structural

Physical or infrastructure changes
to farm

System

Change in overall farm system
dynamics, including type of
animal/product and expansion or
contraction of land base

Examples of changes in category
Includes changes in timing and amount of
fertilizer application, timing and types of
cropping, stocking rate of animals, type and
amount of feed, and wintering animals on or off
Includes installation of buffers on the side of
fields, fencing out animals, new milking parlor,
new effluent system, water retention bunds, and
animal stand-off pad
Includes transition in farm type between dairy,
beef and sheep, sheep milking, forestry, other
types, transition to organic or grass-based
system, land retirement, purchase of new land,
and sale of land

As discussed above, the distinction between managing nitrogen and phosphorus is
important in that it suggests a different set of management or structural practices will be
relevant for each nutrient. However, the categorization of behaviors used here should
capture a range of behaviors appropriate for both nitrogen and phosphorus management.
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In other words, managing options for nitrogen and phosphorus on farms both include
management, structural and system changes, and we’d expect the trends of capital
intensity, reversibility and potential nutrient reduction associated with the different
categories of nutrient management changes to hold true regardless of nutrient.
Network Analysis
We grouped coded interviews by region (Taupo, Rotorua and Vermont) and
used NVivo 12’s matrix query tool to export aggregate, weighted, nondirectional
(symmetrical) adjacency matrices for each region. Following methods adapted from
Hoffman et al. (2014) and Pokorny et al. (2018), adjacency matrices for each region were
imported into R version 3.5.1 (R Core Team, 2018) and analyzed as group mental model
network graphs using the igraph package (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006).
The adjacency matrices report the co-occurrence of drivers, behaviors and
outcomes in the grouped interviews for a region. To co-occur, two or more codes must
have been assigned to the same portion of text. In the aggregate matrices for each region,
the weight of the relationship between codes represents the number of farmers in that
region that reported a connection between two concepts. When translated into a network
graph, each node represents a concept (i.e. SES driver, behavior or outcome), the link
between them represents a connection between those concepts and the weight of the link
represents the number of participants in a region who made the connection between the
two concepts.
Regional group mental model networks were analyzed using simple network
node statistics, again following Hoffman et al. (2014) and Pokorny et al. (2018). Each
111

node in the network graph is evaluated by occurrence probability and strength. The
occurrence probability of a node represents the likelihood that a node is included in the
network. It is calculated, following Hoffman et al. (2014) as the ratio of farmers that
mentioned the node to the total number of farmers in a region’s sample. In our analysis,
this represents the extent to which a node resonates across a regional sample. Strength
represents a combination of the occurrence probability of a node and the number of nodes
that a node is connected to (i.e. the “degree” in network statistics). Strength represents
both the breadth and prominence of influence of a node. It is the sum of the weights of
links for all links connected to a node (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006). We analyzed each of the
regions’ group mental models separately and below interpret themes and results using
representative quotes from interviews. Further, to examine which SES subcategories were
most influential in driving nutrient management behavior, we analyzed a subset graph
with only drivers and behaviors (i.e. no outcomes) to isolate the connections between
drivers and behaviors. In this subset graph, we then ranked drivers in each region by node
strength and report on driver rankings. The network visualizations for each of the three
regions, including a network with just high-level SES categories and a more detailed
network with SES subcategories are in Appendix 2 Figure 5-2 to Figure 5-7.

4.5. Results
4.5.1. Behavior Changes
Farmers across all regions reported making a number of behavior changes
relevant to nutrient dynamics on their farms. As shown in Table 4-4, on average, farmers
in Vermont made 5.81 behavior changes each, farmers in Taupo made 4.55 behavior
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changes each and farmers in Rotorua made 3.64 behavior changes each. Farmers across
all three regions made management changes, but Taupo farmers also favored system
changes (versus structural changes), whereas Vermont farmers favored structural
changes. Rotorua farmers do not show a preference for structural versus system changes.
Table 4-4. Count of nutrient management changes and average number of behavior changes per
person by Region
Taupo (n = 11)
Behavior change

Vermont (n = 16)

Rotorua (n = 11)

Count

Average

Count

Average

Count

Average

Management changes
Structural changes
System changes

33
4
19

3.00
0.36
1.73

46
40
10

2.88
2.50
0.63

19
14
11

1.73
1.27
1.00

Total changes

50

4.55

93

5.81

40

3.64

We examined counts of specific changes by behavior category as described
below. Some behaviors are specific to each region and agricultural systems. These
practices include soil sampling (VT), no-till (VT), manure spreading (VT), putting in a
new barn or updating barn structures to mitigate runoff (VT), and grazing animals off of
pasture or farm for a period time to reduce nutrient leaching (NZ).
Management Changes
The top two management categories for all three regions are seeding varieties/
cropping changes and fertilizer changes as shown in Figure 4-2. Reduced animal stocking
rate was a relatively common management change in Taupo and Rotorua, but no farmers
in Vermont reduced animal numbers on their farm. Only Vermont farmers and one
Rotorua farmer started nutrient management planning and soil sampling. Across all three
regions we see a small number of farmers engaging in learning or pursuing nutrient
management knowledge. All of the behaviors noted thus far would be considered
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behaviors in the intended direction, i.e. leading to reductions in nutrient use or intensity.
We do, however, see two categories of management behavior change with increased
nutrient use: increased fertilizer use and increased stocking rate. In Taupo and Vermont,
one and two farms respectively increased fertilizer use, and just two farms in Vermont
also increased the stocking rate, i.e. the number of animal units on their farm.

Figure 4-2. Number of Management changes by region

Structural Changes
As shown in Figure 4-3, Vermont farmers made the most structural changes.
The structural changes in common across the three regions are fencing and purchasing
new equipment (e.g. more efficient irrigator). The top structural changes for Vermont
were buffers and setbacks, manure pit or pad upgrades, leachate systems and water flow
control structures. In Rotorua, manure pits or pad upgrades was the top structural change.
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In Taupo, relatively few structural changes were made. Those that were made included
milking parlor upgrades (one farmer), equipment upgrade (one farmer) and fencing (two
farmers).

Figure 4-3. Number of Structural Changes by Region

System Changes
The top system changes across all three regions were switching to a lower
intensity farm system and the purchase or lease of new land. In Vermont, three farmers
transitioned to lower intensity, i.e. lower nutrient input, grass-fed and organic dairies. In
Rotorua, four farms retired land into forestry or transitioned to sheep and cattle from
dairy grazing. Finally, in Taupo, six farms retired land into pine plantation or native
plantings or transitioned to beef finishing systems from dairy support or cattle breeding
operations. Figure 4-4 shows the counts of system changes reported by farmers in each of
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the three regions in the study. Taupo and Rotorua farmers report the sale and ceasing of
leasing land, but Vermont farmers do not. Although it should be noted that two of the
farmers that sold land in Taupo also purchased land in the watershed, so they do not
represent an exit from farming in the watershed. Importantly, there are three instances
where farmers shifted to a higher intensity farm system in Rotorua and Taupo including
transitions to dairy, sheep milking and cattle breeding operations. Similarly, in Vermont
there were two cases in which a farmer transitioned land from forestry into agricultural
production. These transitions represent an increase in potential negative water quality
impacts via nutrient runoff and leaching.

Figure 4-4. Number of Systems Changes by Region

4.5.2. Behavioral Drivers
Overall, Taupo and Vermont farmers referenced 19 different SES sub-categories as
behavioral drivers, whereas Rotorua farmers referenced 16 (see Appendix 2 Table 5-9 for
full list of driver nodes by region and Appendix 2 Table 5-10 for a list of ranked driver
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nodes by region). As such, not all SES subcategory drivers were present in each of the
regions. However, in general, farmers in each region referenced many of the same
drivers. Table 4-5 lists the key SES drivers across all three regions and their node
statistics in each region. We define key drivers as those drivers that ranked in the top five
drivers by strength in at least one region.
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Table 4-5. Key behavioral driver node statistics. Key drivers are those that are ranked by strength in
the top five of drivers in at least one of the three regions. Strength captures both the number of other
nodes a node is connected to in the network and the number of individuals that mentioned each
connection. Occurrence probability represents the proportion of individuals in a region that
mentioned a node. Lack of statistics for a node in a region means that a node was not mentioned in
the region.

Water quality
policy
(governance)

Node description

Node statistics

The specific water quality policy in
each region (i.e. Taupo's Variation
5, Vermont's Act 64 and the RAPs
and Rotorua's Rule 11 and
Proposed Plan Change 10)

Government
assistance
(governance)

Technical or financial assistance
from a government agency/entity

Economics (actor)

Any considerations tied to a farm
or farmer’s economic situation,
e.g. income, debt and economic
efficiency of farm

Ecological
(resource system)

Existence, mitigation or prevention
of erosion, runoff, drought,
flooding etc.

Nitrogen market
(social, economic,
political setting)

Purchase or sale of nitrogen in
Taupo's nitrogen market or future
purchase or sale in Rotorua's
nitrogen market

NGOs or other
organizations
(governance)

Interactions with nongovernmental entities including
extension, watershed programs,
land trusts, and research
organizations and universities

Economics and
markets (social,
economic, political
setting)

Broader market and economic
dynamics including prices, market
access and competition

Nitrogen and
phosphorus
attributes (resource
units)

Attributes of nitrogen and
phosphorus and the movement of
these nutrients in the landscape and
farm system
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Taupo

Vermont

Rotorua

Rank

1

2

1

Strength

88

58

42

100%

94%

100%

10
9

1
74

4
14

18%

88%

45%

2

5

2

49

21

2

91%

50%

64%

5

4

3

31

31

17

45%

44%

55%

3

-

10

42

-

2

82%

-

9%

11

3

6

7

48

6

9%

75%

36%

Rank

4

8

8

Strength
Occurrence
probability
Rank

40

9

5

82%

44%

9%

Occurrence
probability
Rank
Strength
Occurrence
probability
Rank
Strength
Occurrence
probability
Rank
Strength
Occurrence
probability
Rank
Strength
Occurrence
probability
Rank
Strength
Occurrence
probability

Strength
Occurrence
probability

8

12

5

16

2

11

27%

6%

27%

Governance Drivers
Water quality policy is the top ranked behavior driver in Taupo and Rotorua, and
the second in Vermont. In both Taupo and Rotorua, the occurrence probability is 100%,
which means that every farmer interviewed referenced water quality policy as a driver of
behavior. In Vermont, similarly, we see a very high occurrence probability of 94%. The
following three quotes, one from each region, demonstrate the influence of each region’s
water quality policy on behavior:

“Some of my land, I’m on the early spreading ban. Due to the new RAPs I
got to hit [by] them in the midsummer, so we’re changing the way we got
to do things, a little bit. We’ll see in a few years. Hopefully, it’ll benefit.”
– Vermont Farmer

“But when Rule 11 came in… we [got rid of] 230 cows and 2 full time
jobs. That was a result of [the water quality policy]. Because we were
leasing land. We were leasing land and then with the [the water quality
policy] we needed to get out of the catchment, which we’ve done.” –
Rotorua Farmer

“We bought the farm and farmed it for a couple of years and through
consultation process, it was pretty obvious that it was going to be capped,
and it might be worse than that, we weren't sure what was going to come
119

out of that…So we decided after a lot of soul-searching that we would
sell.” – Taupo Farmer

In Vermont, instead of water quality policy, government agency assistance has the
highest driver strength rating for nutrient management behavior change in the group
mental model and an occurrence probability of 88%. In Rotorua, government agency
assistance is also relatively influential, ranked 4th amongst behavior drivers with an
occurrence probability of 45%, however, in Taupo, it is ranked 10th, with an occurrence
probability of only 18%. Farmers in Vermont reported government agency assistance
mainly from the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Natural Resources and
Conservation Service (NRCS) programs that give financial assistance for adopting,
upgrading or installing new practices/structures on the farm, as well as technical
assistance and advice form NRCS agents. In Rotorua, farmers referenced some financial
assistance from the Bay of Plenty Regional Council to install physical structures on their
farms such as fencing or water detainment berms, as well as funding to write farm
management plans. The following quote represents the strong influence that NRCS
played in driving behavior change for many Vermont farmers in the sample:

“So, [NRCS agent] just stopped in one day and they’re non-regulatory. It
was just a total social visit and I said, “Well, I’ve got some concerns”….
So, we sat down and he said, “Well, let’s go around and just look at things
if you want. No commitment.” …So, when I started explaining the
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concerns of the stream bank erosion and stuff and you know he had
always been a supporter of conservation stuff anyway. So, he really
listened to me and said, “Yeah, let’s go for it. Let’s do it.” So, [the USDA
NRCS’ Environmental Quality Incentives Program] project is maxed out
at $250,000.00 at the time. Well, we maxed it out.” – Vermont Farmer

NGOs and other organizations ranked third amongst behavioral drivers in Vermont,
sixth in Rotorua and eleventh in Taupo. Seventy five percent of farmers in Vermont
referenced technical assistance from the University of Vermont (UVM) agricultural
extension and organic certification programs, or financial assistance from watershed
programs and land trusts as drivers of their nutrient management behavior changes. One
Vermont farmer noted a sentiment about UVM extension, that was shared by many in the
Vermont farmer sample, in regard to beginning to take soil samples: “I went to Extension
yesterday…They’re really, really helpful.” In Rotorua, only 27% of farmers cited NGO
and other organizations as behavior change drivers, but they included similar categories of
organizations, such as land trusts, research organizations like AgResearch and industry
extension like DairyNZ. The other two governance nodes - other government policies and
participation in a farmer group - were not listed in the top five of behavioral drivers in any
region.
Actor Drivers
Actor economics was an important driver across all three regions. This node
encompasses any considerations tied to a farm or farmer’s economic situation as opposed
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to broader market considerations like price. Other actor sub-category behavior drivers,
representing different attributes of the individual farmers interviewed, were not listed
amongst the top five behavioral drivers in each region, although some still varied quite
considerably in their influence between regions. These other actor drivers include ethic,
flexibility, leadership or entrepreneur, lifestyle, past experience, social attributes and
technology.
Actor economics, in terms of node strength, ranked second in Taupo, second in
Rotorua, and fifth in Vermont. However, occurrence probability did vary quite
significantly between the regions, with 91% of the farmer sample in Taupo citing actor
economic drivers compared with only 64% and 50% of the farmer samples in Rotorua
and Vermont. Actor economic drivers were phrased in similar language across all three
regions. For example, in Vermont, one farmer noted in reference to transitioning forested
land into agricultural land, “really, for me the biggest driver is getting the most out of
every dollar.” Similarly, in Rotorua, when explaining the reason for reducing the use of
nitrogen fertilizer, a farmer stated, “I mean, it was just around maximizing profit.”
Finally, in Taupo, one farmer described their reason for leasing out their land as “three
things, money, money and money.”
Resource System and Resource Unit Drivers
Ecological drivers, such as drought, flooding and erosion, were in the top five of
behavioral drives across all three regions. In Rotorua ecological drivers were ranked 3rd,
including protecting native species, minimizing runoff, and reducing erosion. In
Vermont, ecological drivers were ranked 4th including soil health, minimizing runoff,
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stabilizing streambanks, concerns over water quality and controlling erodible soils.
Lastly, In Taupo, ecological drivers were ranked 5th, with many farmers noting multiple
years of drought as driving behavior. Farm production needs were not listed as a key
behavioral driver in any of the three regions.
Nitrogen and phosphorus attributes were ranked relatively higher in Rotorua (5th)
and Taupo (8th) than Vermont (12th). Only one farmer interviewed in Vermont referenced
attributes of nitrogen and phosphorus as driving behavior (i.e. not the policies treatment
of nitrogen and phosphorus, but the specifics of the nutrients cycling), corresponding to a
6% probability of occurrence in the sample. Whereas, a small subset of farmers in
Rotorua and Taupo demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of nitrogen or
phosphorus dynamics and cited this as a driver of behavior change. For example, one
Taupo farmer said: “we have also learned that we stop leaching here below the root zone
about the middle of October. So we put no fertilizer on until after that date. We do not
use any nitrogen fertilizer. We fertilize to grow clover, and clover is fixing according to
scientists and according to overseer modeling, we are fixing between 250 and 300 kg of
nitrogen per hectare per annum.”

Social, Economic, and Political Setting Drivers
The nitrogen market sub-category is very influential as a behavioral driver in
Taupo, but practically non-existent as a driver in Rotorua and not present as a driver for
Vermont. This code was specific to the existing nitrogen market in Taupo that existed as
a part of the water quality policy as a voluntary nitrogen trading market. The nitrogen
market is ranked 3rd as a behavioral driver in Taupo, with an occurrence probability of
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82%. One farmer in Rotorua referenced concrete plans to sell nitrogen to the newly
formed nitrogen market in Rotorua, and there is no current market in Vermont.
Broader economic and market drivers, such as price, market access and
competition were ranked 4th as a behavioral driver in the Taupo region and 8th in both
Vermont and Rotorua. The ranking, however, doesn’t quite capture the variance in
probability occurrence, which was 82% in Taupo, 44% in Vermont and only 9% in
Rotorua. The other four social, economic and political setting drivers were ranked
relatively low across the three regions in terms of behavioral influence. These include
social context, industry or consultant advice, demographic shifts and carbon market.
4.5.3. Outcomes
Farmers across all three regions reported individual- and watershed-level social,
economic and ecological outcomes related to behavioral changes and the policy process
across the spectrum from negative to neutral to positive.
Individual Outcomes
At the individual level, Taupo farmers reported both more negative and positive
economic outcomes on average than Rotorua and Vermont farmers in the sample.
Negative economic outcome sub-categories at the individual level included compliance
costs, farm viability, financial impacts, and impacts to farm economic flexibility. For
example, one Vermont farmer referenced a negative financial impact related to
requirements under the water quality policy, when they said: “The biggest problem I have
is we have to put a leachate system in. Ugh. It’s an $81,000.00 project, which I don’t
think is even needed,” but later clarified that they wouldn’t pay the full cost of the project.
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Similarly, positive economic outcomes for individuals include the sub-categories of
positive farm viability, positive financial impacts, positive farm economic flexibility and
access to new markets. In terms of positive individual financial outcomes, one Taupo
farmer said in terms of the impact of the water quality policy on their farm business: “To
me it’s been a windfall. We bought land cheaper. We made some very clever smart
moves, so it’s opened up huge opportunities for me as a person.” A number of farmers in
Vermont and Rotorua mentioned that the water quality policy has not had a significant
impact in terms of costs of compliance on their farm economically, represented by the
neutral economic category. Very few Taupo farmers referenced neutral economic
impacts.
In terms of individual social outcomes, Vermont farmers on average reported
more positive individual outcomes than Taupo and Rotorua and less negative social
outcomes than Taupo and Rotorua. In terms of positive individual social outcomes,
farmers reported increased knowledge and awareness, non-financial benefits such as
pride, and recognition for environmental stewardship. For negative individual social
outcomes, farmers mentioned distrust in regulation, non-financial costs like time, stress
and mental health impacts, uncertainty in the future of their farming livelihoods and a
few farmers in Rotorua mentioned feeling like they were unfairly impacted by the water
quality policy at a personal level.
At the individual level, no farmers across any of the regions reported negative
ecological outcomes on their farm as a result of their behavior changes or the water
quality policy, however, a few farmers in Vermont and Rotorua, but not Taupo,
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referenced positive ecological change on their farms in terms of pasture or soil quality,
and water quality.
Watershed Outcomes
Similar to individual level outcomes, farmers across all three regions reported
social, economic and ecological watershed-level outcomes. As shown in Figure 4-5, there
appears to be much greater variation in perceptions of watershed-level outcomes across
the three regions.

Figure 4-5. Number of watershed outcomes by region. Note for Taupo and Rotorua n = 11 and for Vermont
n = 16.

Vermont Watershed Outcomes
In Vermont, relative to Taupo and Rotorua, farmers generally noted more
perceptions of positive and neutral watershed level outcomes than negative. Vermont
farmers mentioned increased community awareness, community well-being and fairness
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as positive social outcomes, and a few reported negative community well-being. One
farmer described the difficulty a neighbor was facing with the new water quality policy
regulations: “And, I think it’s too bad. He gets really upset about it. He’s done a really
good job farming all his life…So, they’re basically forcing him out of business.” In terms
of watershed economic impacts, only a few Vermont farmers noted negative or positive
impacts. On the negative side farmers cited challenges to the agricultural community
operating with low product prices and regulation, while on the positive side farmers cited
financial viability with cost share assistance and flexibility in the water quality policy
regulations.
Eight Vermont farmers perceived positive watershed ecological outcomes, seven
perceived neutral ecological outcomes and no farmers perceived negative ecological
outcomes. Most of Vermont farmers’ ecological outcome perceptions related to existence
or lack of farming management changes on the landscape and not on broader land use
changes. Vermont farmers in the sample appeared split as to whether management
changes were being made, with some farmers reflecting that don’t see changes, like one
Vermont farmer who said, “I go by some of the other farms that do some of the things
they do, I go, “What the heck? How do they get away with that?” Other farmers were
optimistic in their outlook for water quality from land use changes, like this Vermont
farmer who said, “I see the bigger farms – a lot of them are doing cover crops where they
never did before.”
Taupo Watershed Outcomes
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In the Lake Taupo watershed, similar to the individual level outcomes, farmers’
perceptions were polarized, with high numbers of positive and negative outcomes. In
many cases these were the same farmers. Socially, we see that every farmer mentioned at
least one negative outcome of the water quality policy, either along the lines of fairness
of the policy or community well-being. One Taupo farmer reflected on the policy process
by remembering that the “uncertainty emotionally and mentally [was] shocking. It
demotivated farmers, a lot of farmers were depressed because they didn't see a lot of
hope.” Many farmers mentioned other farmers selling their farm and leaving the
catchment during the policy process. For the large number of relatively low intensity
Maori farms in the catchment, farmers expressed that the policy was unfair, as one farmer
reflected, “And being a lot of Maori owned land they went overly heavy about it because
it sort of hindered what they could do with their land further down the track.”
Conversely, a number of farmers reported neutral and positive social outcomes, seven
and four farmers respectively. Neutral watershed social perceptions included acceptance
of the policy, a desire to “just get on with it.” Positive Taupo social watershed outcomes
included flexibility from nitrogen trading and the ability to sell nitrogen to the trust,
which was seen as a positive outcome for Maori farms to allow them to liquidate capital
without selling property. Except for freehold land purchased by Māori individuals, Māori
cannot sell land.
Perceptions of watershed economic impacts in Taupo varied greatly amongst the
farmer sample, with 6 farmers each reflecting on positive and negative economic impacts,
with two reflecting neutral impacts. One farmer explained how the policy negatively
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limits their farm’s economic potential: “Essentially, under this process we can't grow any
more meat per hectare, our livestock numbers are capped at 2004 levels, and cost
inexorably keep growing.” On the positive side, one farmer reflected on farm viability in
Taupo when they mentioned that “the beauty about farming in here is that you've got a
resource that comes in for 25 years. Now, I'd argue that there is nowhere in New Zealand
that you’ve got a license to farm for 25 years.”
Ecologically, perceptions of watershed outcomes in Taupo also varied greatly,
with farmers again split equal between negative and positive perceptions of ecological
outcomes. On the positive side, farmers perceived of the policy technically as a success,
purchasing nitrogen out of the catchment, changing land use to reduce nitrogen leaching,
and capping nitrogen in the watershed and in some cases farmers thought the lake was
clearing up. There appeared to be some disagreement amongst farmers as to whether the
policy achieved its ecological goals. One farmer said that the best thing the policy “did
[was] stop intensification of dairy farming coming close to the lake,” while another
farmer reflected that the policy didn’t do “what they were hoping it would do which was
halt dairy farming.” Some farmers reflected negatively upon the fact that new dairy
farmers were able to come into the watershed under the policy and intensify through
purchasing nitrogen credits from other farmers. Additionally, many farmers reflected
negatively upon the transition of much of the landscape from pastoral agricultural to pine
planation, a lower nitrogen leaching land use, under the water quality policy. As one
Taupo farmer reflected: “All that now is getting developed…That should never ever be
put into trees, and it is going to end up having trees. That is wrong.”
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Rotorua Watershed Outcomes
In Rotorua, farmers in the sample in general perceived more positive ecological
watershed outcomes, more negative social impacts and only negative economic impacts
of the water quality policy process. Economically, seven farmers reported that the policy
process has resulted in a steep decline in investment in farming in the watershed and the
perception that for farming “financially, it’s not doable” to achieve future nutrient
reductions required under the policy. In terms of social impact, nine farmers perceived
negative social impacts at the watershed scale including impacts on community wellbeing and perceived fairness of the policy. According to one Rotorua Farmer, the policy
process has been emotionally difficult: “So, I think – but it’s like grievance; this – this
phase is the angry phase, and then acceptance might come because that’s what
happened…in the Taupo catchment like I say.” Rotorua farmers reported that the policy
is unfair towards farms and that the urban share of the burden is being overlooked.
Furthermore Rotorua farmers expressed frustration that previous actions to reduce
phosphorus runoff that they have undertaken voluntarily have not been given enough
credit under the new policy. A few farmers, four each, noted positive and neutral social
outcomes. One farmer noted that as a result of the policy community awareness and wellbeing has risen: “Well, farmers have become aware of the environmental impacts that
farming has on the waterways and the lakes. So, yeah. Actually, I think that probably the
biggest plus out of it is actually talking to your neighbor, and working with your
neighbor, and seeing what they’re doing.”
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In terms of ecological outcomes, seven Rotorua farmers perceived positive
ecological outcomes, with two perceptions of neutral outcomes and just one negative.
One the positive side, one farmer suggested that the policy has halted land use
intensification: “I think possibly there might have been a few more farms convert to
dairy, or in that time period, had [the water quality policy] not been there.” In some
cases farmers reported that “most farmers have done small changes to improve areas”
whereas others perceived that “the land use, land use change, in the catchment, has been
minor.” While a number of Rotorua farmers noted positive ecological outcomes, similar
to Vermont, the outcomes were mostly around management changes, not land use
change.

4.6. Discussion
4.6.1. Differential Behavior Outcomes
From the perspective of fit and functioning of the mandatory water quality policy in the
three focal regions, farmers in the sample reported changing nutrient management
behavior mostly in the intended direction (i.e. reduced nutrient loading). The actions of
these farmers should improve water quality over time in line with the goals of the policy.
The first clear take-away on behavior is that management changes are the low-hanging
fruit and farmers interviewed across all three regions have made on average 2-3 types of
management changes. Management changes, as defined in Table 4-3 are relatively
inexpensive compared to structural and system changes, more reversible if they fail to
work and do not necessarily require major time or financial investments.
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The difference in structural and system changes between the regions, and in
particular the dominance of structural changes in Vermont compared to the dominance of
system changes in Taupo amongst our sample, may have long term implications for water
quality impacts. As described above, system change are likely to be associated with a
larger range of potential nutrient change because it is likely that system changes to lower
intensity systems will change nutrient dynamics more significantly than structural
changes. This suggests that although Vermont shows the highest reported behavior
change per person in our sample, the high levels of system change reported by farmers in
our sample may ultimately be associated with greater water quality improvements.

4.6.2. Water Quality Policy Interplay with SES Context
The reason for the dominance of structural versus system changes in Vermont
and Taupo in our sample is likely due to the design of each of the policies, as well as the
broader SES context represented by the drivers. There are major differences in how the
policy appears to interplay with the SES context according to each of the regions’ group
mental models.
In Vermont the top three behavioral drivers are government agency assistance,
the water quality policy and NGOs or other organizations. It is notable that Vermont is
the only region in which the water quality policy is not reported as the main driver of
behavior. In essence, Vermont farmers described an incentive-based SES context that
supports farmers with financial and technical assistance to adopt new management and
structural nutrient management practices with a regulatory backstop. This aligns broadly
with the United States’ strong financial support for farmers through subsidies and cost
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share programs. The design of the practice-based policy, requiring specific practices on
farms, also aligns with the program structure of NRCS and other pre-existing programs to
pay farmers a cost share to adopt similar practices. As a result, there are very little system
change happening in Vermont, at least among those that we interviewed. Further, the
heavy role of incentives in the SES context shapes the outcomes for farmers with a lack
of negative social and economic impacts. Relative to Taupo and Rotorua, actor
economics is ranked lower in Vermont suggesting that farmers have the financial ability
to make management and structural changes with the existing financial assistance. In
terms of ecological and long-term water quality outcomes, we see mixed perceptions
about whether the policy is actually having an effect. Farmers interviewed were split
between positive and neutral perceptions of land management changes, and there was not
any discussion of big, landscape scale changes.
In Taupo, the water quality policy is reported as the main behavioral driver,
coupled with farmer economics and the voluntary nitrogen market component of the
policy amongst our farmer sample group mental model. The voluntary nitrogen market
appears to promote system changes as opposed to structural changes and with the
performance-based policy, structures do not “count” in the policy in the way they do in
Vermont. Furthermore, there are not programs to assist farmers in purchasing or
upgrading infrastructure due to the lack of agricultural subsidies. To adapt to the
performance cap, famers in our sample sold nitrogen and used the capital to restructure
their farm system. In Taupo, both actor economics and broader economics and markets
are important drivers. This reflects two polarized experiences: first, many farmers are at
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the margin economically and do not have access to financial assistance to offset new risks
and exposures and second, some farmers benefitted greatly under the new policy regime
and were able to take advantage of the opportunity to further their economic situation.
For many farmers in the first situation in our sample, we see that the new policy has
fostered entrepreneurship and innovation in a way that was not seen in the other two
regions. In Taupo, farmers are experimenting with new farm system types, such as sheep
milking and new branding/marketing strategies to make up for their inability to intensify.
Similarly, Taupo farmers report polarized impacts from the policy with farmers who
gained significantly, farmers who struggled and very few in-between.
Finally, in Rotorua, our study captured a time of high uncertainty with a strong
policy signal. Rotorua’s farmers cited fewer drivers than the other two regions and fewer
behavior changes. However, the water quality policy was reported as the top driver of
behavior change in the region, suggesting that even though just a policy signal (i.e. not
operation), the proposed rules were perceived as changing behavior. The high role of
actor economics reflects that farms are pursuing changes that are low hanging fruit, while
evaluating the potential economic impact of future changes. It is possible that once the
policy is operational, Rotorua will look more like Taupo, with the nitrogen market
playing a central role and more system changes as a result. Unlike Taupo, the regional
council in Rotorua has played a role in giving cost share and technical assistance to farms
to install some structures, mainly fencing and detainment berms on farms in the past ten
years. However, there is not cost share available for practice adoption under the new
policy. As a result, we see highly negative perceptions of social and economic outcomes
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in Rotorua amongst our sample. Interestingly, some farmers reported positive ecological
outcomes as a result of land management changes, but again like Vermont, these were not
perceived as broad landscape changes.
4.6.3. Opportunities for Water Quality Policy Fit and Interplay
Comparing across the three regions, a key takeaway is that in one way or
another, farmers needed financial access or assistance to achieve structural or system
changes. In Vermont, farmers used financial assistance and cost share to make changes,
in Taupo farmers sold nitrogen to enable system change, and in Rotorua, without a
functioning nitrogen market or extensive financial assistance options, there were much
lower levels of structural and system change.
Resource system and resource unit drivers represent interesting opportunities for
policy. Ecological drivers across the three regions played a role in nutrient management
decisions under water quality policy. Aligning nutrient management changes with
ecological functioning on farm, such as drought tolerance or reducing erosion, appears to
be an important component of behavior change. Further, the role of nitrogen and
phosphorus attributes, was a relatively low ranked driver across all three regions, but
particularly low in Vermont. This is surprising given that farmers in Vermont reported
high levels of nutrient management plan adoption, which is intended to improve
efficiency in nutrient use and improve farmers understanding of nutrients in their farm
system (Beegle et al., 2000). In Taupo and Rotorua, the requirement to model the farm
system and staying under a nutrient cap appears to have, in at least a few cases improved
farmer understanding of nutrient dynamics in a way that has changed behavior. Some
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Taupo farmers reported a change in mentality on their farm system to evaluating
efficiency as “dollars profit per kilogram of nitrogen leached.”
Finally, we’d like to end with a point raised by a Taupo farmer when asked about
benefits of the water quality policy:
“I'm nervous about the question, because a lot of research is predicated
on the assumption that you can continue to improve and you can continue
to reduce your environmental impact and continue to increase your
production. No. The lesson from this is that you can't. We shut down 30%
of the farmland in the catchment, those trees that you drove past. We
spent $80 million shutting down those farms. There is nothing on the
science horizon that will allow those farms to continue, and to look after
the lake. So we have to get real with these conversations” – Taupo Farmer
As this Taupo Farmer suggests, conversations around agriculture and water
quality need to acknowledge the true environmental costs of agricultural production.
When agricultural production is brought in line with ecological limits, as was the case in
Taupo, there will most likely be a dramatic social and economic adjustment period for
farm businesses. While we see relatively lower reports of social and economic impacts in
Vermont, we also see less certainty in achieving the ecological goals of the policy. This is
evidenced both by Vermont farmers reliance on structural changes in the region and the
lack of perceived broad landscape changes. Whereas in Taupo, we see social, economic
and ecological changes that have caused deep pain, as well as great opportunity and
innovation. It is likely that Rotorua as reflected here was similar to the Taupo catchment
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5-8 years prior. Moving forward, policy should acknowledge that win-win solutions may
not always be possible. To achieve long term water quality goals, policies may require
significant adjustments to farm systems that align farm production in a watershed with its
ecological capacity, particularly in highly impaired systems. In these cases, policy design
should focus on assisting the farming community through a dramatic adjustment period.

4.7. Conclusion
Farmer behavior change is a critical element of improving water quality and reducing
agricultural NPS pollution. In this study we have looked to farmers experience and
perceptions in three regions facing mandatory rules to curb agricultural NPS pollution.
Water quality policy, and any policy for that matter, exists within a broader socialecological context and the fit and interplay of a policy in that context ultimately
determines the success of the policy. Farmer mental models, as used here in this study,
can provide important insight into how behavior is changing across the landscape and
what combinations of factors are driving it. Our results suggest that policy design
interacts with the social-ecological context to produce differential patterns of behaviors
and outcomes, which ultimately may mean differential improvements in water quality.
Throughout the policy process, attention should be paid to the types of behaviors that are
important for water quality improvements and the degree of adjustment required by
farmers to achieve behavior change. Farmers will likely need support to adjust, and it is
important that support is given for behaviors that will have long term water quality
impacts, or else there is risk of further regulation down the line. More explicit focus on
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farmer behavior and experience within water quality policy can allow for improved
policy design for achieving the ecological goals of the policy.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1. Synthesis of Results
In this dissertation, I have examined the interaction between water quality policy
for agricultural NPS pollution and farmer behavior and decision making to improve our
understanding of if and how policy will improve water quality in agricultural watersheds.
After defining the problem and my approach in the first chapter, in the second chapter I use
declining water quality from agricultural NPS pollution as an example case to explore
ways to improve our analytical study of environmental public goods dilemmas. This
chapter laid the theoretical foundation for the rest of the dissertation by calling for the need
to focus greater attention on the link between institutions and behavior in environmental
public goods dilemmas.
In the third chapter I built on the theoretical foundation in chapter two to explore
the impact of new institutional interventions for agricultural NPS pollution (i.e. mandatory
practice-based and performance-based policies) on farmer nutrient management behavior
and decision making. The key insights from this chapter are that, in the sample of New
Zealand farmers in 2015, there was no evidence that mandatory regimes were driving
increased behavior change amongst farmers when compared to regions without mandatory
policy. If the key role of these policies are to change behavior, this implies two things: 1)
we need to keep monitoring behavior to see if it does change over time and 2) we may
need to consider additional avenues to change behavior within policy regimes. Another key
insight, however, is that we did see a potential for increased behavior change in the future
in performance-based regimes and greater alignment between farmer decision making in
performance-based regimes and their values and beliefs. Therefore, our results suggest that
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mandatory practice-based policies may not be as effective as performance-based policies in
achieving long term water quality improvements.
In the fourth chapter, we analyzed grouped farmer mental models in three
mandatory water quality policy regimes to evaluate the fit and interplay these policies in
each context. Here we used the SES Framework as proposed in chapter two to examine
farmer’s reported behavior change, behavioral drivers and perceived outcomes of the
policy process. We find in comparing these three regions that policy is reported as a key
driver of behavior change in each of the regions, but it interacts with other SES dynamics
to produce different patterns of behavior change and outcomes. In Vermont, USA the
practice-based mandatory policy interacts with multiple sources of financial and technical
assistance to drive management behavior changes (e.g. timing and amount of fertilizer
applications) and structural behavior changes (e.g. upgrade manure pit). Whereas in Taupo,
New Zealand the performance-based policy combines with a voluntary nitrogen market to
drive management and system changes (e.g. transition from dairy system to cattle system).
In Rotorua, New Zealand, we see that despite not having an operational policy yet, the
signal of the future policy does drive behavior change. However, behavior change is not to
the same extent as the other two regions, with more management changes than structural
than system. Based on my analysis of these three regions, I suggest that paying attention to
the types of behavior change, whether management, structural or system across a landscape
has implications for water quality improvement. Additionally, we suggest that to achieve
structural or system change, farmers need financial assistance or access to capital.
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5.2. Broader Implications
Taking into account the theoretical and empirical analysis of chapters two, three
and four, I can make some general conclusions for the study of agricultural NPS pollution.
First, the social and ecological context of a policy is a critical component driving patterns
of behavior change and perceived outcomes. Policy design must be tailored to its particular
social and ecological context and the potential interactions between policy design and other
behavioral drivers should be accounted for in order to achieve long term water quality
improvements.
Second, the design of a water quality policy impacts farmers’ experience of the
policy and the potential for long term policy success. Incorporating the social
psychological aspects of farmer decision making on nutrient management behavior enables
better understanding of how we can design policy to allow farmers more flexibility and
autonomy in running their farm systems. In terms of policy design and behavior change,
the results from chapter three and four are somewhat contradictory. In chapter three our
results suggest that policy design does not appear to drive behavior change relative to
contexts without mandatory policy, but in chapter four farmers strongly perceive water
quality policy to be a major driver of their changes in behavior. I will return to this
discrepancy in the next section when I discuss future research directions.
Finally, acknowledging the links between agricultural NPS pollution policy and
farmer behavior and decision making allows for deeper and more realistic conversations
about the tradeoffs between ecological and agricultural productions goals. If we are to
improve water quality and support farmers, these are the types of frank conversation that
are required to achieve a fair, socially acceptable and ecologically successful policy.
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5.3. Future Directions
The results of this dissertation suggest interesting avenues for future research on
agricultural NPS pollution policy and environmental public goods dilemmas more broadly.
As referenced in the previous section, we see different results in chapters three and four on
the role of water quality policy in driving farmer behavior change. This discrepancy could
be due, in part, to the different time scales at which the data were collected. The data for
chapter 3 was collected in 2015, whereas the data for chapter 4 was collected in 20172019. Regardless, this discrepancy calls for a mixed methods approach, combining
qualitative and quantitative data from the same time period in order to dig deeper into
farmer decision making and behavior change across policy contexts. This might provide
new insights in terms of policy design, behavior change, and survey design/qualitative
approach.
Considering the study of environmental public goods dilemmas more broadly,
including climate change, biodiversity loss and other types of water quality issues, this
dissertation suggests that an SES framework-based study focusing on the links between
policy institutions and actor decision making could provide new insights to inform
sustainable resource management regimes. A related frontier is the governance of
overlapping ecological issues, such as agricultural NPS pollution and climate change. The
approach defined and implemented in this dissertation holds great potential for improving
our understanding of how policy design for overlapping ecological issues impacts
behavior, experience and policy support.
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APPENDIX 1
Table 5-1. New Zealand Regional water quality policy descriptions
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Territorial Authority

Sample

Region

Policy Type

Policy Notes

Sources

17

Representativeness (compared
to 2012 NZ
agricultural
census)
3.61%

Taupo District

Waikato

Performance

Variation 5 to the Waikato
Regional Plan (chapter 3.10 of the
Waikato Regional Plan)
operational as of 2011, lays out a
cap and trade performance-based
policy to control nitrogen leaching
from agricultural land in the
catchment.

Waikato Regional Council. (2012).
Waikato Regional Plan (online
version). Retrieved from
https://www.waikatoregion.govt.nz/
council/policy-and-plans/rules-andregulation/regional-plan/waikatoregional-plan/

Thames-Coromandel
District
Matamata-Piako
District
Hamilton District
Hauraki District
Otorohanga District
Waipa District
South Waikato
District
Waikato District
Waitomo District

8

1.75%

Waikato

No policy

39

2.46%

1
20
23
44
17

1.45%
2.50%
3.02%
2.78%
2.95%

As of 2015 there were no other
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Waikato.

63
19

2.41%
2.96%

Waikato Regional Council. (2012).
Waikato Regional Plan (online
version). Retrieved from
https://www.waikatoregion.govt.nz/
council/policy-and-plans/rules-andregulation/regional-plan/waikatoregional-plan/; Greenhalgh, S., &
Murphy, L. (2017). Freshwater
contaminant limit assessment of the
regions. Motu Economic and Public
Policy Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/
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Rotorua District

22

2.80%

Bay of Plenty

Performance

Rule 11 of the form Regional
Water and Land Plan (now RL R1
in the Regional Natural Resources
Plan) is operational as of 2005 and
limits property's leaching rates at
their nutrient benchmark, assessed
between 2001 and 2004. Rule 11
will be supplemented by Proposed
Plan Change 10 of the Regional
Natural Resources Plan (formerly
the Regional Water and Land
Plan), notified in 2016, which lays
out a cap and trade performancebased policy to control nitrogen
leaching from agricultural land in
the catchment, including a
reducing in farm-scale leaching
limits by 2032.

Bay of Plenty Regional Council.
(2012). Lake facts Rotorua Lakes:
What is Rule 11? Retrieved from
http://www.rotorualakes.co.nz/vdb/d
ocument/136; Bay of Plenty
Regional Council, Rotorua Lakes
Council and Te Arawa Lakes Trust.
(2016). A Guide for Landowners:
Lake Rotorua Nutrient Managment.
Plan Change 10 to the Bay of Plenty
Regional Water and Land Plan, Bay
of Plenty Regional Council. (2018).
Operative Bay of Plenty Regional
Natural Resources Plan. Ta Mahere
Rawa Taiao a-Rohe. Retrieved from
https://www.boprc.govt.nz/yourcouncil/plans-andpolicies/plans/regional/regionalnatural-resources-plan/

Kawerau District
Opotiki District
Tauranga City
Western Bay of
Plenty District
Whakatane Districts

1
8
1
77

16.67%
2.08%
0.62%
2.60%

Bay of Plenty

No policy

29

3.43%

As of 2015 there were no other
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Bay of Plenty
Region.

Bay of Plenty Regional Council.
(2018). Operative Bay of Plenty
Regional Natural Resources Plan.
Ta Mahere Rawa Taiao a-Rohe.
Retrieved from
https://www.boprc.govt.nz/yourcouncil/plans-andpolicies/plans/regional/regionalnatural-resources-plan/; Greenhalgh,
S., & Murphy, L. (2017). Freshwater
contaminant limit assessment of the
regions. Motu Economic and Public
Policy Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/

48

6.02%

Hawke's Bay

Performance

Hastings District
Napier City
Waiora District

56
6
19

3.34%
4.44%
5.07%

Hawke's Bay

No policy

Ruapehu District

14

2.41%

Practice

Whanganui District
Manawatu District

19
57
13

2.95%
4.33%
4.61%

ManawatuWanganui

Plan Change 6 to the Hawke's Bay
Regional Resource Management
Plan: Tukituki River Catchment
put into place performance-based
policy, based on a natural capital
standard for landownders in the
catchment. Plan change operative
October 2015 with performancebased leaching standards to be met
by 2020. Measurement and
budgeting via OVERSEER
required as of 2013.
As of 2015 there were no other
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Hawke's Bay
Region.
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Central Hawke's Bay
District

Palmerston North
City

Manawatu-Wanganui (Horizon's)
One Plan was operative in 2014.
Standards in place for priority
catchments (performance),
practice-based requirements for
non-priority catchments. No
priority catchments in Ruapehu
District. One small priority
catchments in Wanganui District
(Kaitoke Lake) (performance). One
priority catchments in
Wanganui District (Northern

Hawke’s Bay Regional Council.
(n.d.). Plan Change 6 to Hawke’s
Bay Regional Resource
Management Plan: Tukituki River
Catchment (No. HBRC Report No.
SD 15-08 – 4767).

Hawke’s Bay Regional Council.
(2012). Hawke’s Bay Regional
Resource Management Plan.
Retrieved from
https://www.hbrc.govt.nz/document
s-and-forms/rrmp/; Greenhalgh, S.,
& Murphy, L. (2017). Freshwater
contaminant limit assessment of the
regions. Motu Economic and Public
Policy Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/
Horizons Regional Council. (2014).
One Plan: Mo te iti - mo te rahi. The
Consolidated Regional Policy
Statement, Regional Plan and
Regional Coastal Plan for the
Manawatu-Wanganui Region (No.
2014/EXT/1338). Retrieved from
http://www.horizons.govt.nz/publica
tions-feedback/one-plan

Manawatu Lake). No priority
catchments in Palmerston North
City.
42

5.20%

Horowhenua District
Tararua District

16
45

2.79%
3.86%

Clutha District
Duneden City
Queenstown Lakes
District
Central Otago
District

59
20
5

4.86%
2.71%
2.14%

37

4.80%

Buller District
Westland District

20
13

7.94%
4.25%

ManawatuWanganui

Performance

Otago

Performance

West Coast

No policy
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Rangitikei District

Manawatu-Wanganui (Horizon's)
One Plan was operative in 2014.
Standards in place for priority
catchments (performance),
practice-based requirments for
non-priority catchments. Standards
in place for priority catchments
(performance). Three priority
catchments in Rangitikei District
(Southern Whanganui Lakes,
Northern Manawatu Lakes, coastal
rangitikei).Three priority
catchments in
Horowhenua District (Lake
Horowhenua, Lake Papaitonga,
Waikawa). Eight priority
catchments in Tararua District
(Upper Manawatu, Weber-Tamaki,
Upper Tamaki, Upper Kumeti,
Tamaki-Hopelands, HopelandsTiraumea, Mangatainoka, Upper
Gorge).
Plan change 6a Otago Water Plan;
threshold for nutrient leaching
come into effect in April 2020.
Effects-based approach
(performance) that allows
landowners to determine methods
for managing nutrients and other
contaminants as long as they meet
the threshold in the Plan's Schedule
16 (in 2020). Rules are operative as
of May 2014, but leaching
thresholds don't come into effect
until 2020.
As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for

Horizons Regional Council. (2014).
One Plan: Mo te iti - mo te rahi. The
Consolidated Regional Policy
Statement, Regional Plan and
Regional Coastal Plan for the
Manawatu-Wanganui Region (No.
2014/EXT/1338). Retrieved from
http://www.horizons.govt.nz/publica
tions-feedback/one-plan

Otago Regional Council. (2018).
Regional Plan: Water. Retrieved
from https://www.orc.govt.nz/planspolicies-reports/regional-plans-andpolices/water; Otago Regional
Council. (2016). Regional Plan:
Water for Otago. Retrieved from
https://www.orc.govt.nz/media/1207
/regional-plan-water.pdf

The West Coast Regional Council.
(2014). West Coast Regional Land
and Water Plan. Retrieved from

Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in West Coast Region,
aside from the Lake Bunner
Catchment in Grey District.
5

2.78%

West Coast

Practice

Waimakariri District
Timaru District
Mackenzie District
Waitaki District
Kaikoura District
Christchurch City
Waimate District

40
37
11
39
4
15
18

2.46%
3.77%
4.12%
4.51%
2.90%
1.95%
3.30%

Canterbury

Performance

Chapter 9 in the West Coast Land
and Water Plan designates special
management practice-based rules
for the Lake Brunner/KotukuWhakaoho catchment. The
practices include stock exclusion,
low rates of agricultural effluent
application to land, resource
consents for stock crossing in
water ways, and other restrictions
on agricultural land use activities.
The West Coast Land and Water
Plan was operative as of 2014.
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Grey District

https://www.wcrc.govt.nz/Documen
ts/Resource%20Management%20Pl
ans/Operative%20Land%20and%20
Water%20Plan%20May%202014.p
df
Stuart, B. (n.d.). Review of the Lake
Brunner Project 2015. NZ Landcare
Trust. Retrieved from
http://www.landcare.org.nz/files/file
/1824/Review%20of%20Lake%20B
runner%20Project%202015_2.pdf;
The West Coast Regional Council.
(2014). West Coast Regional Land
and Water Plan. Retrieved from
https://www.wcrc.govt.nz/Documen
ts/Resource%20Management%20Pl
ans/Operative%20Land%20and%20
Water%20Plan%20May%202014.p
df

The Canterbury Land and Water
Regional Plan (LWRP), operative
2016, region-wide rules apply to
all areas, unless otherwise
specified through plan changes
(e.g. Selwyn, Ashburton, and
Hurunui Districts have different
policy in some areas). Under the
LWRP regions are divided up into
nutrient allocation zones, including
red for those that are more
vulnerable to nutrient pollution,
orange which are at risk and blue
and green which are not currently
at risk. In each of these nutrient
allocation zones, farms are
regulated based on a "baseline"
nutrient leaching rate assessed

Environment Canterbury. (2019).
Canterbury Land and Water
Regional Plan. Retrieved from
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/yourregion/plans-strategies-andbylaws/canterbury-land-and-waterregional-plan/

48

4.83%

Canterbury

Practice

Selwyn District

62

3.24%

Canterbury

Performance
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Hurunui District

during the years 2009-2013.
Different leaching rates are
permitted in each of the zones, but
an increase above the N baseline is
not permitted. This operates as a
performance-based farm-scale cap.
Some properties, based on location
and nutrient leaching baseline are
required to write a Farm
Environment Plan and propose
management practices to avoid or
minimize nutrient loss. All farms
are expected to be at Good
Management Practice standard.
Hurunui and Waiau River Regional
Plan, operative 2013, requires
farms to become part of a
Collective or group with an
environmental management
strategy or apply for a resource
consent on their own that
designates practices in place to
ensure regional water quality
standards are met.

Selwyn Waihora catchments,
LWRP Plan Change 1, operative in
June 2016, is similar to the LWRP
rule structure. Under Plan Change
1, farming is a controlled activity if
the property is location in certain
high nutrient risk locations, or if
the property is leaching nitrogen
above its baseline leaching rate.
Controlled farms are required to
produce a Farm Environment Plan,
propose Good Management
Practices and could involve
nutrient reductions.

Environment Canterbury. (2019).
Canterbury Land and Water
Regional Plan. Retrieved from
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/yourregion/plans-strategies-andbylaws/canterbury-land-and-waterregional-plan/
Environment Canterbury. (2019).
Canterbury Water: What’s Your
Zone? Retrieved from
https://www.canterburywater.farm/z
ones
Environment Canterbury. (2019).
Canterbury Land and Water
Regional Plan. Retrieved from
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/yourregion/plans-strategies-andbylaws/canterbury-land-and-waterregional-plan/Environment
Canterbury. (2019). Canterbury
Water: What’s Your Zone?
Retrieved from
https://www.canterburywater.farm/z
ones

Ashburton District

46

3.18%

Canterbury

Performance

Hinds catchment, Canterbury
LWRP Plan Change 2, operative in
2018, performance-based policy
that requires a reduction in
leaching rates for those farm
operations with leaching rates
above 20kgN per ha per year to
reduce by percentages relative to
baseline. Schedule 24a in the
LWRP (Good Management
Practices) required of all farms as
well.

Environment Canterbury. (2019).
Canterbury Land and Water
Regional Plan. Retrieved from
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/yourregion/plans-strategies-andbylaws/canterbury-land-and-waterregional-plan/
Environment Canterbury. (2019).
Canterbury Water: What’s Your
Zone? Retrieved from
https://www.canterburywater.farm/z
ones

New Plymouth
District
Stratford District

31

2.54%

Taranaki

Practice

21
39

3.89%
2.57%

Taranaki Regional Council's Draft
Freshwater and Land Management
Plan was released in April 2015 is
practice-based. It requires fencing
and planting on intensively farmed
properties (over 20 ha) on ring
plain and coastal terraces by 2020.

61
38
66

3.21%
3.27%
4.10%

Northland

No policy

As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Northland Region.

Taranaki Regional Council. (2015).
Draft Freshwater and Land
Management Plan for Taranaki (No.
Document number 1496392).
Retrieved from
https://www.trc.govt.nz/assets/Docu
ments/Planspolicies/SoilWaterPlanReview/Draft
Plan-April2015W.pdf
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L.
(2017). Freshwater contaminant
limit assessment of the regions.
Motu Economic and Public Policy
Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/

South Taranaki
District

170
Far North District
Kaipara District
Whangarei District
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Gisborne District

39

3.16%

Gisborne

Practice

Kapiti Coast District
Porirua City
Upper Hutt City
Hutt City
Wellington City
Masterton District
Carterton District

17
2
7
0
5
27
14
13

6.75%
2.78%
5.98%
0.00%
8.77%
4.13%
3.99%
2.91%

Wellington

No policy

51

3.00%

Marlborough

No policy

Proposed Freshwater Plan,
Gisborne Regional Freshwater Plan
took effect when the plan was
notified on October 10, 2015.
Policy encourages the adoption of
good management practices and in
cases where freshwater objectives
are not met, requires the
implementation of Good
Management Practices.
As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Wellington Region.

South Wairarapa
District
Marlborough District

As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Marborough
District.

Gisborne District Council. (2017).
Gisborne Regional Freshwater Plan.
Retrieved from
https://www.gdc.govt.nz/freshwaterplan-proposed/

Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L.
(2017). Freshwater contaminant
limit assessment of the regions.
Motu Economic and Public Policy
Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L.
(2017). Freshwater contaminant
limit assessment of the regions.
Motu Economic and Public Policy
Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/

6

6.45%

Nelson

No policy

As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Nelson City.

Tasman District

65

4.09%

Tasman

No policy

As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Tasman District.

Gore District
Southland
District/Stewart
Island

21
94

3.66%
3.27%

Southland

No policy

6

2.35%

As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Southland Region.
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Nelson City

Invercargill City

Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L.
(2017). Freshwater contaminant
limit assessment of the regions.
Motu Economic and Public Policy
Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L.
(2017). Freshwater contaminant
limit assessment of the regions.
Motu Economic and Public Policy
Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L.
(2017). Freshwater contaminant
limit assessment of the regions.
Motu Economic and Public Policy
Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/

Auckland City

91

2.61%

Auckland

No policy

As of 2015 there were no
mandatory water quality policies
(as relating to the NPS for
Freshwater) drafted, notified or
operational in Auckland Region.

Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L.
(2017). Freshwater contaminant
limit assessment of the regions.
Motu Economic and Public Policy
Research. Retrieved from
https://motu.nz/ourwork/environment-andresources/agriculturaleconomics/agricultural-greenhousegas-emissions/freshwatercontaminant-limit-assessment-ofthe-regions/
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Table 5-2. Theory of Planned Behavior related survey questions (plus moral norm related question – environmental stewardship)
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Construct

Scale

Type

perceived
behavioral
control

0-3

Ordinal
(run as
categorica
l)

perceived
behavioral
control_no

0-3

Ordinal
(run as
categorica
l)

Question type on
survey
List of 10 yes/no
questions of
which respondent
could check up to
3 factors.
Perceived
behavioral
control includes 6
of the 10
questions, the
other 4 did not
related to
perceived
behavioral
control.
Binary list of 10
questions of
which respondent
could check up to
3 factors.
Perceived
behavioral
control_no
includes 6 of the
10 questions, the
other 4 did not
related to
perceived
behavioral
control.

Aggregation type

Questions

Simple count variable
of sum the total
number of checked
factors out of the 6.
More factors (max 3)
is considered high
perceived behavioral
control (score of 3).

What factors led you to implement a nutrient
management plan on your farm? [Tick up to 3]
1) I saw nutrient management plans successfully
demonstrated on similar farms
2) Trialing a nutrient management plan on my farm
was simple
3) Nutrient management plans are reversible if I
change my mind
4) I had the necessary skills/knowledge to do this
5) I had good sources of advice about how to do this
6) I had the financial resources necessary to do this

Simple count variable
of sum the total
number of checked
factors out of the 6.
More factors (max 3)
is considered low
perceived behavioral
control (note – this is
the reverse of
perceived behavioral
control above).

What are the main reasons you have not implemented
a nutrient management plan on your farm? [Tick up
to 3]
1) I haven’t seen nutrient management plans
successfully demonstrated on similar farms
2) Trialing a nutrient management plan on my farm is
not simple
3) Nutrient management plans are not reversible if I
change my mind
4) I don’t have the necessary skills/knowledge to do
this
5) I don’t have good sources of advice about how to
do this
6) I don’t have the financial resources necessary to do
this

0-30

Continuou
s

3 questions, each
consist of
10 point Likert
scale from
“Strongly
disagree to
strongly agree”

Score for each
question was added to
produce aggregate
norms score

Attitude

3-9

Continuou
s

3 questions, each
consist of 3 point
scale from
“Lower/worse” to
“Higher/better”

Score for each
question was added to
produce aggregate
norms score

Stewardship

0/1

Binary

Binary

Stewardship_no

0/1

Binary

List of 10 yes/no
questions of
which respondent
could check up to
3 factors.
Stewardship is
one of the
binaries.
List of 10 yes/no
questions of
which respondent
could check up to
3 factors.
Stewardship_no
is one of the
binaries.
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Subjective
norms

Binary

To what extent do you agree with each of the
following statements?
1) My family expects me to manage my farm in an
environmentally friendly way.
2) The farming community expects me to manage my
farm in an environmentally friendly way.
3) The New Zealand public expects me to manage
my farm in an environmentally friendly way.
To the best of your knowledge, how has/would
implementing a nutrient management plan affect(ed)
your farm?
1) Financial performance
2) Environmental performance
3) Farming lifestyle
What factors led you to implement a nutrient
management plan on your farm? [Tick up to 3]

Environmental stewardship

What are the main reasons you have not implemented
a nutrient management plan on your farm? [Tick up
to 3]

Few environmental benefits

176
Figure 5-1. Logic of survey structure, featuring sample size (N=) associated with each question

Table 5-3. Farmer sample descriptive statistics broken down by policy type

Continuous variables
farm size (thousand
hectares)
age
attitude (n = 1018)
norms (n = 1830)
nmp_adopt_extent (n = 773)
Categorical variables
NMP (yes)
NMP intention to adopt
(yes, n = 1139)
profitable (yes)
farm type
farm type: other
farm type: dairy
farm type: sheep & beef
farm type: grazing support
education
education: secondary school
or less
education:
certificate/diploma
education: bachelor’s degree
education: advanced degree
education: other
N (nmp extent adoption
model only)
0. perceived behavioral
control
1. perceived behavioral
control
2. perceived behavioral
control
3. perceived behavioral
control
stewardship (yes)
n (nmp intention model
only)
0. perceived behavioral
control_no
1. perceived behavioral
control_no
2. perceived behavioral
control_no
3. perceived behavioral
control_no

No policy
(n = 1048)
mean sd
0.23
56.94
6.57
21.34
2.64

Practice
(n = 286)
mean
sd

Performance
(n = 583)
mean sd

0.43
11.52
1.33
4.78
1.35

0.34
57.52
6.35
21.13
2.41

0.65
11.38
1.17
4.4
1.16

0.65
55.14
6.17
21.38
2.77

42.75

count
112

%
39.16

count
217

102
489

17
46.66

25
134

14.37
46.85

118
312

32.33
53.52

279
265
445
59

26.62
25.29
42.46
5.63

47
70
155
14

16.43
24.48
54.2
4.9

131
90
320
42

22.47
15.44
54.89
7.2

367

35.02

112

39.16

221

37.91

296
202
168
15

28.24
19.27
16.03
1.43

79
53
42
0

27.62
18.53
14.69
0

169
112
77
4

28.99
19.21
13.21
0.69

242

57.21

59

13.95

122

28.84

68

28.1

21

35.59

39

31.97

90

37.19

22

37.29

51

41.8

68

28.1

11

18.64

27

22.13

count
448

%

6.61

2.1
11.74
1.28
5
1.41
%
37.22

16
122

50.41

5
26

8.47
44.07

5
72

4.1
59.02

303

50.84

85

14.26

208

34.90

126

41.58

33

38.82

80

38.46

107

35.31

32

37.65

68

32.69

52

17.16

13

15.29

43

20.67

18

5.94

7

8.24

17

8.17

177

stewardship_no (yes)

56

19.31

Table 5-4. NMP adoption model
Predictor
policy type (base = no policy)
practice
performance
farm size
farm type (base = other farm type)
dairy
sheep and beef
grazing support
age
profitable
education (base = secondary school or
less)
education: certificate/diploma

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.91
(0.16)
1.03
(0.14)
1.01
(0.04)
9.03***
(1.58)
0.50***
(0.07)
0.52**
(0.13)
0.99
(0.00)
1.35**
(0.15)

0.86
(0.12)

education: bachelor's

0.92
(0.14)

education: advanced degree

0.91
(0.15)

education: other

0.51
(0.32)
-0.24
(0.33)
0.02
(0.03)
1917
350.7
0.00

constant (not odds ratio)
District constant (not odds ratio)
N
chi2
p
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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11

13.41

29

14.87

Table 5-5. Extent of NMP adoption models
Full model
Predictor
Beta (SE)
policy type (base = no policy)
practice
-0.19
(0.11)
performance
0.06
(0.07)
perceived behavioral
control (base = score of
0)
1.perceived behavioral
control
0.11
(0.08)
2.perceived behavioral
control
0.21*
(0.09)
3.perceived behavioral
control
0.31*
(0.15)
attitude
0.00
(0.03)
norms
0.01
(0.01)
stewardship
0.21**
(0.07)
farm size

0.06*
(0.03)
farm type (base = other farm type)
dairy
0.48***
(0.08)
sheep and beef
0.14
(0.09)
grazing support
0.24
(0.17)
age
-0.00
(0.00)
profitability
0.06
(0.06)
education (base = secondary school or
less)
education:
certificate/diploma
-0.02
(0.08)
education: bachelor's
-0.05
(0.09)
education: advanced
degree
0.05
(0.09)

No policy
group
Beta (SE)

Practice Group
Beta (SE)

Performance
Group
Beta (SE)

0.18
(0.11)

0.02
(0.29)

0.05
(0.14)

0.16
(0.12)

0.19
(0.30)

0.33*
(0.16)

0.44*
(0.18)
0.04
(0.04)
0.01
(0.01)
0.22*
(0.09)

-0.55
(0.57)
0.04
(0.11)
0.02
(0.03)
0.10
(0.23)

0.42
(0.35)
-0.06
(0.05)
0.01
(0.02)
0.26
(0.14)

0.17*
(0.08)

0.04
(0.19)

0.05
(0.03)

0.47***
(0.10)
0.218
(0.13)
0.42
(0.24)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.04
(0.09)

0.68*
(0.31)
0.11
(0.39)
0.29
(0.51)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.24)

0.28
(0.17)
-0.08
(0.17)
-0.19
(0.29)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.11
(0.12)

-0.12
(0.12)
-0.13
(0.12)

0.11
(0.30)
0.21
(0.31)

0.08
(0.14)
-0.03
(0.16)

0.07
(0.11)

0.20
(0.31)

-0.25
(0.23)
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education: other

-0.32
(0.36)
constant
0.37
(0.31)
TA constant
0.00
(0.00)
N
401
chi2
78.68
p
0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

-0.15
(0.37)
0.13
(0.41)
0.00
(0.00)
230
52.24
0.00

-0.89
(1.18)
0.00
(0.00)
52
11.24
0.735

-15.79
(1875.80)
0.92
(0.55)
0.00
(0.00)
119
27.08
0.04

Table 5-6. Intention to adopt NMP models
No policy
group
Odds Ratio
(SE)

Practice
Group
Odds Ratio
(SE)

Performance
Group
Odds Ratio
(SE)

1.53
(0.44)

1.12
(0.56)

4.80
(6.45)

1.84
(0.75)

1.37
(0.45)

1.00
(0.59)

0.25
(0.42)

1.74
(0.82)

1.25
(0.62)

0.92
(0.87)

0.30
(0.68)

1.35
(0.92)

attitude

1.56***
(0.16)

1.98**
(0.41)

2.02
(0.89)

1.35*
(0.20)

norms

1.08**
(0.03)

1.14*
(0.06)

1.06
(0.15)

1.06
(0.04)

stewardship_no

0.98
(0.33)

1.09
(0.60)

0.34
(0.50)

0.78
(0.41)

farm size

1.00
(0.06)

2.37
(1.71)

114.50**
(196.90)

1.00
(0.06)

2.89

3.62

0.22

4.20

Predictor
policy type (base = no policy)
practice
performance
perceived behavioral
control_no (base = score of 0)
1.perceived behavioral
control_no
2.perceived behavioral
control_no
3.perceived behavioral
control_no

farm type (base = other farm
type)
dairy

Full model
Odds Ratio
(SE)
0.91
(0.37)
3.96***
(1.07)
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(1.85)

(3.63)

(0.45)

(5.47)

sheep and beef

2.21**
(0.66)

5.23*
(3.36)

0.01*
(0.02)

1.76
(0.72)

grazing support

3.04*
(1.42)

2.16
(2.14)

0.20
(0.50)

4.40*
(2.88)

age

0.97**
(0.01)

0.97
(0.02)

0.90*
(0.04)

0.98
(0.01)

profitability

1.31
(0.31)

1.22
(0.52)

1.20
(1.24)

1.47
(0.51)

1.71
(0.52)
2.19*
(0.77)
1.25
(0.50)

2.12
(1.25)
3.02
(1.89)
0.53
(0.50)

0.19
(0.27)
0.65
(0.93)
0.22
(0.42)

1.59
(0.65)
2.14
(1.16)
2.03
(1.08)

education (base = secondary
school or less)
education: certificate/diploma
education: bachelor's
education: advanced degree

education: other

3.10
(3.67)

constant (not odds ratio)

-5.70***
(1.21)

-9.23***
(2.62)

-0.21
(3.68)

-3.89*
(1.67)

0.03
(0.15)

0.27
(0.53)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

N
chi2

536
70.27

271
31.87

76
11.90

186
17.51

p

0.00

0.01

0.69

0.35

District constant (not odds
ratio)

8.41
(12.75)

Standard errors in parentheses
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***
p<0.001
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APPENDIX 2
Table 5-7. Interview protocol question for farmers
Interview protocol questions
How long have you or your family been farming in the watershed?
Could you tell me a bit about your farm system?
Can you run me through what a week on your farm looks like?
In the last 5-10 years, have you made any changes to your farm system or the
management of your farm business? What was the driver for these changes?
What are the costs of these changes? Benefits?
Are you planning to make any changes to your farm system in the next 2 years?
Can you tell me a little about your experience with the water quality policy
process?
Has the capping of nutrients changed the face of the watershed?
How fair do you think the policy is/was?
Would you have done anything different to manage water quality in the lake?

Table 5-8. Full codebook with descriptions and representative quotes
Nodes
drivers
Actor
A_economics

Description

Example Quote

funding, debt, efficiency, other
sources of income,
dependence on farm

A_ethic

stewardship or land ethic, love
of learning, aesthetic, price of
being a "good farmer"

A_flexibility

convenience, steady supply,
lifestyle, flexibility in running
the farm system

"I think, ultimately, its profitability.
The most decisions we’ve made are
on profitability. And so, the smaller,
environmental changes – well,
there’s benefits as well. So, applying
nutrients on lower rates more often,
if we don’t waste the nutrients, it
makes more sense. So, most of those
changes, we hope, eventually, help
profitability as well."
"And we did a lot of those things
because we were under a lot of
pressure. But that’s not the whole
story. We are an environmental
organization. So, it’s sort of part of
our mission to be good. So, it wasn’t
like we didn’t want to do them. It’s
what we’re supposed to do."
"Yeah it was about giving us more
flexibility in our system, and to help
try and drought proof, yeah to - for
the lake issue was, it was about
being capped, effectively capped.
That is a way of still being able to
improve and maximize. But it also
gave us another block of land that is
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separate if we ever wanted to sell
something or anything like that."

A_leadership or
entrepreneur

Actor themselves represented
leadership and entrepreneurial
spirit to drive change, or actor
received advice or followed
path of leader or entrepreneur.
For personal, the actor should
mention something about
trying something new, being
on the cutting edge, taking a
risk, taking leadership or being
an entrepreneur. For receiving
advice, the actor should
mention a figure or figures that
influenced their change.

"Two and a half years ago we made
the decision that we were sick of
dealing with dairy farmers, and that
we were really really keen to support
[a new business initiative led by
local farmers]. So we went and saw
them to see what they needed and
how it would work."

A_lifestyle

this includes ease of
management

"So really I make the decision based
on what I want to do, what I think is
going to be more profitable, what
suits the way I farm as well and my
lifestyle."

A_past experience

past experience with
policy/state/regional
government

"So the decision had been made by
then that they were going to
benchmark and that we knew. So I
knew how the farming system was
going to work [because of
experience with the policy process
and previously owning land in the
catchment]. I probably knew it
better than anybody, I’d say. So
that’s why I was more comfortable
in getting back in."
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A_social attributes

family life, succession

"Well, I had a son and daughter both
milking cows for someone else and
then would come home and crutch
lambs. So, I was left in the muck and
getting no time off because there’s
only one main unit. And so, we
thought if we could buy the dairy
unit, we’d employ more staff and
hopefully be able to get on the roster
and get some time off."
"No incentive and stuff, but the other
thing with the lake is it's the taonga
for the Maori. So it's their treasure.
They were very keen to protect it
anyway, and they'd made decisions
around the lake to protect it way
before Environment Waikato
started."

A_technology
Governance
G_gov assistance

G_ngos or other

G_other gov policies

G_farmer group

availability of specific
technology

"We've modeled land use change [to
make a farm diversification plan]."

technical or financial
assistance from a government
agency

"The guy I’ve been working with
through NRCS, he keeps me pretty
informed. I’m pretty good friends
with him, so he keeps me quite
informed on everything and we go
over stuff. I had a couple spots that I
had to change things but other than
that we’ve been pretty – we pretty
much knew what was going on."
“As far as the rules for organic are
so strict that these new laws on the
water quality and watershed, we’ve
already been having to follow since
we went organic. The stream
setbacks and all that are already in
there for organic."

Interactions with nongovernmental entities, these
include organic, extension,
watershed programs, land
trusts, housing and
conservation board, industry
group requirements or best
practices, and research
organizations/universities
Central, regional or local
government policies that
impact nutrient management,
such as conservation policies
participation in a group
representing farmer interests
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"Well, we were up for resource
consent, so it was – as far as the
effluent upgrade, it helped us get a
longer resource consent, and it kept
us compliant."
"I probably got a little bit involved
in [the farmer group] as to see how
[the policy] was going to work more
for my own selfish reasons because
most of the farms around here are
managed by farm managers, and I
thought well if it's going to turn to
shit I'd really want to be the first one

to get out but if I could see some
opportunities I wanted to stay"

G_water quality policy

cap, state, regional policy

"And the interesting thing was that
when they brought the new rules into
the catchment, the big businesses
that owned those farms, sold the
farms in the catchment straight
away."
"Some fields flood. Some of my land,
I’m on the early spreading ban. Do
with the new [water quality policy]. I
got to hit them in the midsummer, so
we’re changing the way we got to do
things, a little bit. We’ll see in a few
years. Hopefully, it’ll benefit."

Resource_system
RS_ecological

RS_farm production

Resource_units
RU_n p attributes

erosion, runoff, endowment,
improve ecosystem, nutrients,
drought, flooding

animal needs,
increase/decrease, quality of
product, pasture integrity

attributes of N & P and the
movement of these nutrients in
the landscape and farm system

Social economic and
political settings
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"I bought a manure truck, so I had to
do it myself, now... Well, doing it
myself, I’ll do it more times per year,
less each time, and try to minimalize
runoff and get on when the land
needs it. When the land can use it."
"Originally the country that went
into pines was the lower producing
areas, but the nitrogen is sort of
considered to be across the whole
farm. So by taking out the lower
producing areas it meant we could
farm the better areas a little bit more
intensively which gave us options,
but then they sold more nitrogen and
now we don’t have a lot of options."

"I’m doing it as a cover crop and
I’m gonna crop it. I’m gonna do it as
a forage so we’re gonna chop it.
We’re gonna try it because the soil
will pull up a lot of phosphorus out
of the soil. Really, every time you
plow and see the field, you’re
releasing that phosphorus that’s
bound because phosphorus doesn’t
move in the soil. "

S_industry or consultant

S_ c market

Carbon Market as a driver

S_demographic shifts

For example, people going out
of farming without a successor

S_economics and
markets

competition, profit, efficiency,
prices broader than the
watershed dynamic, carbon
credit opportunities

S_n market

Nitrogen market as a driver

S_social context

Neighbor complaints
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"So, we actually did a feasibility
study. We got consultants to do a
feasibility study, put the whole thing
together, talked to the accountant,
and then went to the bank and the
regional council on the condition
that – the last condition for doing it
for buying the farm was that the
pond was that we got the consent for
the whole thing."
"[Did you get carbon credits on
that?] On the pines that they planted
yes... So when [the farm] sold the
nitrogen, Mighty River Power
generate energy out of the lake.
They’ve got the dams in the river.
So they put a deal that they wanted
carbon so they tied the two
together."
"I was renting these places – I had
my milkers – and, I was renting
places for my heifers. And, I had my
heifers over at this farm, over here.
This [neighbor 1] – that I told you
he only milked 35 cows – he had
sold his cows; he had retired from
farming. And, I had my heifers way
over at [neighbor 2's], at a different
farm. And, [neighbor 2] came to me,
and said, “Do you want to rent my
pastures?” And so, I rented them,
and it was a lot of fence, because it
was a hexagon, so it was a big
area."
"The main reason why we came back
in and bought here was location.
Secondly, different land use in the
future. And thirdly, land prices.
Land prices had dropped by thirty or
forty percent, so it made it economic
to get back in again."
"We planted about 40 hectares of
pine trees, production pines, but no,
the size didn’t change at all. And
that was partly because we’d sold
some nitrate credits, once we got our
cap sorted out, we had plenty so we
sold it down."
"I tell my friend, I said "Farming is a
hostile environment right now. It's
hostile." I mean, the environment
that we're in is hostile. Not only do
we have pressure from regulators,
we have regulations, we have
pressure from intolerance from the
community."

outcomes
Individual Outcomes
IO_negative economic
IO_Neg_compliance

compliance costs related to
policy

"But it’s just got to the point where I
might actually have to get a little bit
more involved with it, because they
just sent me a monitoring bill that
was huge and I’ve just wrote a letter
to them and said that I’m not going
to pay that because that’s 153
percent increase on last year’s bill."

IO_Neg_farm viability

Reduction in ability for farm
to remain solvent and
profitable, survive as a
business

IO_Neg_financial

Reduction in profit, payoff,
funding, reduced earnings,
compliance, property value,
new revenue streams including
new products, new markets,
diversification

"Well, just for the very reason – if
you can’t grow your business then
you can’t survive. So, we had to
shift. So, we decided we would
reduce our operation in the
catchment, and increase our
operation outside of the catchment."
"Well, there are direct financial
costs and there are also social costs,
I think. The direct cost to you is
these physical costs like building
detainment berms and putting
effluent ponds and buying upgraded
irrigators and things like that."

IO_Neg_flexibility

Loss of flexibility in farm
management

"And before the rules, you could do
whatever you wanted to do. Now,
you can probably make changes as
long as you stay within the rules. So,
I suppose, yes. We started cropping
in the summer to develop those
pellets to improve the quality of
grass. And that’s not going to
happen. So, that hasn’t changed in a
way. Although, I don’t know think
we expected to do it for long
anyway, did we? It’s just an option
that we don’t have anymore."

Frustration or distrust with
regulation or agency
implementing the regulation,
or in the monitoring
(Overseer)

"Oh, I just don’t contact [the
Regional Council]. Because I don’t
have enough respect or trust in them
to be able to do that."

IO_negative social
IO_Neg_distrust in
regulation
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IO_Neg_fairness

Perceived that situation is
unfair in individual position

IO_Neg_non-financial
costs

time, depression, involvement
with community

IO_Neg_uncertainty in
future

Uncertainty in the future of the
farm system and what will be
possible

IO_neutral economic
IO_Neu_compliance

IO_positive ecological
IO_Pos_environmental
quality
IO_Pos_soil quality

“We planted trees on steep land to
stop erosion. And we did flood
control work. And I can show you
that on the photos that I’ve got. And
those things all worked really well,
but the annoying thing is that now
that doesn’t count towards what
we’re doing. So, what we’ve done is,
we’ve harvested the trees, and we
haven’t replanted. Because we need
to have more grass to try and keep
our cow numbers up. It’s stupid. It’s
stupid that they’re not recognizing
environmental benefits that were
done in the ‘90s and the ‘80s."
"It was tough, man it was tough.
Because we were all farming. We
used to joke and say man this would
be great if this was your day job.
Because A) you are on a salary, B)
You are really interested, C) you
haven't got any skin in the game, and
it’s just really interesting stuff. But
we were all trying to hold down, I
had two little babies, trying to hold
down farms, and businesses, and
represent people and communicate
and try and forge our way through
this process, it was incredibly hard."
"Well, we won’t have a business.
Because they’re looking for a 30
percent reduction. So, instead of
having 230 cows, we’ll have 160
cows. That just won’t work. Just like
if you’re salary got cut by a third, it
would certainly change your
perspective as well."

Compliance with policy is a
negligible cost

"So, you know I mean the RAPs I
mean definitely yes we’ve had to
make some adaptations to our
management here and all, but they
haven’t really impacted us
detrimentally. It hasn’t been a big
burden or impact on us as a farm."

specific resource not specified

"No. No benefits. Apart from
environmental benefits, that’s about
it. Certainly no financial benefits."

improvements in individual's
soil and pasture quality

"And all that where the brook is, it’s
not mud now, its grass. And going
over the years, it’s not just grass, it’s
nice grass – nice, and lush grass;
and, I only pasture it, maybe, three
or four times a year."
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IO_Pos_water quality

improvements in water quality
at the farm-scale level, or due
to farm-scale level behaviors

IO_positive economic

IO_Pos_farm viability

improvements in ability for
farm to remain solvent and
profitable, survive as a
business

IO_Pos_financial

Improvement in profit, payoff,
funding, increased earnings,
compliance, property value,
new revenue streams including
new products, new markets,
diversification

IO_Pos_flexibility

Improvement in flexibility in
farm management

IO_Pos_new markets

Accessing new markets,
marketing, pricing, supply
chain changes
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"So, I think we must – so, if water
quality is improving in [the] Bay…
Something is happening. Some of
these practices are – and I don’t
know whether that has to do with it
or not. I just think we’ve done so
much – that it’s useful. It’s proven
that it works."
"Yeah, so that’s what I’m trying to
say. If I’d kept running a similar
number of stock my nitrogen output
would have dropped but the policy
changes allowed me to improve the
farm’s productivity without
breaching my nitrogen cap."
"Well, the NMP plan is a chance to
save money, there, because we know
for over fertilizing. With the first one
we did, the comprehensive one, we
found out that we were putting
almost double manure on the
grassland than we should’ve been.
You can put too much. It’s all there
is to it. You put too much. That’s a
good thing to save money, if you
can."
"Yeah there were benefits. For
people like me that had very, very
high NDAs, to have sold a few off the
top. Like I sold down to a reasonable
level and that would have been good
if we hadn't lost the extra 1300. So
there were benefits in yeah any very,
very high NDA farms - could get
part of their capital out. It was like
selling part of your farm, but
actually not losing the farm."
"Pretty much, like we sold down the
cattle and replaced those cows with
trading stock and they were winter
grazers, so it didn’t really alter the
figure too much, it just gave us more
management flexibility."
"We’re certainly producing the
product, but we haven’t had a decent
product to sell, which has been the
biggest issue. We’ve tried cheese
and yoghurts. We have been
exporting frozen milk to our cheese
maker in Aussie for the last few
years. But the last 18 months we’ve
taken on a [new] partner and they’re
powdering it and take it to China.
That’s been a pretty amazing leap
forward, and it’s given us a solid
market with reasonable returns."

IO_positive social
IO_Pos_awareness

improved understanding of
farm system, nutrient
dynamics

IO_Pos_non-financial
benefits

new opportunities,
involvement with community,
sense of pride in work, reduces
burden of work

IO_Pos_enviro
recognition

Received recognition for
environmental
stewardship/sustainability of
farm system

watershed outcomes
WO_negative ecological
WO_Neg_environmental
quality

specific resource not specified

WO_Neg_land use
patterns

WO_Neg_water quality
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"So those sort of things, yeah, you’re
very aware of - we talk a whole new
language now in terms of nitrogen
discharge allowance, NDAs and
things like that. Yeah and we’re
conscious of those things. We live in
a different world here now."
"Oh, I sleep easier at night. Yeah, to
keep compliant with the old pond, I
did some stuff that I wasn’t very
proud of. But he had to do it to stay
compliant really. Yeah, so now all
that’s gone now. Easier management
and all that sort of stuff is, yeah."
"Then we won the [environmental
award], now is the moment when the
dollars profit per KG of nitrogen
came together. We've been testing,
the [farm system] thing is just a big
experiment. We've measured
ourselves against other farmers
through the [award]."

"Well, we’re back again to the
nitrogen, phosphorus/biodiversity.
Because if you look at what the
Regional Council’s job is, it’s not
only nutrients, its biodiversity. It’s
protecting native bush. Its pests.
There are a lot of things. But it’s
only actually PC 10 hasn’t taken
into consideration any of those other
things that actually the Regional
Council is in charge of
implementing, or controlling."
"That was all taken out of farm land
and they were farming
conservatively anyway. They were
having no effect on the lake over
there at all because they all had
sheep. But that’s all in trees now."
"So this trading of nitrogen also
creates another problem of what
they call hotspots. Some people
don't want to know about it but of
course it makes a difference. Put it
this way; if I put this tea towel on the
bench and I get two glasses of water,
one I just sprinkle lightly
everywhere, it hardly sinks through,
the other one I just pour it right
here, you’re going to find a big
puddle here that’s going to run over

here. In effect this nitrogen cap
thing has done exactly that."

WO_negative economic
WO_Neg_farming
viability

WO_Neg_financial
watershed

WO_negative social
WO_Neg_well-being

WO_Neg_fairness

Reduction in ability for
farming in the watershed to
remain solvent and profitable,
survive as a business/industry

profit, payoff, funding,
reduced earnings, compliance,
property value, new revenue
streams including new
products, new markets,
diversification

"That's just what happens. The –
yeah, they're a lot of farms that are –
it's kind of a perfect storm situation
too, where I think the number of
farms is like 750 farms left in the
state... Somebody said the other day
that they read from the agency that
they could see 150 to 200 more
farms go out this year. A lot of that's
like – milk price, and then
regulations at the same time."
"Farmers have made a real stand in
this catchment to say, 'We can do
this, what’s required by 2022,
whatever the percentage top is. But
what’s required after 2032 is not
doable. Financially, it’s not
doable.'"

community involvement,
depression, community
members leaving

"So, I think – but it’s like grievance;
this – this phase is the angry phase,
and then acceptance might come
because that’s what happened for us
in the Taupo catchment like I say."

perceived fairness of the
policy process/policy
outcomes

"When grandparenting was on the
table, who was going to miss out?
[Maori land], big time. And as
owners of the lakebed, and
individually owners of the farms, a
lot of farms especially down in the
Western area, 55% of the
landholding, they had a really big
series of interests to try and weigh
up. And they had voluntarily retired
a whole heap of their own land...
And so when grandparenting came
out, these guys were severely
penalized. There is no recognition
of those environmental benefits from
having already given. So you can
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understand why they are pretty
pissed off."

WO_neutral ecological
WO_Neu_lack of
changes

WO_neutral economic
WO_Neu_economic
impact

Not sure whether there is a
positive or negative impact on
water quality or other
environmental indicators at the
watershed scale

"The land use, land use change, in
the catchment, has been minor."

Perception that policy has had
neutral economic impacts

"But actually, well, I’ve personally
found it pretty easy, it hasn’t been
too bad at all. Most of the farms
down here are large Maori owned
blocks, and when I talk to the other
managers, they’ve pretty much found
the same thing. There’s a couple on
lower benchmarks that sort of get a
little bit - the farms were probably
not as developed, so that’s probably
limited how much they can develop
their farms. But in general, I don’t
think it has affected things too
much."

WO_neutral social
WO_Neu_acceptance

"But, you know, it’s something that
I’ve been involved with for 30 years
of farming and so it’s been a major
cost to farms definitely, which
everybody seems to have just – just
get on with it."
"Socially, some people who are
really unhappy have gone. Which is
good they've sold, probably still not
happy but they were able to exit.
Some of the angst around that was
that the trust stood on the market
and paid what private valuations,
but some of those people still say
that wasn't enough."

WO_Neu_well-being
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WO_Neu_fairness

Policy is both fair and unfair

"Everybody’s got to do their share.
Are they picking on us? No, I don’t
think so. Some people think they are,
but I think everyone’s gotta do their
part. I think there’s certainly been
room for improvement; I think it
runs you know. I only see something
no one’s – nothing’s gonna change."

WO_positive ecological
WO_Pos_land use
patterns

"I think there would be a lot more
dairy farms [without the policy],
particularly on Maori lands down
the bottom of the lake, which is just
beautiful land. There would have
been more development, yep. So, it
met its purpose. I think the lake is
improving too."
"I see the bigger farms – a lot of
them are doing cover crops where
they never did before."

WO_Pos_management
changes

"So – so, yeah, so, – but we want the
lake to get – to get better as well and
we – we – we think we’re seeing that
so there’s a – we – we do think there
is a balance in things, but – but then
the financial imperative sort of
seasonal; these are making some
good decisions anyway,
unfortunately."

WO_Pos_water quality

WO_positive economic
WO_Pos_farming
viability

"And that is one of the best thing that
has actually happened in this
catchment, is that we have, we can
trade effectively. So it doesn’t lock
someone in forever and gives people
flexibility and things like that. A lot
of people wouldn’t actually realize
that or use that or whatever, but that
is huge flexibility. You’ve got to have
that flexibility if you want to go
ahead."
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WO_Pos_financial

WO_positive social
WO_Pos_awareness

profit, payoff, funding,
reduced earnings, compliance,
property value, new revenue
streams including new
products, new markets,
diversification

"So for the Maori incorporations the
benefits were huge. They could take
capital out of land but they can't sell
it. So Maori land can't be sold. So
if it was me, I owned this land and I
couldn’t sell it and someone was
going to give me a whole lot of
money for that land and I owned it,
I'd have planted the whole thing in
trees...So it allowed them to release
capital out of their land holdings,
retain their land because they can't
sell it and then they’ve taken that
money out and my incorporation
have treated it as capital."

awareness of water quality,
farm dynamics and
environmental footprint

"Well, farmers have become aware
of the environmental impacts that
farming has on the waterways and
the lakes."
"So, yeah. Actually, I think that
probably the biggest plus out of it is
actually talking to your neighbor,
and working with your neighbor,
and seeing what they’re doing."
"Yes, I do, absolutely. I think we
have a workable proposition, a
workable nitrogen constraint."

WO_Pos_well-being

community involvement,
depression, community
members leaving

WO_Pos_fairness

perceived fairness of the
policy process/policy
outcomes

Recent nutrient
management behavior
Management change
M_change breed

M_reduced fertilizer

Change in animal stock, part
of the physical stock of the
farm, not something that can
be changed on a day to day
management basis.

changes in the application of
fertilizer timing and/or
amount, including manure
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"Basically, change the breed really.
As I say, they were very high
maintenance. We had dry seasons
and the following year they didn’t
perform very well. So we got a
hardier, bit more robust sheep on
board, but they don’t produce quite
as much, but they cost - the cost of
running them has dropped as well,
so - and that was to fit with putting
milking on it, sort of changed the
dynamics of the farm, so just that fit
with the whole system."
"Just, I suppose, I have changed
from putting the fertilizer on in the
autumn to putting it on in the spring.
Or late spring, probably, more than
early spring. Due to, probably, a
bigger loss would occur in the
autumn."

M_grazing off

Began or changed grazing off
of livestock, or wintering off,
including dairy support

M_increased fertilizer

increase in the application of
fertilizer

M_increased stocking
rate

M_pursue knowledge

Actively pursue knowledge to
better understand nutrient
dynamics (engage in research)

M_manure spreading

Changes in the application of
manure timing, amount or
pattern, also changes in
location of manure stacking

M_notill

Switch to no-till
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"What we've done instead of winter
cropping and wintering on the farm,
we've taken more animals off the
farm during the winter. It also
helped that the grasses that were
growing now provide feed over a
wider part of the season. But it's
both continual productivity
improvements that has come to help
in the situation."
"And then, in the last few years,
we’ve found that we haven’t really
had enough manure on the closer
fields, and it costs a lot more to get it
to the further fields, so the last few
years, we’ve been putting more
commercial fertilizer on the further
fields, and sometimes no manure,
and putting more of that manure on
the grass ground during the summer
and definitely putting more – or,
enough – on the corn ground that’s
close by."
"Yeah, chicken as well, so it's kind of
a quick background. I guess I'd say
also we've grown the flock a little bit
–"
"We've actively pursued knowledge
by engaging in research trials."
"I bought a manure truck, so I had to
do it myself, now. I’m gonna do –
rather than hiring somebody to come
in and mainly want the pit empty, so
just put it on as heavy as they can
put it on because they’re only
coming in once or twice a year.
Well, doing it myself, I’ll do it more
times per year, less each time, and
try to minimalize runoff and get on
when the land needs it. When the
land can use it. That way, absorption
is better and I’d like to hit it as soon
after cropping and pray for doing it
the day before a rain, that way it
gets incorporated in."
"Then, as for fields, the last few
years we've been – we've been kind
of experimenting with no till for
about 20 years, and probably six or
seven years ago we went halfway no
till and four years we got to 100
percent no till –"

M_nutrient management
plan

Began or revised a nutrient
management plan or overseer
plan

M_reduce feed inputs

Changes in purchased feed or
other inputs (non-fertilizer)

M_seeding or cropping

Began, changed or stopped
seeding varieties or cropping
patterns

M_soil sampling

Began or changed soil
sampling

M_stocking rate

Changed number of animal
units

Structural change
St_barn

Change or construct barns

St_biodigester

St_ buffers

"That was my first effort at writing
my NMP, yeah. We had a different
contractor doing it for us initially
the first year or two. Even back then,
we were already at $4,500.00,
$5,000.00 then and we didn’t have
the land base that we have now."
“Yeah we also bring in palm kernel
at this stage. Yeah we have cut down
- well we’re trying to do at the
moment because it is not worth
losing money on using it. "
"Yeah, yeah. We’re gonna seed
more, now. We always like our corn
but we used to plant 300 acres and
now we’re down to 180."
"Talking with USDA, I’m trying to
reseed to improve my pastures and
so I’ll be doing some soil testing. I
didn’t do that when I went to the
[nutrient management class], but I
will now just so that I better
understand."
"No, there’s no reduction in – well,
actually it did come with a reduction
in stocking rate as well. I think I’ve
mentioned that we reduced from
about 3.4 down to 2.9."
"Then we're actually building a barn
to bring these animals home because
that contract grade is – they're doing
a nice job raising them, but that's –
we can more than pay for a barn."
"[Q: When did you guys put in the
biodigester?] 2008... Yup. It was
something we decided to do."

Change or construct buffers or
setbacks on rivers, streams or
ditches
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"right, yeah, and some ditches and
with buffers I think was the last
project we did a while back was
maybe 30 feet and then they came
and planted trees and they help even
compensate us a small amount for
the land that we lost because our
fields did go right down to those
areas."

St_detainment bunds

Change or build detainment
berms to control flow of water,
slow flow of water and runoff
of nutrients

St_equipment

Purchase or change farming
equipment

St_fencing

Change or construct fences

St_leachate system

St_manure pit or pad

Change or construct manure
pit

St_milking parlor

change or construct milking
parlor
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"Obviously where we pug ground up
is another issue, we are always
conscious of that, but we've also put
in a lot of detainment berms, if you
can imagine this farm is elevated it's
got quite a big catchment and all the
water eventually is coming down
into the lake. It's going to get there
one way or the other. These
detainment berms, so far we have
done about seven with the regional
Council to reduce or to mitigate the
flow of water that comes through,
especially when we have these big
downpours."
"We have adopted the best
management practice advice in
terms of effluent and disposal. We
put in a new storage system. A
rubber-lined storage system. It – to
have best practice for effluent and
disposal. We brought new land
application irrigators to meet the
application requirement."
"We had to fence up the swamps
because there are some wetlands on
the backside of a couple of our fields
that we had to fence out. Water
quality. Like I said, it all makes
sense. It makes you more money in
the long run. Cows aren’t gonna
make milk standing in the mud."
"The biggest problem I have is we
have to put a leachate system in.
Ugh. It’s an $81,000.00 project,
which I don’t think is even needed
because our bunker are – well,
they’re 100 feet from the brook and
they’re 50 feet from the road."
"By getting manure on the land – we
put in a manure pit – by getting the
manure on the land, we went – our
tonnage of feed multiplied by four
times in two years, per acre. It’s
huge. That’s all money in your
pocket because you’re not
purchasing that extra feed."
"We’ve been going about eight or
nine years. Eight years, yeah. It
didn’t actually take that long, built a
shed, a purpose built milking shed
and pretty much within 12 months
we were producing milk."

St_stand-off pad

Change or construct stand-off
pad

St_tree planting

Plant trees to restore banks or
native bush (not pine
plantation - that is a system
change)
add or change culvert, put in
drains to divert water

St_water flow control
structures

System change
Sy_purchase or lease
land

Purchase new land for
agriculture within the policy
region

Sy_put land in
production

Sy_sale or lease of land

Sale of agricultural land

Sy_switch to higher
intensity

Transition to or from dairy,
sheep, beef, vegetable, other,
pine plantation, dairy support.
Note that many farms can be
multiple different farm
systems at once, and may take
up additional system types, for
example a dairy may retire
some land and plant a pine
plantation. Switch from
breeding operation to
purchasing stock included as
well, or reverse, switch from
purchasing to breeding
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"We still have no – on our own, we
put in a cement pad to feed the cows
on. We're still dealing with – we kind
of get a nice bedded pack built that's
dry, and then we get six inches of
snow on top of it –"
"Apart from fencing off gullies and
planting them in natives, rather than
productions trees, that’s about it."
"Some of our diversion water goes
through a culvert underneath this
pushway. I didn’t wanna pour
concrete there, so what I did is I
added onto the culvert on both sides
and just built it up, so now the dirt is
much higher than our concrete
pushway, and when she came back,
she said that was fine."
"Well, we just barely purchased
some more land. We’re up to 280
acres. We rent another 100 acres of
crop land."
"Then there was a white pine stand
that we wanted to cut and reclaim
for pasture and we wanted to clear
all that junk wood, and then we
wanted to drastically thin out the
hemlock out of the sugar
bush..."Yep, he gave me approval." I
said "Can we start?" "Yeah, go
ahead. Get started." We start. Clear
cut 20 acres here, and clear cut a
bunch here, and do a bunch of work,
and we only did, probably 25
percent of what we wanted to do –"
"So we decided after a lot of soulsearching that we would sell."
"Well, one would be put the sheep
milking unit on...So basically, we’ve
put that on and it has changed the
dynamics a little bit. And then we’ve
sort of intensified that area, the
sheep milking area, quite a bit.
Mainly with the sheep, but it hasn’t
changed our nutrient output a hell of
a lot, I don’t think."

Sy_switch to lower
intensity

Transition to or from dairy,
sheep, beef, vegetable, other,
pine plantation, dairy support.
Note that many farms can be
multiple different farm
systems at once, and may take
up additional system types, for
example a dairy may retire
some land and plant a pine
plantation. Switch from
breeding operation to
purchasing stock included as
well, or reverse, switch from
purchasing to breeding

"Really, since we went grass fed –
this is recent – we’ve had to – we’re
still trying to figure out how this is
changing our – last summer was the
first summer we were 100 percent
grass fed."

Figure 5-2. Network graph representing group mental model of Taupo farmers’ watershed socialecological system. The arrangement of nodes mimics the structure of the SES Framework in Figure
4-1 above. Color of node represents the category of node: driver nodes are orange (governance),
magenta (social, economic and political settings), yellow (resource system), cyan (actor), and pink
(resource system); behavior nodes are light blue (management), blue (structural) and navy (system);
watershed (WO) and individual (IO) outcomes nodes are red (negative), grey (neutral) and green
(positive).
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Figure 5-3. Taupo SES sub-category group mental model network.

Figure 5-4. Rotorua SES Category group mental model network
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Figure 5-5. Rotorua SES sub-category group mental model network

Figure 5-6. Vermont SES Category group mental model network
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Figure 5-7. Vermont SES sub-category group mental model network.
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Table 5-9. Driver node statistics by region in Driver-behavior sub-network. Rank reflects the descending rank of strength (high to low). The data
driving these ranks is from the Driver-behavior sub-network so ranks do not reflect influence on outcomes.
Taupo (n = 11)
Sub-category node
A_economics

Vermont (n = 16)
occurrence
probability
91%

rank
5

strength
21

Rotorua (n = 11)

degree
13

occurrence
probability
50%

rank
2

strength
25

degree
16

occurrence
probability
64%

rank
2

strength
49

degree
23

A_ethic

14

2

2

9%

6

17

15

38%

8

5

5

18%

A_flexibility

10

9

7

18%

9

8

8

13%

-

-

-

-

7

17

12

27%

10

4

3

13%

-

-

-

-

8

16

11

27%

11

3

3

6%

6

9

8

36%

A_past_experience

12

5

5

9%

10

4

3

13%

-

-

-

-

A_social_attributes

10

9

8

27%

12

2

2

6%

11

1

1

9%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

10

2

2

9%

G_farmer_group

12

5

3

27%

13

1

1

6%

-

-

-

-

G_gov_assistance

10

9

7

18%

1

74

25

88%

4

14

9

45%

G_ngos_or_other

11

7

7

9%

3

48

22

75%

6

9

8

36%

G_other_gov_policies

13

4

3

27%

10

4

4

13%

7

8

5

27%

G_water_quality_policy

1

88

28

100%

2

58

26

94%

1

42

25

100%

RS_ecological

5

31

18

45%

4

31

18

44%

3

17

15

55%

RS_farm_production

6

23

14

64%

6

17

13

31%

10

2

2

9%

RU_n_p_attributes

8

16

11

27%

12

2

2

6%

5

11

10

27%

S_c_market

9

11

7

18%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

S_demographic_shifts

-

-

-

-

13

1

1

6%

-

-

-

-

S_economics_and
_markets
S_industry_or
_consultant
S_n_market

4

40

18

82%

8

9

6

44%

8

5

5

9%

13

4

4

9%

10

4

4

6%

8

5

5

18%

3

42

18

82%

-

-

-

-

10

2

2

9%

-

-

-

-

7

15

13

19%

9

3

3

9%

A_leadership_or
_entrepreneur
A_lifestyle

A_technology

203

S_social_context

Note: The one letter prefix of the driver sub-category node name represents the overall driver category that the node belongs to: A = Actor, G = Governance, RS = Resource
System, RU = Resource Units, S = Social, economic and political setting.

Table 5-10. Drivers ranked by strength across each region. Note that data driving these ranks is from
the Driver-behavior sub-network so ranks do not reflect influence on outcomes. The one letter prefix
of the driver sub-category node name represents the overall driver category that the node belongs to.
Rank

Taupo

Vermont

1

G_water_quality_policy

G_gov_assistance

2

A_economics

G_water_quality_policy

3

S_n_market

G_ngos_or_other

4

S_economics_and_markets

RS_ecological

5

RS_ecological

A_economics

6

RS_farm_production

A_ethic

Rotorua
G_water_quality_policy
A_economics
RS_ecological
G_gov_assistance
RU_n_p_attributes
A_lifestyle

RS_farm_production
7

A_leadership_or_entrepreneur

S_social_context

8

A_lifestyle

S_economics_and_markets

G_ngos_or_other
G_other_gov_policies
A_ethic
S_economics_and_markets

RU_n_p_attributes

S_industry_or_consultant
9

S_c_market

A_flexibility

10

A_flexibility

A_leadership_or_entrepreneur

A_social_attributes

A_past_experience

G_gov_assistance

G_other_gov_policies

S_social_context
A_technology
RS_farm_production
S_n_market

S_industry_or_consultant
11

G_ngos_or_other

A_lifestyle

12

A_past_experience

A_social_attributes

G_farmer_group

RU_n_p_attributes

G_other_gov_policies

G_farmer_group

S_industry_or_consultant

S_demographic_shifts

13

14

A_ethic

204

A_social_attributes

Figure 5-8. Number of individual outcomes by region. Note for Taupo and Rotorua n = 11 and for
Vermont n = 16.
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